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ABSTRACT 
 
Ethnic Diplomacy: Race, the United States, and Mexico during 
World War II 
 
Jordan Lieser 
 
 
 This dissertation begins by framing the overall relationship between the United States 
and Mexico during World War II and recognizes the significant economic role Mexico played in 
the U.S. wartime industrialization.   With this framework in place, the emphasis of this research 
then turns to how Mexico pressured the United States government into addressing the racial 
prejudice which existed within the United States against what was perceived as a unified Latin 
American ethnic group.  Thanks to the increased importance of Mexico, multiple parts of the 
United States government including the State Department, the Office of the Coordinator of 
Inter-American Affairs, the state government of Texas, and the state government of California 
all participated in what the author terms as “ethnic diplomacy.”  Ethnic diplomacy is a 
categorical delineation of diplomacy which emphasizes why different diplomacy occurred 
instead of the format of the diplomacy.  In this case, the United States government actively 
sought to end racial prejudice in the American Southwest and beyond in the hope to remain 
“Good Neighbors” with Mexico at a time of global crisis when they could not afford otherwise. 
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Snow White and the Seven Dwarves, Pinocchio, Fantasia, Dumbo, and Bambi.  
As pretty much every U.S. Citizen—and I dare say a significant percentage of the world 
population—knows these are all Walt Disney animated feature films.   To be precise, 
these are the first five feature films from the Walt Disney Company, which today are 
ingrained into American culture; however, what is more interesting about this list are 
numbers six and seven.  While these next two were popular in their own time, only 
“disneyphiles” really remember Saludos Amigos and The Three Caballeros today.  
Evidence of the first five film’s status as more successful than these two is found in their 
lack of subsequent attention.  All of the first five had either a proposed sequel, a soon to 
be made sequel, or a finished sequel before these two films were even released on 
VHS or DVD home video in 2000.  The reality is that Saludos and Caballeros represent 
a drastic divergence in Disney’s animated films by emphasizing Latin American nations.   
Walt Disney and his wartime films were part of a broader movement that 
promoted better relations under the guise of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
Good Neighbor Policy.  Disney was cooperating with the Office of the Coordinator of 
Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA, see chapter five), specifically their Motion Picture 
Division.   The Division had a very specific set of objectives:  
1) Increase the number of features, shots, and newsreels about the United 
States and the “other Americas” to distribute throughout the hemisphere. 
2) Stimulate and produce pictures made in the other Americas to show in the 
United States. 
3) Eliminate Axis-sponsored productions in the hemisphere. 
4) Stop producing films that offend the other Americas. 
5) Stop distributing films that “create a bad impression of the United States and 
our way of life.”1 
                                                           
1 United States. Office of Inter-American Affairs., History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American 
Affairs, Historical reports on war administration (Washington,: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1947). 
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By November of 1941, the Division had earned commitments from “all major 
companies…to produce a minimum of 24 hemispherical shorts for theatrical release in 
addition to specifically designed travelogues.”  Within two years, the actual number of 
shorts produced in this category was 61, including titles such as “Viva Mexico,” 
“Highway to Friendship,” “Gaucho Sports,” “Madero of Mexico,” and “Cuba, Land of 
Romance and Adventure.”  According to the Official History of the OCIAA written in 
1947, “Mr. Disney was held to be one of the most effective in the field.”  The Division 
even funded a trip through some American Republics for Disney and his staff—known 
as El Grupo—which directly resulted in Saludos Amigos and a number of shorts.  Future 
contracts between Disney and the OCIAA followed, resulting in The Three Caballeros 
and a number of other animated works.  Walt Disney had become a major player in 
improving hemispherical relations and the story of ethnic diplomacy goes a long way in 
explaining why Walt Disney ever looked south of the border. 
“Ethnic diplomacy” is a straight forward concept.  It is defined as all forms and 
styles of diplomacy—including cultural, public, or traditional—conducted with the intent 
of combating racial discrimination against a perceived ethnic group.  The case 
described in this work, titled as Ethnic Diplomacy, originated in the State Department 
during World War II.2  The State Department and eventually a much wider network of 
individuals, groups, and layers of government, strived to maintain harmonious, or at 
least non-confrontational, relations with its “neighbors” to the south in Latin America, 
                                                           
2 Note on usage: When Ethnic Diplomacy is italicized it is referring to the dissertation as a whole, when Ethnic 
diplomacy is left without italicization it is referring to the concept as defined here. 
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particularly Mexico, by preventing acts of racial discrimination against Latin Americans 
within their own borders.3 
The standard narrative of the U.S. in World War II typically does not include 
ethnic diplomacy or typically even Latin America.  Instead, the emphasis is always on 
the European theatre, the Pacific theatre, and the mass industrialization and 
cooperative efforts on the home front.  In some of the more recent World War II 
scholarship, these discussions have been expanded somewhat to include topics such 
as the Women’s Army Corps, dissent on the home front, and controversial troop 
behaviors such as sexually transmitted diseases and prostitution.  Even with this 
historiographical growth, Latin America largely remains out of the discussion with the 
exception of the harboring of Nazis in South America and the infamous historical fallacy 
that Hitler absconded to Argentina rather than committing suicide.  Interestingly, the 
statistics tell us to think otherwise.  The first notable number is the troop deployments in 
the early part of the war.  While the bulk of the soldiers ended up in the classic theatres 
mentioned above, 19 different deployments sent troops to Latin America: The Bahamas, 
Haiti, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Curacao, Antigua, St. Lucia, Jamaica, Aruba, British Guiana, 
Brazil, Chile, Peru, Guatemala, Galapagos, Venezuela, Trinidad, Ecuador, and 
Suriname all had separate deployments.4   
U.S. government funds also flowed freely to Latin America.  While aid came in 
many forms, such as approximately $90 million via the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
                                                           
3 Ethnic diplomacy is a term coined by the author.  Typically, diplomacy is categorized by the form it takes: 
traditional, cultural, public, or back-channel.  In this way, I am attempting to emphasize the purpose of the 
diplomacy rather than the form it takes. 
4 Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1941 – June 30, 1943 to the Secretary of 
War. Original Source from the Center of Military History. Hyperwar Foundation. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/.  
Bermuda also had a deployment, but it is considered an Oceanic Island rather than part of Latin America. 
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American Affairs, the famous Lend-Lease program had a noticeable presence in Latin 
America.5  Half (19 out of the 38 countries) supported by this aid program were located 
in Latin America (see Table 1).  While only 1% of the total money of Lend-Lease went to 
Latin America, it still represented $455,722,281.45 going towards the defense of the 
Western Hemisphere—a place where there was not any significant military action.  The 
primary reason the money was provided was to allow Latin American nations to 
purchase American weapons.  Up until the onset of World War II, Latin America had 
been shut out of purchasing U.S. arms legally.  Beginning in 1939, loopholes were used 
to supply Latin American governments with surplus munitions to both protect 
themselves against fascism and maintain control over their own countries.  FDR himself 
approved a Liaison Committee (War and State Departments) decision to provide aid to 
specific Latin American nations for the following reasons:  
a. For arming the countries named to the extent indicated, as determined in each 
case by our estimate of their requirements: 
(1) (a) Brazil-To insure her ability to defend herself against a major attack from 
neighboring states, or from overseas, and against internal disorder, until U. S. 
armed aid can arrive in sufficient force to insure success. 
(b) Mexico-To insure her ability to defend herself against any probable attack 
from overseas, and against internal disorder, until U.S. armed aid can arrive in 
sufficient force to insure success. 
(2) Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela-To insure their ability to meet and repel 
any probable minor attack from overseas and to insure their internal stability. 
(3) Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, 
Haiti, and the Dominican Republic-To insure internal stability. 
                                                           
5The Lend-Lease Act, officially known as An Act to Further Promote the Defense of the United States, was in effect 
from March 1941 until August 1945 and allowed for substantial financial support to allied countries. 
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(4) Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Peru-To be determined 
after requirements for the other republics have been computed and plans to 
supply them have been approved. 
b. For providing these arms on financial terms these Republics can meet. 
c. For assistance in the matter of military, naval, and industrial personnel. 
d. For adjusting the economic relations between the United States and Latin 
American states to insure the latter's political cooperation. Financial 
arrangements to accomplish this adjustment should be made on the basis of 
accepting the loss as a proper charge against our National defense.6 
 
Once Lend-Lease became official policy, Latin American aid for the sake of arms 
sales went under the new system and saw multiple disbursements.  Brazil’s 
extraordinary large number stands out noticeably.  This can be explained only in part by 
these arms sales.  Between 1943 and 1945 Brazil dedicated over 25,000 men and 
women soldiers to the European Theatre, a group known as the Brazilian Expeditionary 
Force.  These troops required huge increases in the amount of U.S. dollars flowing to 
Brazil, ultimately pushing them up to the fifth largest recipient of U.S. aid during World 
War II.  Their lack of military preparedness before the war coupled with Brazil’s close 
geographic proximity to the fighting in Europe made the Brazilian government 
particularly concerned about their defenses.  At almost every diplomatic meeting where  
                                                           
6  Proposed National Policy Re: Supply of Arms to American Republics, 27 July 1940, and General Marshall's 
pencil notation thereon, indicating the President's approval, WPD 4244-10 as cited in Stetson Conn and Byron 
Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere 
(Washington,: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1960). 
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TABLE 1: 
Country 
 
Amount of Lend-
Lease Aid in USD 
 
Country 
 
Amount of 
Lend-Lease Aid 
in USD 
British Empire 31,267,240,530.63 Liberia 6,408,240.13 
Soviet Union 11,260,343,603.02 Cuba 5,739,133.33 
France 3,207,608,188.75 Bolivia 5,633,989.02 
China 1,548,794,965.99 Ethiopia 5,151,163.25 
Brazil 355,545,226.43 Iran 4,795,092.50 
The 
Netherlands 
230,127,717.63 Iceland 4,795,027.90 
Belgium 148,394,457.76 Venezuela 4,336,079.35 
Greece 75,475,880.30 Paraguay 1,933,302.00 
Norway 51,524,124.36 Guatemala 1,819,403.19 
Mexico 36,287,010.67 Dominican 
Republic 
1,610,590.38 
Yugoslavia 32,026,355.58 Haiti 1,449,096.40 
Turkey 26,640,031.50 Egypt 1,019,169.14 
Chile 21,817,478.16 El Salvador 892,358.28 
Peru 18,525,771.19 Nicaragua 872,841.73 
Saudi Arabia 17,417,878.70 Honduras 732,358.11 
Poland 16,934,163.60 Czechoslovakia 413,398.78 
Colombia 7,809,732.58 Costa Rica 155,022.73 
Uruguay 7,148,610.13 Panama 83,555.92 
Ecuador 7,063,079.96 Iraq 4,144.14 
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the Brazilians met with the U.S., hemispheric defenses (especially anti-aircraft 
installations) were a priority issue.  This point ultimately brought  the United States and 
Brazil close together diplomatically; whereas, the other two “ABC” powers, Argentina 
and Chilé, preferred to stand their diplomatic ground with more fervor. 
 A lot of resources were dedicated to Latin America during the war, Disney films, 
weapons, and hundreds of millions of dollars are really just the tip of the iceberg. With 
these facts in hand, an important question is raised, why were these resources 
committed to the only populated continent on earth not seeing immense violence from 
fascist aggression?  A section of a very lengthy letter from the U.S. Ambassador to 
Mexico, “40-page George” Messersmith, to President Franklin Roosevelt sheds light on 
this purpose as he describes an interesting new problem occurring in Mexico in the 
middle of the war. 
….As a result of the programs of various agencies of our Government interested 
in the procurement of strategic agricultural products, in this case particularly oil-
bearing seeds, we have entered into a number of agreements with Mexico for the 
production of such oil-bearing seeds.  As a result, the farmers in the lowlands, 
which, as you know are in the more tropical areas in Mexico, and where they can 
raise three crops of corn in a year on one piece of ground, have already turned a 
good part of their corn land into oil-bearing seed crops.  They do this because the 
returns are much better from such oil-bearing seeds than from corn.  The result is 
that there is already a serious shortage of corn…. Mexico’s program of 
production of strategic materials in which we are so much interested for war 
purposes, is going to be seriously endangered if this primary food problem which 
is confined to corn, cannot be met….  You may be sure that I would not bring this 
matter to your attention if it were not a matter of primary importance and I have 
the deep conviction that it is just as important in some ways for us as it is for the 
Mexicans that the economic and political order now so happily prevailing in 
Mexico should be maintained.  You know what can happen when people get 
hungry, and you know that such things can happen more easily in Mexico than in 
some other places.7 
                                                           
7 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume VI, Part 2, The American Republics, 1943, (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1965), Document 75. P 432-435. 
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 As most of the histories of Mexico argue, the early 1940s was a time of 
industrialization in much of the country—often compared to the Porfiriato 
modernization.8  This economic conversion was so extreme that by 1943 the country 
most associated with maize was not making enough to feed even itself.  With the lost 
access to East Asian resources from Japan’s aggressive imperialism, Latin America 
became the only outside region available to support U.S. production.  In response to the 
loss of East Asia, the National Industrial Conference Board discussed what “essential 
resources” were available in every Latin American nation.  They included oil, lead, gold, 
silver, wood, zinc, vegetables, sugar, coffee, bauxite, rice, nuts, rubber, cacao, cotton, 
iron ore, manganese, diamonds, tungsten, platinum, emeralds, quinine, nitrate, copper, 
coal, guano, tropical produce, cattle, hogs, sheep, hardwoods, and bananas.  Oil and 
rubber proved to be in particularly large demand; interestingly, the bulk of the oil came 
from Mexico and the best Latin American source for rubber was the interior of Brazil.  
Unfortunately, this significant contribution of raw materials to the Allied War effort from 
Latin America during World War II has not been systematically investigated by 
historians 
 The importance of Latin America during World War II was tantamount for two 
basic reasons: hemispheric security—which the U.S. needed to insure in order to 
execute a two front war—and raw materials for production.  In an odd turn in diplomatic 
affairs, this “need” for Latin American resources, which also included its people as farm 
                                                           
8 The Porfiriato was the period that Porfirio Diaz ruled as dictator of Mexico, 1876-1911.  While the economy 
declined during certain periods, a general export-led economy resulted in a major building up of infrastructure, 
urbanization, and general modernization orchestrated by a cooperation between foreigners (mainly the United 
States) and Diaz’s administration.  For more on Diaz or the economics of the Porfiriato see Robert Phillip Case, 
"The Path to Personal Power: The First Administration of Porfirio Diaz, 1876-1880" (Dissertation, Northern Illinois 
University, 1973).  Michael Johns, The City of Mexico in the Age of Díaz, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1997). 
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laborers, gave these nations negotiating power that had never been realized previously.  
Most of the Latin American Republics were long since on the wrong side of a colonial or 
neocolonial relationship up until this window of diplomatic opportunity.  Specifically, they 
suffered from problems associated with monoculture when the prices of their exports 
dramatically fell.   The conservative governments of Latin America were enjoying the 
benefits of wartime United States trade and foreign aid and never petitioned the U.S. 
government to change its economic policies; however, some of them—mainly Mexico—
proved willing to utilize their newfound negotiating power.  The primary way that this 
leverage was pressed was in terms of pushing for racial equality.  Mexico—and 
occasionally other Latin American nations—petitioned the U.S. government at the local, 
state, and federal levels to correct the racial inequality within the United States itself.  In 
the years leading up to war this message fell on deaf ears; however, beginning in 1941 
the United States government was motivated to curb what most people would 
categorize as discrimination due to Latin America’s importance both for hemispherical 
security and raw materials to feed the U.S. industrial war machine. 
These claims, as admitted by the State Department itself, were typically and 
sadly fair representations of racism in the United States.  The reality at the time—and 
sadly even still to this day—was that some Americans segregated, disrespected, and 
committed hate crimes against people based upon their appearance.  This type of 
behavior is traditionally viewed as racial discrimination; whereas, people reveal their 
prejudices based on a social construct of racial categories defined by physical 
appearances.   The U.S government’s actions in response to Mexican protests included 
cultural goodwill events, a crackdown on public incidents of discrimination, the creation 
11 
 
of new bureaucracies, and even state level legislation were all part of a plan to win the 
favor of Latin American nations—especially neighboring Mexico—and prevent their own 
Latin American minority groups from interrupting wartime cooperation.  The United 
States was targeting discrimination against a large ethnic group, any person from any 
Latin American nation, in order to appease Mexico and by extension the rest of Latin 
America during World War II.  In reality, this targeted group consisted of an array of 
different racial categories; therefore, while the discrimination was “racial” in its practice, 
this diplomacy was “ethnic” in its design.   
The concept of an ethnically targeted diplomacy exists only by standing on the 
shoulders of a wide array of quality scholarly work.  This work, at the most basic level, 
fits within the historiography of U.S. foreign policy and race—a recent field that has 
existed for less than two decades.  The work produced thus far is insightful, but as a 
whole it is limited to two categories: American prejudices from within American 
government affecting foreign policy decisions and American prejudices from outside 
American government affecting foreign policy decisions.  The within category has been 
discussed more frequently by historians; most notable from this group is Michael Hunt’s 
Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy.9  Hunt’s highly acclaimed book covers a handful of 
different ideological tenets evident in U.S. foreign policy.  Concerning race, he points 
out that from its inception the United States has implemented its policies, both general 
and foreign, with an understanding that Anglo-Saxons were superior to all other races.10  
A more narrowly focused work is Michael Krenn’s The Color of Empire, which discusses 
with more detail the role that race and racism play, “both consciously and 
                                                           
9 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy  (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009). 
10 Ibid., p 91. 
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subconsciously,” in policy making.11  The concept of utilizing race as a lens into 
understanding U.S. foreign policy, as defined by Hunt and Krenn, is extraordinarily 
insightful and includes a number of other adherents.12  For the outside category of race 
related diplomacy, the field is well represented by Brenda Gayle Plummer and Mary 
Dudziak.  Plummer’s two most well-known books are Rising Wind: Black Americans and 
U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (1996), which discusses the interests of African-
Americans in foreign affairs, and Windows on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign 
Affairs, 1945-1988 (2003), a compilation work which she edited and contributed to 
addressing a range of topics.13  Dudziak, who was a contributor to Windows on 
Freedom, published Cold War Civil Rights in 2000, and is perhaps the best example of 
how racism from outside the Washington establishment can influence foreign policy.  
Her argument focuses on the connections between Cold War politics and the relative 
successes of the Civil Rights Movement in the post-war period.  Ethnic Diplomacy aims 
to stake new ground in a newly developing historiography by analyzing the race and the 
U.S.-Mexico relationship during World War II. 
Ethnic Diplomacy in some ways also overlaps with the emerging historiography 
which discusses public diplomacy; in particular, chapter five covering the Office of the 
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs delves into this section of international relations 
                                                           
11 Michael L. Krenn, The Color of Empire : Race and American Foreign Relations, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C.: 
Potomac Books, 2006).  Krenn’s work is cleverly separated into different four content chapters, “White,” “Brown,” 
“Yellow,” and “Black.”  He discusses, in detail, how a racially centered ideology has affected U.S. foreign policy 
around the world, even bringing his thesis to include the War on Terror. 
12 Some examples include: Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government : Race, Empire, the United States, and the 
Philippines  (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). Kramer’s book argues that Americans used a 
racial justification for Empire after taking the Philippines in the Spanish-American War.; George White, Holding the 
line : Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy toward Africa, 1953-1961  (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2005); Michael L. Krenn, Race and U.S. Foreign Policy from 1900 through World War II  (New York: 
Garland Pub., 1998). 
13 Brenda Gayle Plummer, Window on Freedom : Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988  (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Rising Wind : Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960  
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).  Krenn was one of the contributors to Window on Freedom. 
13 
 
history.  The first works in this area cover exclusively what the authors’ call “Cultural 
Diplomacy,” most notable among them for the United States in the twentieth century is 
Culture and Diplomacy by Morrell Heald and Lawrence Kaplan.  This work emphasizes 
the intellectual context of culture and diplomacy, while a few years later a more 
comprehensive work by Frank A. Ninkovich entitled The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. 
Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations expanded the discussion to include Bureaucratic-
Cultural relations and what he classifies as the “merchants” of atomic-age cultural 
diplomacy. In reality, these early cultural diplomacy accounts also discussed “public 
diplomacy,” but it was not until more recently when a few scholars have differentiated 
the two forms of diplomacy.  Richard T. Arndt’s The First Resort of Kings distinguishes 
the two, stating how public diplomacy is more of a public relations campaign than 
cultural diplomacy (he later advocates for a return to cultural diplomacy).14  Another 
work which focuses on the Cold War, Practicing Public Diplomacy by Yale Richmond, 
simplifies the definition by arguing that public diplomacy is when an agency directly 
communicates with a population from a foreign nation rather than through diplomats.  A 
quality contribution to the field in 2013, Empire of Ideas by Justin Hart, does not 
differentiate cultural from public diplomacy.  Instead he argues that its origins can be 
traced to FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy.  Ethnic Diplomacy fits within this larger 
historiography of cultural and public diplomacy; in fact, many of the actions included in 
this study are examples of cultural or public diplomacy techniques.  One could make the 
case that the United States targeted its own population for a form of internalized public 
diplomacy under the umbrella of Ethnic Diplomacy. The main distinguishing difference is 
                                                           
14A similar argument is found in Nicholas John Cull, The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency 
: American Public Diplomacy, 1989-2001  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
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that Ethnic Diplomacy is less concerned about the classification of diplomacy strategy 
and instead uses the justification behind the cultural, public, and even traditional 
diplomacy as a form of categorization. 
While historians have approached race and foreign policy together previously, 
the specific U.S. government intervention against racial prejudices on behalf of 
Mexican-Americans during World War II is unchartered territory for historians.  That 
being said, scholars have separately analyzed both the U.S.-Mexican relationship and 
racial prejudices against Mexican-Americans during World War II.   
The vast majority of scholars who have studied U.S.-Mexico relations during the 
war years do so with a broader scope, analyzing U.S.-Latin America relations in whole.  
These authors discuss the extent of U.S. intervention, the role of the Good Neighbor 
Policy, and the economic ties between the United States and most of Latin America 
during the conflict.15  One survey from this category concluded that the wartime era was 
a period where, “Washington aggressively worked in conjunction with the Latin 
Americans to protect its interests.”16  In this case, “its interests” refers to the U.S.—and 
many other Latin American nations—desire to keep Germany out of the French, Danish, 
and Dutch American holdings.  For instance, the Mexican newspaper El Universal 
commented on the “Spirit of Solidarity” shortly after Pearl Harbor on its front page.17  In 
addition, the United States wanted to maintain some form of its regional hegemony 
                                                           
15 Thomas M. Leonard and John F. Bratzel, Latin America during World War II, Jaguar books on Latin America 
series (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 
16 Kyle Longley, In the Eagle's Shadow : the United States and Latin America  (Wheeling, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 
2002). p 178.  In this case, “Washington” refers to the American political establishment as a whole—for foreign 
policy, the President, State Department, advisors, non-governmental organizations, military, etc.  It is assumed by 
the author that Washington itself is not a consensus decision maker and itself represents a number of separate 
viewpoints; however, for the sake of understanding U.S. policy with Latin American with some notion of brevity, a 
unified “Washington” is acceptable terminology. 
17 "Espiritu de Solidaridad," El Universal, Janaury 9 1942. 
15 
 
through the continuation of “economic assistance and programs such as the Inter-
American Highway linking markets and providing means of transferring troops and 
supplies.”18   Another work declares, “The crowning achievement of Roosevelt’s Good 
Neighbor policy was hemispheric solidarity during World War II.”19    These books are 
representative of a range of scholarship which generally agrees that during the war 
years, Mexico and the United States had a positive relationship.  However, these works 
are also quick to point out that while relations were good; the United States during the 
war years wanted something more than just “good neighbor” status.  The primary 
objective of the United States-Latin America relations during the war was ensuring 
hemispherical solidarity.  The disparity from previous administrations is that Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR) administration attempted to ensure that Latin America had 
pro-U.S. governments while still operating under The Good Neighbor Policy—which 
meant their classic interventionist and interference toolsets were unavailable.20  The 
U.S. instead turned to new methods, particularly cultural diplomatic methods, economic 
strength and diplomatic persuasion.  It was these “new tactics in response to changing 
circumstances” that allowed for a unique new federal strategy to combat racial 
prejudices in the Southwestern United States.21 
Several scholars interested in U.S.-Latin American relations have addressed the 
World War II period specifically in terms of cultural diplomacy.  Monica Rankin in her 
book Mexico, La Patria: Propaganda and Production during World War II, discusses the 
                                                           
18 Ibid. 
19 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle : Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
20 The United States has a long history of interventionism in Latin America.  Some of the more studied examples 
include William Walker and the filibusters, Teddy Roosevelt’s Gunboat Diplomacy and his corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine, the dollar diplomacy of Howard Taft, and Wilson’s interventions in Mexico. 
21 Ibid, p 87. 
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comprehensive propaganda campaigns in Mexico from both the Mexican government 
itself and external groups—with a special emphasis on the United States propaganda 
coming from the OCIAA—and  relates it to the aggressive industrialization happening 
under the Camacho administration.  The other important work in this area is American’s 
All by Darlene J. Sadlier.  She takes an in-depth look of the OCIAA and it’s cultural 
diplomacy strategy across Latin America in her study of FDR’s hemispherical solidarity.  
Of all the works that discuss U.S.-Latin American relations, these two proved most 
valuable in the contextual framing of Ethnic Diplomacy, placing the racial-prejudice 
targeted diplomacy into its larger context. 
An entirely different historiography addresses the civil rights struggles of 
Mexican-Americans before, during, and after the war.   Many scholars have emphasized 
the importance of World War II as a key factor in curtailing racism between Mexican-
Americans and the rest of the population.  One scholar noted, “As part of their [the U.S. 
Government’s] effort to unite and motivate all Americans, officials ‘discovered’ Mexican 
Americans.”22  For the most part, these works focus strictly on the local level of the 
struggle.23  There are a couple of notable exceptions in this field.  Both Emilio Zamora’s 
Claiming Rights and Righting Wrongs in Texas and Neil Foley’s Mexicans in the Making 
of America dedicate about a chapter which relate the Mexican-American Civil Rights 
                                                           
22 Richard Griswold del Castillo, World War II and Mexican American Civil Rights, 1st ed. (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2008). p 3. 
23 See Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodriguez, Decade of Betrayal : Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s, 
Rev. ed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006).; Michelle Hall Kells, Héctor P. García : everyday 
rhetoric and Mexican American civil rights  (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2006).; Maggie Rivas-
Rodriguez, Mexican Americans & World War II, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005). 
  Also, it is important to point out that the idea of diplomacy affecting race relations at home is not an entirely new 
enterprise for historians.  Mary Dudziak’s benchmark work, Cold War, Civil Rights, discusses the interplay between 
Cold War Foreign Policy and the impact it had on the Civil Rights Movement.  Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War civil 
rights : race and the image of American democracy, Politics and society in twentieth-century America (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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movement to the Good Neighbor Policy.24  This work attempts to exist as a bridge 
between these two well-developed historiographies by establishing itself among the 
relatively new categorical field that analyzes race and its relationship to foreign policy.   
The existence of ethnic diplomacy is significant in the way World War II is 
understood.  The patriotic pride and success that is often associated with the memory of 
World War II was only possible with good diplomatic relationships with our Latin 
American neighbors.25  It is also an interesting case to see how, when, and to what 
extent the United States government chose to act against racial discrimination. 
It is tempting to utilize the common simile and say the story of Ethnic Diplomacy 
is like an onion, multi-layered and could possibly make you cry.  While this comparison 
can be used to an extent, an even better description for ethnic diplomacy is much 
simpler: lower-case “d” diplomacy.  It is a case-study of how people from different 
nations dealt with one another in terms of race.  In order to best analyze ethnic 
diplomacy, I have utilized separate chapters to emphasize the different elements of 
ethnic diplomacy. 
The first chapter, just like the ethnic diplomacy definition describes it, is about 
people.  Specifically, it covers the major personalities that were involved with the 
crafting of ethnic diplomacy policy.  In this case, “personalities” has a dual meaning of 
both a group of people and interesting character traits.  These people, their personal 
lives and beliefs setup an important framework for a greater understanding of ethnic 
                                                           
24 Neil Foley, Mexicans in the Making of America  (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2014); Emilio Zamora, 
Claiming Rights and Righting Wrongs in Texas : Mexican Workers and Job Politics during World War II, 1st ed., 
Rio Grande/Río Bravo (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009). 
25 Jordan Patrick Lieser and George Cotkin. Modern America's Greatest Memory: The World War II Renaissance 
and the Construction of the Greatest Generation Collective Memory: Thesis. [San Luis Obispo, Calif.: California 
Polytechnic State University]. 2008. 
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diplomacy.  Chapter two shifts to the development of State Department policy and 
examines where, when, and how ethnic diplomacy began. 
Chapters three and four represent an interesting turn in the history of ethnic 
diplomacy.  As I was conducting my archival research at the national level of 
government, I noticed that many of the policies behind ethnic diplomacy were created, 
ignored, or enforced at the state level.  What resulted were interesting cases where U.S. 
foreign policy was being determined by state governments.  Texas and California, 
respectively, serve as two different examples of this unusual situation. 
Chapter five shifts focus to cover an essential, yet somewhat separate area of 
U.S.-Latin American relations.  The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs 
overlapped with the State Department, Texas, and California as they practiced ethnic 
diplomacy; however, it also covered a much broader area of US-Latin American 
relations.  In this chapter, I tackle the broader organization, but give special attention to 
the primarily cultural and public diplomacy elements that coincided with ethnic 
diplomacy. 
In the final chapter, I consider Mexico’s role in the enactment of ethnic 
diplomacy, the political environment of Mexico during World War II, and the long term 
impacts of these policies on both nations.  Since ethnic diplomacy is indeed diplomacy 
between multiple nations, Mexico’s half of ethnic diplomacy and contextual World War II 
history provides a vital part of the overall analysis and also helps explain ethnic 
diplomacies limitations. 
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In the conclusion, everything is brought together for an overall analysis of the 
impact and importance of Ethnic Diplomacy.  Here, I consider its implications into 
multiple fields of history and interdisciplinary connections.  
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Chapter 1: The Framework of Ethnic 
Diplomacy 
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Paul Harvey’s famous radio signoff, “And now you know the rest of the story,” is 
a fitting statement to understand the history surrounding Ethnic Diplomacy.  The 
willingness of the State Department—or any government body in the 1940s—to actively 
seek to combat racial prejudices of any kind is unheard of at this point in U.S. history; 
therefore, the environment in which ethnic diplomacy existed is perhaps as important as 
the story of ethnic diplomacy itself.    As with other case studies, knowing the relevant 
historiography and historical context makes it a more useful historical example.  Ethnic 
diplomacy first and foremost fits within the larger history of the Good Neighbor Policy.  
While ethnic diplomacy is new ground in international relations, the Good Neighbor 
Policy has been thoroughly explored by historians.  Standing on the intellectual 
shoulders of these great scholars, ethnic diplomacy can be situated within this larger 
history.  In addition, the time period that ethnic diplomacy operated within was 
instrumental in its existence.  World War II changed both the international and national 
priorities of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s administration.  FDR even famously quipped, 
“Dr. New Deal” has become “Dr. Win the War.”  The reality was simply that political 
priorities had changed due to the international conflicts.  Specifically relevant for ethnic 
diplomacy was the changing Mexico-U.S. relationship and government’s response to 
racial discrimination on the home front.  The final important contextual element is a 
bureaucratic argument: Ethnic diplomacy was created by a group of people, not crafted 
in a single resolution nor officially announced.  Due to the loose nature of its 
implementation, the figures behind its inspiration and creation are vital to understanding 
why it was presented in the manner in which it was.  Ethnic diplomacy was possible due 
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to a window of opportunity framed by a series of unique circumstances: The Good 
Neighbor Policy, World War II, FDR and his staff.26 
 
The Good Neighbor Policy 
The first and most vital of these framed circumstances for ethnic diplomacy is the 
Good Neighbor Policy: a vague policy premise which promised Latin Americans that the 
United States would be better neighbors, predominantly through non-interventionism.  
Since the 1950s historians have thoroughly discussed the depths of the overarching 
program which dictated the administration’s approach to Latin American relations for 
over a decade.  The study began when Donald Dozer introduced the simple question: 
“are we good neighbors?” and attributed the Good Neighbor Policy changes to a set of 
circumstances in the Roosevelt Administration.27  Most modern readers of this 1959 
book conclude that “We were no better neighbors than we had to be” under FDR.28  
After Dover broke the ground, the historiography next turned to a number of excellent 
analytical approaches which focused on the motivations behind the policy changes 
while still telling the story itself.  This group is highlighted by scholars such as David 
Green, Lloyd Gardener, Samuel Flagg Bemis, and David Lloyd Mecham.  These 
                                                           
26 It is more than a fair argument to suggest that Avila Camacho and his administration should be added to this list.  
Ethnic diplomacy is obviously a form of two-way diplomacy, to best facilitate this discussion the relevant context of 
the Camacho administration is saved for chapter six. 
27 This was counter to many who credited the origins of The Good Neighbor Program to President Herbert Hoover.  
Those that side with Hoover as the originator of the policy credit him inventing the he helped settled the Tacna-
Arica boundary dispute between Peru and Chile.  It was here that he reportedly mentioned being a “good neighbor.”  
Secondly, his administration publicly adopted the Clark Memorandum  in 1930 which drew back on the Roosevelt 
Corollary which clarified that its purpose was for the United States standing against European intervention, not Latin 
America. 
28 Frederick Pike, FDR's Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos  (Austin, Texas: University 
of Texas Press, 1995). 
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historians created a historiographical dichotomy questioning the motivation behind the 
program: economics vs. security.   
Green and Gardener emphasized an economic strategy behind Good 
Neighborism; whereas, arguing that the reasoning behind the friendly front was simply a 
method of continuing (and actually expanding) Latin America as an ideal region for U.S. 
investors.  Their economic argument fits into the broader spectrum of U.S. foreign 
relations historiography personified by renowned historians William Appleman Williams 
and Walter LeFeber.  Frederick Pike, in FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of 
Generally Gentle Chaos, argues that this section of the historiography can be expanded 
to also include “more ideologically rigid historians, some of whom are Marxists of one 
stripe or another.”  The radicals he refers to have argued that FDR’s policies were 
actually a continuation of the United States’ capitalist goals to completely dominant the 
hemisphere and to make certain Latin America fit into the larger exploitative American 
empire.29 
Bemis, Mecham, and Dana G. Munro best represent the security side of the 
dichotomy.  They collectively emphasize the U.S. priority towards protecting U.S. 
interests.  These scholars argue that Good Neighborism was a means to protect U.S. 
businesses, American owned land, and—perhaps most importantly—their access to 
agricultural and mineral resources in Latin America.  From looking at the entire 
historiography, there is an obvious overlap between these security and economic 
interests in Latin America.  Since the two are so “intimately intertwined” when it comes 
                                                           
29 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 50th anniversary ed. (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 2009); Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions : the United States in Central America, 2nd ed. (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1993).  
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to the U.S.’s interests in the Western Hemisphere, it is no surprise that over time a 
synthesis occurred from the two canonical schools.30 
Authors such as Fredrick Pike and Hans Morgenthau were the first to marry the 
two concerns together with a more pragmatic understanding of policymaker actions.31  
Pike himself labeled this the realpolitik school of diplomatic history. They argue that a 
nation should make military and economic strength their priority.  However, having the 
ability to express this power does not mean that exerting it upon a neighbor will result in 
the desired outcome.  In other words, realpolitik adherents still argue that power comes 
from traditional sources (military and economic), but how that power is utilized is 
perhaps more important.  Policies therefore should be more of a traditional “this” for 
“that” negotiation rather than policies driven by theory.  These adherents believe that 
imposing U.S. ideologies upon unwilling recipients (such as which was commonplace in 
the decades prior to the Good Neighbor Policy and later during the Cold War) was 
meritless and counterproductive; instead, practical steps should be taken to achieve 
whatever currently are the desired results.  For example, attempts to enforce stability 
(as perceived by the United States government or American businessman) typically 
resulted in some degree of resentment; however, advocating non-intervention could 
instead gain support from nations vital to U.S. hemispheric interests.   Adherents to this 
school of thought also argue that FDR himself was a practitioner of realpolitik.  He 
                                                           
30 Ibid., p xii. Dana Gardner Munro, The United States and the Caribbean Area  (Boston,: World peace foundation, 
1934); The Latin American Republics, a History, 3d ed. (New York,: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960); Samuel Flagg 
Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States  (New York,: Harcourt, 1943); J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey 
of United States-Latin American Relations  (Boston,: Houghton Mifflin, 1965). 
31 Pike is also noteworthy for his view that while President Herbert Hoover originated the Good Neighbor Policy, it 
was FDR who coined the term and systematically implemented it. Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National 
Interest : A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy  (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 
1982). 
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believed that if left without reasons to dislike the United States, Latin America would 
discover that a relationship with the United States had economic, cultural, and moral 
advantages.  Therefore, FDR’s non-intervention policy, trade agreements, and ethnic 
diplomacy work as examples of policies which respect power, but also show a 
pragmatic path to the desired outcome. 
Ethnic diplomacy could be utilized as evidence for any of these three schools of 
thought: Those scholars who privileged economics in their arguments could emphasize 
the importance of Mexican laborers in U.S. agriculture or Latin American resources—
such as rubber or oil—during a time of war.  Security adherents have an obvious 
argument given that the racially motivated policies were at least partially prompted only 
by the U.S. entry into World War II after Pearl Harbor.  Additionally, one could cite 
hemispherical defense initiatives from the major diplomatic meetings during FDR’s 
administration to further support the Security school’s argument.  Nevertheless, it is 
really no surprise that it fits best as evidence within a synthesized argument.  While on 
the surface ethnic diplomacy seems to be a humanitarian policy, its limitations reveal a 
deeper understanding.  One of main goals of ethnic diplomacy was to help avoid racially 
charged disturbances which would threaten the security and economic interests of the 
United States.  Ethnic diplomacy was first and foremost a pragmatic solution to this 
potential problem and was more of a series of diplomatic reactions initially.  In addition 
racism threatened the relationship between the United States and Latin America at a 
time when the United States needed Latin America more than ever before to help 
protect the Western Hemisphere and fuel the U.S. war machine.  This reality gave 
nations like Mexico more weight in their diplomatic negotiations with the U.S.  If the U.S. 
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government could appease Mexico in this regard, it could count on uninterrupted 
cooperation.  These points make ethnic diplomacy more the right policy at the right time 
instead of an idea created from a theory designed to promote U.S. interests.   
 
 
World War II 
World War II changed a great many things in the world, two of which are key to 
understanding ethnic diplomacy.  First, the way racial relations were addressed by the 
United States government and secondly how the United States diplomatically dealt with 
Mexico.     
Generally speaking, World War II allowed for some progress to be made against 
racial discrimination because the administration was willing to compromise in order to 
ensure unity and prevent civil unrest.  The specific policy changes related to ethnic 
diplomacy with the onset of war are discussed at length in the next chapter; however, it 
is important to note that even before “the day of infamy” FDR had already sought to 
avoid racial unrest on the homefront.  The most notable example came in June of 1941 
when a group of African-Americans led by A. Phillip Randolph and The Brotherhood of 
Sleeping Car Porters pressured for more workplace equality.  Their most effective 
strategy was termed the March on Washington Movement (MOWM) which came about 
after a meeting at the White House.  Randolph, Walter White of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and T. Arnold Hill of the National 
Urban League (NUL) met with FDR’s labor team in an attempt to end segregation within 
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the defense industries.  The result was the opposite then what they had hoped.  The 
White House press release which came from the meeting actually reaffirmed a 
segregated workforce and made it seem as though Randolph, White and Hill endorsed 
the policy.  As the MOWM committee was formed, Randolph became determined that 
the march occur. This determination caught Roosevelt’s attention personally.  New York 
City Mayor Fiorello La Guardia and Eleanor Roosevelt met with Randolph and White on 
behalf of the president.  The First Lady insisted and La Guardia concurred—according 
to Randolph—that FDR was “greatly wrought up” over the march and hoped for a way in 
which it could be called off.  Randolph did not waiver and, while polite, continued to plan 
the March on Washington.  FDR next called Randolph to the White House for a face-to-
face meeting.  In the meeting FDR showed no change in position.  He was unwilling to 
issue an executive order, because then he would “be required to sign it for other 
groups” as well and Randolph was unwilling to accept any compromise.  Eventually La 
Guardia had a change in position.  He urged Secretary Knox and Roosevelt that the 
administration should consider a permanent solution, the main reason being that he was 
convinced that Randolph would go through with the march.  Roosevelt’s reluctant 
answer was the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) via Executive Order 
8802.  The most quoted element of the order reads, “there shall be no discrimination in 
the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, 
color or national origin.”32   Interestingly, as the state department was fielding 
complaints from Mexican nationals and Mexican-Americans, this organization was often 
                                                           
32 For more on Philip A. Randolph’s long struggle for civil rights see Cornelius L. Bynum A Philip Randolph and 
the Struggle for Civil Rights (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2010).  Cynthia Taylor, A. Philip 
Randolph: The Religious Journey of an African American Leader  (New York City, New York: NYU Press, 
2015).The “or government” element was added in the second draft as Randolph was not satisfied without its 
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included in the conversation.  Many of the complaints in both California and Texas were 
eventually forwarded to the FEPC, even a few that were only loosely related to the 
FEPC mission of defense industry or government. 
The FEPC worked with the OCIAA even more closely than with the State 
Department.  Lawrence Cramer, Executive Secretary of the FEPC collaborated with the 
OCIAA’s Division of Inter-American Activities to create a campaign specifically targeting 
employment discrimination against Mexicans in February of 1942.  The FEPC/OCIAA 
strategy was to target a few “major cases” in the Southwest with the hope that it would 
“bring the rest of the industries along.”  Cramer admitted in a letter to the OCIAA that 
“the worst offenders” of discrimination against Mexicans were in Texas, specifically the 
oil companies on the Gulf Coast.  Ultimately, the “few cases” of 1942 proved to not 
provide enough motivation for the region’s hiring practices and the FEPC opened up 
regional offices across the Southwest in the summer of 1943, including specifically 
investigated the gulf oil companies.33  Some scholars have argued that the overall the 
FEPC was ineffective in making significant changes towards integrating the wartime 
industries workplaces; however, it is clear that the OCIAA and the State Department 
working in conjunction with the FEPC made a significant effort in the Southwest.34 
The most relevant example of how World War II changed the administration’s 
perspective on Mexican relations involves more U.S. oil companies and their long 
standing claims for Mexican oil.  Roosevelt inherited an already sensitive diplomatic 
issue when he assumed the presidency in 1933.  During the Mexican Revolution, the 
                                                           
33 Zamora, Claiming Rights and Righting Wrongs in Texas : Mexican Workers and Job Politics during World War 
II: 92-93. 
34 Ibid. 
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foreign—primarily U.S.—ownership of the oil fields fueled the revolutionary spirit of 
people, while the companies complained to Washington that yields were low and 
production was threatened from the instability of Mexico.  Both sides were never 
satisfied at the same time and often both sides were completely unsatisfied with the 
current arrangement.  With the close relationship that U.S. companies enjoyed with U.S. 
government in the 1910s, this tense situation was of the utmost importance to US-
Mexican relations.  In 1917, when the Mexican Constitution was passed, the famed 
Article 27 specifically reserved subsoil rights to the state; however, as with much of the 
Mexican Constitution in that era, the implementation of these subsoil rights was a much 
more difficult reality.  Over the next few decades U.S. oil companies were actively 
supported by the U.S. State Department, and in fact, on two occasions the U.S. 
seriously considered armed intervention to protect these companies mineral rights. With 
this support, the primarily U.S. firms retained nearly complete control of Mexican oil.35 
What one scholar has called the “biggest challenge” to the Good Neighbor Policy 
occurred in 1938, when nationalization-minded president Lázaro Cárdenas invoked 
Article 27 and made all of Mexico’s oil state-owned.36  Even before the nationalization 
when compromises could have been made, Hull and the State Department vehemently 
worked in favor or retaining oil rights for the U.S. companies.  Once Cárdenas’ decision 
came down, the State Department then worked for a reversal during the first year.  Hull 
attempted to curb U.S. trade with the newly formed Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and 
ultimately succeeded with a 61% decrease in sales to the United States.  Cárdenas 
                                                           
35 Lorenzo Meyer, Mexico and the United States in the Oil Controversy, 1917-1942  (Austin: University of Texas 
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36 Clayton R. Koppes, "The Good Neighbor Policy and the Nationalization of Mexican Oil: A Reinterpretation," The 
Journal of American History 69, no. 1 (1982): 62-81.  Reserving subsoil rights for the state was not a radical 
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however was unwavering, prompting Secretary Hull to privately refer to the cárdenistas 
as “those Communists.”  After no progress was made, FDR, Hull, and Welles opted for 
a new strategy.  They drafted up an agreement which allowed Mexico to retain oil rights, 
but gave a fifty year operating contract to the U.S. oil companies with complete control 
of management and a small slice of profits heading to the Mexican government.  
Cárdenas again rebuffed the attempt to regain control by the U.S. oil companies and 
this second stalemate persisted until he was out of office.  Ávila Camacho had a much 
different approach (his economic policies are discussed in chapter six) which embraced 
Roosevelt’s wartime plan and was much more open to compromise.  Less than a month 
before Pearl Harbor, the State Department broke their close relationship with the oil 
firms (and therefore their hard stance) and setup the bi-national Cooke-Zevada 
commission to reach a fair compensation figure.  The final number was $23,995,991 
with an additional $5 million dollars in interest over four years.  By most accounts this 
number was generous for the U.S. side; however, the firms were not willing to accept 
the loss of future income—which they estimated as an additional $200 million.  Almost 
two years later they acquiesced and on October 1, 1943 the firms accepted the 
commission’s figure.37 
Historians have noted that the State Department’s divergence from the oil 
companies in 1941 was a direct result of the changing security situation.  The best 
evidence that something changed within the administration comes from Roosevelt’s 
insistence that Vice President Wallace attend the inauguration of Ávila Camacho in late 
1940.  Roosevelt and the military wanted army and navy bases in Mexico, but the oil 
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problem had impeded any negotiations on that front. Wallace, being the goodwill 
emissary for this matter, placed a wreath on the monument commemorating the young 
soldiers, the famous niños heroes, who died defending Mexico City against the U.S. 
invasion in 1847.  Wallace ultimately concluded that cooperation was more likely with 
Camacho than Cárdenas for any and all affairs.  Unfortunately, as historian Clayton R. 
Koppes argues, this argument is a bit too simplistic.  While it shows FDR had a change 
in priorities for Latin America, it does not explain why Hull and Welles never wavered in 
their insistence to return U.S. oil companies to Mexico after accepting the deal.  This 
dual handed reality aligns perfectly with the limited scope of ethnic diplomacy.  Hull and 
Welles were willing to work within FDR’s hemispherical unity agenda with the onset of 
World War II and proved it here with the acceptance of the nationalization of Mexican 
oil.  Just as racial unrest could threaten the relationship with Mexico, so could the lack 
of an agreement over Mexican oil.  The State Department was operating within a 
window of time where they could not jeopardize Mexico’s friendship, but—as  proven by 
their repeated efforts to regain access to Mexican oil—they still believed in private U.S. 
access to Latin American resources as key to U.S. interests and feared that the rest of 
Latin America would follow Mexico’s model.38 
Although the U.S. adhered to the Good Neighbor Policy, relations with Mexico 
remained strained due to the oil controversy.  The U.S. attempted to “drive a hard 
bargain” in forcing the Mexicans to give what U.S. officials saw as adequate 
compensation for the oil expropriation and Mexican officials strongly resisted.  Yet, at 
the same time, U.S. officials were also concerned about improving U.S.-Mexican 
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relations—even to the point of investigating Anglo-Mexican racism.  This represents the 
concept that U.S. foreign relations towards a particular country is rarely unified within 
the bureaucracy and for Mexico in the 1940s, the policies were especially complicated, 
arguably even contradictory. 
 
Diplomacy and Bureaucracy 
 Ethnic diplomacy, just like the rest of the Good Neighbor Policy, was not created 
in a single monumental treaty or agreement.  There were never any “we won’t be racist 
anymore” clauses in treaties, constitutional amendments, or specific Presidential 
declarations.  Instead, a bureaucratic team of public officials crafted it under the guise of 
FDR’s overarching diplomatic agenda for Latin America.  FDR, the State Department, 
the Office of Inter-American Affairs, state governments, and grass-root interest groups 
all contributed; but, most of the decision making stemmed from the high level 
bureaucrats.  This section will focus on their motivations in crafting ethnic diplomacy.  
This reality—that individual people are responsible for making policy decisions—means 
that their personal lives and problems are as important as the Good Neighbor Policy 
itself and World War II in their contributions to the creation of ethnic diplomacy. 
At the very top of the ethnic diplomacy policy was FDR, albeit mostly indirectly.  
For the most part, he is missing from the history of ethnic diplomacy.  While FDR did 
play a role in crafting ethnic diplomacy, he did not have the same amount of influence 
as he did in other foreign relations matters elsewhere in the world.  FDR’s personal 
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opinions on Latin America’s importance help shed some light on his administration’s 
handling of race relations between the United States and Latin America. 
  While working in the Wilson administration as Assistant Secretary of the Navy—
the same post his cousin Teddy once held—he witnessed firsthand how Germany’s 
unrestricted submarine warfare could propel the United States into war.  One of his 
many reactions to the German aggression was to warn those who would listen against 
their potential infiltration in to the Western hemisphere.39  In his 1928 Foreign Affairs 
article “Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View,” Roosevelt laid out his foreign policy 
views, which revealed a major emphasis on Latin America; so much so that he 
demanded an end to interventionism in the region.  Roosevelt boldly advocated “the 
duty of the United States to associate with itself other American Republics, to give 
intelligent joint study to the problem, and, if conditions warrant, to offer the helping hand 
or hands in the name of the Americas.  Singlehanded intervention by us in the affairs of 
other nations must end with the cooperation of others we shall have more order in this 
hemisphere and less dislike.”40   
Many scholars have pointed to this article as the beginning of his Good Neighbor 
Policy; however, even from this early point it was not a clear or concise policy.41  
Roosevelt discussed his personal imperialist experiences in Haiti and the recent 
Republican interventions, specifically the current Nicaraguan affair—arguing that these 
incidents ultimately damaged the U.S.  However, FDR’s partisan text established a 
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degree of difference between his actions in Haiti and that of Republican leaders 
beginning in 1921: 
In Haiti a worse situation faced us. That Republic was in chronic trouble, and as it 
is close to Cuba the bad influence was felt across the water. Presidents were 
murdered, governments fled, several time a year [sic]. We landed our marines 
and sailors only when the unfortunate Chief Magistrate of the moment was 
dragged out of the French Legation, cut into six pieces and thrown to the mob. 
Here again we cleaned house, restored order, built public works and put 
governmental operation on a sound and honest basis. We are still there. It is 
true, however, that in Santo Domingo and especially in Haiti we seem to have 
paid too little attention to making the citizens of these states more capable of 
reassuming the control of their own governments. But we have done a fine piece 
of material work, and the world ought to thank us.42  
This was FDR’s final parlay into foreign policy prior to the 1932 election—he avoided 
the topic after the stock market crash due to popular opinion favoring a focus on 
domestic issues—and it appears as though FDR was latching on to a non-intervention 
policy.  While his famous 1928 Foreign Affairs article was a marked difference from his 
previous position as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, it was a policy position gaining 
traction among Americans by the late 1920s.  While this does represent a reversal of 
thought on FDR’s part, he remained non-committal and slightly ambiguous.  As is 
evident in his phrasing, he was unwilling to completely stand aloof from Latin American 
affairs and retract the effectiveness of his own previous interventions. 
The appearance of FDR’s reversal of foreign policy towards Latin America could 
have been based on personal experiences or perhaps was simply a knee-jerk reaction 
after losing the 1920 Vice Presidential bid where he touted Wilsonian internationalism—
which called for a more activist U.S. foreign policy and more interventionism.   No 
matter what caused the reversal, it was clear that something had changed once 
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Roosevelt moved into the White House.  Initially, he had supported his cousin’s taking 
of the Panama Canal and the many military incursions in Latin America.  In fact, when 
he served as Undersecretary of the Navy, he bragged that he had written Haiti’s 
constitution (a gross exaggeration which would later be used by political rivals who 
labeled him an imperialist).  Once in office, he reinvigorated his interest in Latin 
American foreign policy immediately by establishing the Good Neighbor Policy concept 
in his inaugural address.  While it was not clearly defined at this point (or perhaps at any 
point), his first term heavily emphasized the end of intervention and the promotion of 
trade with Latin America.  Since the Latin Americans had pressed the U.S. for a promise 
not to intervene militarily in Latin America, the Good Neighbor policy significantly 
warmed U.S.-Latin American relations immediately.  The result was the ending of 
marine occupations in Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, which helped portray 
the United States as at least better neighbors.  
While FDR’s ambiguous foreign policy leadership has been a popular topic 
among historians, most of his interest was pointed towards Europe during his tenure.  
Rather than hack out policies with other American heads of state, he often left the 
region to his diplomatic representatives.  He allowed his foreign policy to function in a 
similar way to that of his domestic policies.  He utilized multiple individuals and even 
multiple government branches to allow different ideas and plans to be hashed out—
eventually giving support to whomever he pleased.43   
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This approach, while quite characteristic of FDR as a leader, is actually more the 
rule than the exception when it comes to U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America.  
United States presidents have rarely grabbed the reins themselves when dealing with 
Latin America.  Thus, FDR’s task of preventing an international controversy over 
American racial prejudice fell to a handful of specialists in the State Department and the 
Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.    The most prevalent purveyors of 
racially related issues for Latin America were the State Department’s Undersecretary of 
State Sumner Welles and Coordinator Nelson Rockefeller.44 
While Latin American affairs were not FDR’s focus, there was a brief period when 
he provided his “Good Neighbors” with a surprising amount of attention.  Latin America 
was an essential component to his foreign policy once Nazi, Italian, Japanese, and 
Spanish Nationalist aggression became evident, and he was still hindered by the 
Neutrality Acts.  FDR was unable to intervene in Europe, Asia, and was also hindered 
from aiding Ethiopia or the Spanish Nationalists as they fought against superior foes.  
However, thanks to the popularity of the Good Neighbor Policy, he could progress his 
global ideologies in a region that was more apt to support his ideas.  By coupling a 
message of hemispherical unity within the West with harsh criticism of the Eastern 
belligerents, he attempted to reach beyond the Americas.  This approach dually served 
FDR’s political interests by quieting some of the criticism he received from being overly 
involved in the Eastern hemisphere’s affairs.  One example of this came during a press 
conference in March 1935 when he responded to a question on German rearmament by 
stating, “I think we can only properly maintain the general principles of the good 
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neighbor and hope that the American principle will be extended to Europe…”45  A few 
months later, he would repeat the global designs of the Good Neighbor policy at the 
San Diego Exposition, “…In every continent and in every clime, Nation will follow Nation 
in providing by deed as well as by word their adherence to the ideal of the Americas—I 
am a good neighbor.”46   The following year the outlook in Europe had only worsened 
and FDR showed an adherence to his use of the Western Hemisphere with his famous 
“I hate war” speech at Chautauqua, New York.  In the speech he showed a desire to 
banish war forever from the Americas and the further hope of extending that vision 
globally.  He even presented the message at the Inter-American conference at Buenos 
Aires in 1936, by posting and subsequently answering his own question: “The madness 
of a great war in another part of the world would affect us and threaten our good in a 
hundred ways….  Can we, the republics of the New World, help the Old World to avert 
the catasthrophe (sic) which impends? Yes, I am confident that we can.”47 
 FDR eventually integrated this idea of utilizing Latin America as a soap box for 
Eastern Hemisphere problems into a Pan-American Day speech.  In 1939 he officially 
made a speech on Pan-American Day for the first time since his inauguration year.  
While the 1933 speech focused entirely on better relations and “the thought that on this 
day the attention of the citizens of the twenty-one Republics of America is focused on 
the common ties-historical, cultural, economic, and social-which bind them to one 
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another;” the 1939 speech had a notably more global focus.48  He made the point that 
American nations hold conferences in an effort to continue peace, while “Elsewhere in 
the world, to hold conferences such as ours, which meet every five years, it is 
necessary to fight a major war, until exhaustion or defeat at length brings governments 
together to reconstruct their shattered fabrics.”  FDR went on to further compare the 
“encircled” feeling of an unnamed European nation to the interdependency and 
neighborly qualities present among the American republics.  It was with this pretext that 
he decided to once again disconnect his foreign policy goals with the historical record of 
the United States by stating, “dreams of conquest appear to us [American republics] as 
ridiculous as they are criminal.  Pledges designed to prevent aggression, accompanied 
by the open doors of trade and [economic] intercourse, and bound together by common 
will to cooperate peacefully, make warfare between us as outworn and useless as the 
weapons of the Stone Age.”  Lastly in his speech he returned to hemispherical unity by 
commenting on how the peace of the Western Hemisphere needs to be defended “to 
the fullest extent of our strength, matching force to force if any attempt is made to 
subvert our institutions, or to impair the independence of any one of our group.”49  FDR 
repeated this point with a similar line the following year, “We have only asked that the 
world go with us in the path of peace.  But we shall be able to keep that way open only if 
we are prepared to meet force with force if [a] challenge is ever made.”50 
FDR’s attention to Latin American was once again evident in the summer of 1940 
when military and economic aid for Latin America was brought to the discussion table.  
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The Axis aggression in Africa coupled with numerous reports of Nazi sedition in South 
America created a fear within FDR and his administration that the Nazis would attempt 
to claim Dutch and French holdings in the Caribbean and perhaps one-day use that as 
a stepping stone toward an invasion in South America.  FDR initially agreed only to 
showcase naval force in Brazil and Uruguay, begin military talks, and authorize a 
Congressional resolution to sell coastal defense and ships to the Latin American 
countries in exchange for cash.  For his part, Welles championed further support, 
suggesting a stronger naval presence and a credit system for the purchase of arms.  
From Welles’s perspective, the additional aid would be enough to make an impression 
among Latin American nations that the United States was serious about hemispherical 
security; without them he feared it would be much less convincing.  FDR acquiesced to 
his most-trusted Latin American expert to an extent, providing a handful of additional 
ships and a limited amount of military supplies to be purchased on credit.  Mexico and 
Brazil got the first opportunity to purchase the supplies and the other South American 
nations north of Brazil got access to what was left over.51  Piecemeal diplomatic 
goodwill endeavors towards Latin America already had precedent when the war 
changed the diplomatic priorities of the United States.  The security of the hemisphere 
and U.S. economic connections with their southern neighbors were vastly more 
important after Pearl Harbor and the Japanese seizure of much of the Pacific; 
fortunately the United States already had a rough system in place to assuage Latin 
American concerns. 
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In the middle of World War II FDR made arguably his grandest diplomatic 
gesture towards Latin America when he went on a brief tour of Mexico.  In what was a 
highly publicized affair, Roosevelt met with Mexican President Ávila Camacho in 
Monterrey, Nuevo León and Corpus Christi, Texas on April 20 and 21, 1943 
respectively.  The two heads of state traveled together between the appearances, 
where they reportedly got along exceedingly well.  When speaking to the public, the two 
leaders both emphasized the same principles: hemispherical unity, cooperation, and the 
importance of their wartime alliance.  The trip, as various newspapers reminded their 
readers, was also historic.  It marked the first time an acting President had visited the 
interior of Mexico; in fact, only one other, President William Howard Taft, had ever even 
crossed the border.52  It is worth iterating here that FDR’s visit to Mexico, or any Latin 
American nation, was significant by itself; however, FDR’s visit in the middle of a war 
taking place on every other continent in the world reinforces the high value assigned to 
specifically Camacho and Mexico, but by extension the entirety of Latin America.53 
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Sumner Welles Important Role as Latin American Policymaker 
Given this heightened status of Latin America and an increased interest from the 
President, the importance of Welles and (especially) Rockefeller for ethnic diplomacy 
without contextual knowledge is unsuspected.  Traditionally, the commander-in-chief’s 
top diplomatic official, the Secretary of State, would play the major role in forming policy; 
however, FDR opted for a somewhat different approach by the selection of Tennessee 
Senator Cordell Hull.  According to the man who preceded Hull, veteran statesman (and 
future Secretary of War under FDR) Henry Stimson, “Roosevelt had told him that he 
intended to be his own Secretary of State, and Hull had apparently knuckled under to 
it.”54  Despite Stimson’s inevitable bias when discussing the man that replaced him, 
there is definitely some truth to his statement.  With regard to U.S. policy toward Latin 
America in particular, FDR would rely on Welles instead of Hull.  William Phillips, Hull’s 
Undersecretary of State from 1933-36, was a key ally for Hull.  Phillips, a Republican, 
managed the department’s bureaucracy efficiently, while Hull generally stayed outside 
of the day-to-day operations.  This pattern of hiring two antagonists in the same-policy 
area, who would then fight each other, was not a unique occurrence in FDR’s 
administration; however, Hull and Welles provide a classic example.55 
In 1933, Roosevelt and his newly installed State Department leadership got their 
first chance to discuss Inter-American affairs on a big stage at the Seventh International 
Conference of the Americas, held in Montevideo, Uruguay.  FDR tapped Hull to lead the 
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United States delegation.  Hull, seeing it primarily as a goodwill tour, did not want to 
attend (although his memoirs say differently); however, thanks to FDR’s insistence Hull 
became the first American Secretary of State to serve on a Pan-American delegation 
while still in office.  FDR made the announcement publicly and endorsed the trip as a 
way to broaden hemispheric understanding.  Hull, prior to leaving, seemed to put a bit 
more emphasis on economics as he told reporters that he hoped to get a reciprocal 
trade agreement (Hull’s marquee issue throughout his public service) at the conference. 
At the conference, the delegates wrote and signed the Montevideo Convention 
on the Rights and Duties of States.  While race or racial prejudices did not enter into 
any of the resolutions, there were a few noteworthy diplomatic victories.  Hull got 
Argentinian delegate Carlos Saavedra Llamas to agree to a reciprocal trade agreement 
and a couple articles were added in regards to preventing military interventions.  
Perhaps the most interesting among these was article eleven, which guaranteed states 
would not recognize any member’s territory acquired by force; however, the article 
which headlined the conference was number eight, “No state has the right to intervene 
in the internal or external affairs of another.”56  In a radio broadcast on his last night in 
Montevideo, Hull pronounced a new era in hemispheric relations, declaring—in his 
mind—the true start of the Good Neighbor Policy.57 
Shortly after Hull’s return, Roosevelt publicly showed his support for the non-
intervention policy at the Washington Mayflower Hotel at the commemorative Woodrow 
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Wilson birthday banquet on December 28, 1933.  The main point of the speech 
suggests that the United States should cooperate with—but not join—the League of 
Nations; however, he first fittingly mentioned that Woodrow Wilson had initiated the 
nonintervention doctrine in Latin America twenty-years prior with a speech in Mobile, 
Alabama.  Roosevelt declared that evening at around 10:30pm that,  
“President Wilson first enunciated the definite statement, ‘that the United States 
will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest.’  The United 
States accepted that declaration of policy.  The President went further, pointing 
out with special reference to our Latin American relations, our neighbors, that 
material interest must never be made superior to human liberty.”58 
Roosevelt later backtracked a bit by qualifying Wilson’s promise as inconsistent 
with the intervention in to a World War; however, he failed to mention any of his 
incursions into Latin America—perhaps corresponding with Wilson’s own view of the 
invasion of Mexico.59  In spite of this historical oversight, FDR’s Mayflower Speech laid 
the ground work for his policy towards Latin America for years to come. 
Hull’s reciprocal trade agreement was a major victory in his own eyes; 
nevertheless, despite FDR’s endorsement, the President was reluctant to allow Hull a 
free hand in Latin America.  Hull did not speak Spanish, had a lack of cultural 
awareness of the region, and did not boast the intellectual credentials of many of FDR’s 
advisors.   In 1937 he personally appointed Benjamin Sumner Welles as Assistant 
Secretary of State for Latin American affairs—a practice he did with most of the State 
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Department’s higher offices, thus taking away appointing power from Hull—a man who 
possessed the specialist skill-set that Hull was lacking.  Welles, who preferred to go by 
his middle name, had an Ivy League education and a distinguished family pedigree of 
public service.  Welles was considered a very formal individual by his contemporaries.  
He would greet subordinates by placing his fingers on the edge of their desk and then 
bowing.  As a colleague, he proved to be extremely professional, writing the appropriate 
memorandums and resolving issues succinctly.  One interesting personal detail was 
that he conducted himself very differently when it came to his Latin American guests.  
He was much more personal and friendly, exuding a compassionate and perhaps more 
culturally appropriate response. 
Upon graduating from college, Welles chose a career with the State Department.  
He achieved the highest score among those taking the State Department’s entrance 
exam and quickly thereafter left for his first assignment in Tokyo.  Ironically, it was 
during this time in East Asia that he decided to focus his efforts on Latin American 
affairs.  When he returned to the United States in 1917 he requested a transfer to 
Western Hemisphere, where he was assigned to Buenos Aires, Argentina.  At the time 
(and perhaps still today) most foreign service officers would consider an assignment in 
Latin America as an unofficial demotion; nevertheless, Welles believed otherwise and 
showed ambition learning about the local culture, studying Spanish, and excelling at his 
assigned duties. 
Eventually Welles was forced out of the Foreign Service by President Calvin 
Coolidge after rumors of an affair between Welles and Rhode Island Senator Elbridge 
Gerry’s wife worked their way around Washington.  After both of their marriages were 
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destroyed, Welles and the former Mrs. Mathilde Gerry married and seemingly, 
confirmed the rumors.  After losing his post, Welles wrote a two-volume history of the 
Dominican Republic, praising the new interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as 
defending the hemisphere rather than a symbol for U.S. aggression.  This stance 
however did not mean that Welles stood against intervention into Latin America.  
Instead, Welles realized that occasionally military force was necessary, when lives were 
in danger, the Panama Canal was threatened, or other potential emergencies. 60 
Welles and FDR were grew up in the same upper class social circles, but Welles 
first earned FDR’s respect when they collaborated with former Under Secretary of State 
Norman Davis on the drafting of a Foreign Affairs article.61  The entire purpose of the 
article was to respond to an attack made by Secretary Stimson against Wilsonian 
diplomacy in 1931, when presidential candidates were jockeying for position.  Welles 
provided some regional expertise—helping to write the section on Latin America where 
he advocated stronger economic bonds and presented the issue of equality and 
intervention logically: “If the equality of the Latin American republics with the United 
States as sovereign and independent powers is recognized, interference in their 
domestic concerns should be avoided to the same extent which the United States would 
demand that they refrain from interference in its affairs.”62  Once Roosevelt secured the 
Democratic nomination, Welles became an active supporter and even attended the 
White House inaugural dinner with Mathilde.  Not long after the formal dinner, Welles 
had the Roosevelts over to his mansion on Massachusetts Avenue.  However, even 
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before these formal gatherings Roosevelt had already decided that Welles would be his 
man for Latin American policy.  Welles was given the task of summarizing the key issue 
for the Western Hemisphere, and he responded by stating that they “must be regarded 
as a keystone of our foreign policy.”63  In addition, he suggested frequent consultations 
with himself, upgrading Latin American relations to show their importance, and 
reiterated his point about branding the Monroe Doctrine as hemispheric in nature. 
This reliance on Welles in regards to specific Latin American policy would 
continue throughout most of Roosevelt’s presidency. Even in 1934, when Welles was in 
Cuba, FDR admitted in a letter that, “…I have been so taken up with the European 
situation that all I have been able to do in regard to Cuban affairs has been to read your 
dispatches and dismiss them from my mind for the very good reasons that you seemed 
to be getting the situation under control and to have the confidence of the people who 
count.”64  The Cuban affair mentioned in this letter refers to the 1933 Cuban Revolution 
led by popular university professor Dr. Ramón Grau San Martín against strong-man 
dictator Gerado Machado who refused to give up power after his term was over.  
Martín’s nationalist Provisionary Revolutionary Government wanted U.S. diplomatic 
recognition, but at the same time implemented popular reforms such as land reform and 
the abrogation of the Platt Amendment.  The U.S. ultimately backed a conservative 
counterrevolutionary movement in 1934, led by mulatto military leader Fulgencio 
Batistia.65 While FDR’s reliance on Welles was clear, it was not absolute.  During 
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Welles’ Cuban ambassadorship and the diplomatic crisis, FDR rebuffed Welles’s call for 
troops against the military junta and Martín.  However, he did seriously consider 
granting Welles’ recurring request for troops, which is quite telling given its implications 
against the Good Neighbor Policy, the fact that it would have broken the anti-
interventionist promise from Buenos Aires, and the heavy opposition which stood 
against Welles on this decision.  Welles was very much along against a consensus 
consisting of the American public, the press, Congress, Secretary of State Hull, and the 
entire executive cabinet.  Ultimately, no troops were sent, but FDR did back Welles’ 
policy of non-recognition by withholding it from Martín’s Cuban regime.  While the 
Cuban example reveals that Welles’ power to shape Latin American policies was not 
limitless, it is obvious that even from the earliest point in FDR’s presidency that Welles 
would be the central figure for the region.  Looking at it from a broader foreign affairs 
perspective, the Cuban crisis was FDR’s first bilateral conflict and Welles was the 
incident’s most central figure—in fact, Welles had set a precedent by speaking directly 
with the president and circumventing his State Department superiors.  While the history 
of FDR’s relationship with Latin America sheds some light on the ideologies and causes 
behind ethnic diplomacy, it also reveals a dependence on subordinates, none greater 
than Welles. 
Once Welles was promoted to Under-Secretary of State in 1937 his 
responsibilities grew well beyond simply Latin America; however, he did prefer to keep a 
close watch on his diplomatic “home turf.”  In order to balance his new duties he utilized 
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Laurence Duggan, who was promoted three times by Welles, ultimately becoming chief 
of the Latin American division.  The two shared a common background: New York City 
natives, elite boarding school and ivy league educated, and—most importantly—a 
similar commitment to improving inter-American relationships, proven by their extensive 
service records.  The most telling sign that Duggan was an essential ally of Welles was 
the fact that Duggan assumed Welles’ role when he was unavailable.  As once historian 
wrote, “Duggan ultimately became Welles’s alter ego….  If anyone knew what Welles 
was thinking, Duggan did.”66 
Welles’ partiality towards Latin American was once again evident within FDR’s 
State Department through his advocacy for increasing amounts of military and 
economic aid for Latin America beginning in 1940.  During the Axis aggression in Africa, 
when FDR was again focused somewhat on Latin America, FDR was concerned that 
the Nazis would pursue Dutch and French holdings in the Caribbean or eventually 
South America.  FDR and Hull agreed to a minimalist approach based on safeguarding 
U.S. military resources while Welles sought enough aid to actually make an impression 
among Latin American nations.  While Welles had FDR’s ear, this time he did not heed 
the suggestion from Welles. 
While Welles shaped much of what the State Department did towards Latin 
America, Cordell Hull still wanted some control.  As time went on, FDR relegated a 
physically deteriorating Hull to the sidelines in most affairs.  In fact, in a conversation 
with Henry Morgenthau he stated that since Pearl Harbor Roosevelt had not consulted 
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him on important foreign policy issues.67  Despite FDR’s rebuff, Hull still attempted to 
oversee Latin American interests to the best of his ability.  The best accounts of this 
relationship point out that Hull blamed Welles largely for his marginalization and what 
resulted was a bit of a power struggle.  By fall of 1942, Secretary Hull was convinced 
that Welles was disloyal to the department and confided with other colleagues that he 
believed the rumors circulating around Washington that Welles was a homosexual.68 
This mixing of the personal with the diplomatic was commonplace in the State 
Department during this squabble.  One relevant example occurred in October of 1942. 
While Hull was away on vacation, Welles gave a speech in Boston which harshly 
criticized Chile and Argentina for not breaking off relations with the Axis powers.  Upon 
Hull’s return, he scolded Welles for taking this initiative without his prior approval and 
added the point that this could be viewed by Latin Americans as the department turning 
away from good neighborism and back towards imperialism.  What’s most interesting 
however is that this speech was also the breaking point for Hull on some homosexuality 
rumors floating around Welles; following the scolding he setup a secret meeting with 
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to pursue his dissatisfaction.  At the meeting, Hoover 
revealed that the FBI had already formally investigated Welles, publishing a report.  
Eventually he obtained a copy, but as one historian termed it, he was “openly abusive of 
Welles’s reputation” even before he had actually read the report.69  After this episode, 
the relationship between the two men became even more strained.  Welles kept busy 
advancing the Good Neighbor Policy in his own way and began to reveal his post-war 
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philosophy of a United States as a global power.  However, Welles also felt as though 
smaller nations, especially those in Latin America, deserved to play a role in this 
imagined post-war world.  In fact, even after he was out of office he criticized the 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference for leaving the smaller nations out.  Hull on the other hand 
attempted to unseat his perceived disloyal subordinate without actually asking 
Roosevelt to fire him.  This translated into a bureaucratic battle with which the sickly 
Hull was surprisingly active.  Ironically, this period between late 1942-1943 was the 
most active point of ethnically motivated diplomacy.  While each action has its own back 
story, it is a fair to state that the competition for control of U.S. foreign policy aided their 
protracted policies attempting to curb U.S. racism.  Hull and Welles both considered 
themselves champions of the Good Neighbor and responding (or preventing) racial 
unrest was one way in which each man could attain small victories without the others 
involvement.  Generally speaking, Welles’s record shows a more hands on approach to 
the racial concerns that crossed his desk, whereas Hull’s reception is more inconsistent.  
Sometimes this resulted in confusion, as will be seen in future chapters, as Texas or 
California governors would get slightly different feedback depending on who was writing 
the letter.  Essentially ethnic diplomacy was something which was largely influenced by 
two men who had the same surface level goals, mistrust for one another, and very 
different diplomatic strategies. 
Eventually, in late 1943, Hull began to demand that every crucial department 
matter come to him rather than Welles.  This was a difficult reality to create since Welles 
was considered by many to be FDR’s point man for foreign policy, and by 1943 was 
responsible for more of the day-to-day leadership than Hull.  As Hull lined up more and 
51 
 
more support against Welles the President’s hand was ultimately forced.  On August 15, 
Roosevelt and Hull met together and Hull demanded Welles’ resignation.  Welles was 
eventually called into the room and told his fate.  Reportedly, Welles stood up, shook 
hands with Hull and left.  The State Department’s man with the best understanding of 
Latin America was no longer in a position of power. 
According to Henry Stimson, the former Under Secretary haunted Hull well after 
his dismissal.  Stimson claimed Hull spent “restless nights” concerning himself over 
rumors that Welles was running his own State Department from his private residence 
with Roosevelt’s blessing.  To make matters worse, Hull would simply not consider an 
idea once Welles had publicly stated it.  At one point Welles suggested that an inter-
American gathering take place to discuss the peace after the war.  Potentially, this 
conference could have been a place for racial differences to be formally addressed; 
however, Hull immediately rejected the notion due to his personal distaste for Welles.70 
In October of 1944 Hull’s failing health finally caught up with him.  He entered 
Bethesda Naval Hospital in October with a positive outlook; however, his recovery 
would ultimately take seven months.  After close to a month of being absent from the 
State Department, Hull sent his letter of resignation to FDR citing his poor health.  Hull 
wanted to be involved in the building of the postwar peace and even was called the 
“Father of the United Nations” by FDR; however, the reality is that this could not be 
further from the truth.71  Hull, the last true leader of ethnic diplomacy was gone and with 
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FDR’s death the following spring, the new State Department was left with creating the 
United Nations. 
At the end of World War II a number of foreign policy changes occurred which 
shifted Latin America (once again) to the back burner.  The United States had better 
access to European and Asian markets which sidelined Latin America once again in 
both economics and diplomacy.  U.S.-Soviet relations become the highest priority, 
affecting the U.S. relationship with the rest of the world and bringing an end to the Good 
Neighbor Policy.  In addition, Latin America’s biggest champion in D.C., Sumner Welles, 
was out of power and two men who showed an inclination for a new way of dealing with 
Latin America, FDR and Hull, were removed by the failures of their own bodies.  The 
contextual window which allowed for this instance of ethnic diplomacy towards Latin 
Americans to had closed; however, as Mary Dudziak reveals in Cold War, Civil Rights, 
ethnic diplomacy would continue to be a viable policy choice. 
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Mr. Allen Grambling of El Paso, 
Texas made a racially sensitive comment 
at an inopportune time.  Grambling was a 
member of the El Paso School Board and 
a President of El Paso’s Chamber of 
Commerce; a man worthy of respect by 
American standards.  His key moment of 
disgrace came at a school board meeting 
when arguing against a federally funded 
nursery school being placed in Southern 
El Paso.  Unfortunately for Grambling, he 
was less than tactful when he added a controversial coda to his statement, “…besides, 
the children in the nursery school probably would be 90 per cent [sic] Mexican.”72  While 
the comment itself is interesting, what makes the case peculiar is the unprecedented 
United States Department of State (hereafter U.S. State Department) interest that 
resulted from the incident.  Grambling made his comments on May 25, 1942, during a 
window of time when the U.S. State Department was keenly interested in positive race 
relations among Americans of European heritage and Americans of Hispanic heritage.  
Had he made the comment a few years earlier, or even a few years later, the news 
likely would not have spread past the local level.  Due to international circumstances of 
World War II, Grambling was caught in a period of diplomatically charged racial 
sensitivity well above the scope of the El Paso School board, or even El Paso itself.  
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Grambling was eventually forced to issue a public apology and resign from the school 
board under the watchful eye of the U.S. Government. 
 The case of Allen Grambling is just one example of the United States 
government’s inconsistent policy toward domestic racial problems.  Considering the 
long history of racial inequality in the United States, the government has been slow to 
act against racial prejudices and tends to avoid addressing them as they are often 
politically damaging—this has been especially true for whichever political party counted 
the former slave states as part of their constituency.   Of course, a few notable 
exceptions come to mind; the United States Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Civil 
Rights Movement.  As this paper suggests, another important exception to the general 
rule of federal neglect occurred during World War II along the U.S.-Mexico border. 
 Between 1940 and 1942 the United States changed its policy regarding 
instances of racial prejudice against people of Latin American heritage.  However, it was 
not simply a 180 degree reversal of policy; that is, the government did not switch from 
ignoring the problem to trying to end it at all costs.  The U.S. State Department did not 
want to see polarizing court cases based on racial discrimination, the passing of 
controversial legislation, or even noisy newspaper articles; the priority was not to end 
racism, but to prevent racism from ending wartime cooperation between the United 
States and Mexico.  The degree of involvement in the State Department’s new policy 
was a three stage change which ultimately resulted in an unrefined policy designed to 
maintain and promote United States solidarity in the Western hemisphere during a large 
scale, international conflict: Ignorance and deferment between 1940 and Fall 1941; 
research and a changing international scene between Fall 1941 and early 1942; and a 
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widespread monitoring across the U.S.-Mexico border of racially charged incidents, a 
proactive push for inter-American solidarity, and damage control on any potentially 
volatile issues beginning in early 1942. 
   
Simpler Times, Simpler Ethnic Solutions, 1940-41 
 The Grambling incident as a stand-alone event is seemingly inconsequential; 
however, if taken into historical context with the State Department’s actions it becomes 
quite remarkable.  Approximately 22 months prior to the fateful El Paso School Board 
Meeting, a group of Mexican-Americans were denied access to a swimming pool and a 
theatre in the heavily Mexican-American populated Southern California town of Azusa.  
While historians have taught us that these types of occurrences were commonplace for 
people of color in the 1940s, this particular event became an international issue after it 
was reported to the Mexican Consulate in Los Angeles.73  Don Francisco Castillo 
Nájera, the Mexican Ambassador to the United States, penned a letter to Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull complaining about the incident.  His report described the, 
…discrimination which apparently consists in forbidding the nationals of Mexico 
from using the two places on the same terms and conditions as the other 
inhabitants of the town.  To the direct negotiations which our Consul undertook 
with the authorities of Azuza (sic), the Mayor of the said town, V.A. Owens, 
replied on August 31 of this year advising the Consulate that, in his opinion, the 
existence of such restrictions ‘is the best way of handling the whole situation’, an 
opinion with which, as Your Excellency perfectly understands, the consular 
officials, the nationals of Mexico and this Embassy cannot agree.74 
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 Nájera’s letter was eloquent and firm; arguing that the problem was not just the 
racial discrimination, but how Owens failed to address the important issue of racism.  
Later on in the letter the ambassador mentions the mayor’s official response: “young 
Mexicans overrun the park without giving the Americans an opportunity to enjoy the 
benches and other services.”75  Nájera seemingly took offense to this response and 
uses it as a transition point for his letter.  While the first half is a description of past 
events, the second half is a call for the State Department to intervene.  However, before 
calling for action, Nájera points out that “the Civil Code of the State of California, so it 
seems, expressly forbids the use of such discrimination, the victims thereof being given 
the right to apply to the Courts with a request for protection.”76  The implications behind 
this quote suggest that Nájera believes this could become a major incident; should 
those particular Mexican-Americans decide to take action—likely with assistance from 
civil rights organizations such as the League of United Latin America Citizens (LULAC) 
and the Coordinating Council for Los Angeles Youth (CCLAY)—they could do so in a 
very public manner.  While the tone of the letter is extremely polite and formal, the 
words do contain a threat—to allow this problem to be settled in a high profile court 
case.  Nájera, while diplomatic in his language, was unusually aggressive as a Latin 
American representative dealing with the United States; it is clear that he understood 
the sensitivity of U.S. officials who feared the wide dissemination of information of any 
social conflict.  While this was likely a threat which the Mexican government was willing 
to exercise, he backpedaled from his position and offered another option.  Nájera next 
argued that “it would not be advisable to handle this matter through legal channels, in 
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view of the unpleasant attention and publicity which it might receive and its effects on… 
good relations.”77  Instead of using legal and more aggressive means, Nájera preferred 
that Hull deal with the specific discriminating parties and induce “them to collaborate in 
preventing it in the future.”  Nájera’s suggestion to keep the matter between their 
diplomatic offices and settle the matter quickly and quietly suggests that it was in the 
best interest of Mexico, not just the United States, to prevent racism from destroying 
their relationship as World War II intensified in Europe and U.S. officials feared a 
German invasion of Great Britain.78 
The political situation in Mexico caused a similar strategy towards racial policy to 
that of the United States—the Mexican Administration saw race relations as a single 
piece to a more important policy.  Mexico was at a crossroads prior to the Second World 
War; some factions wanted economic prosperity through industrialization and 
cooperation with the United States of America, while others preferred a more 
independent route through drastic social reforms.79  The racial affiliations of these 
groups tended to be divided among color lines.  The poorer, often darker-skinned 
mestizos and Native Americans often sided with reform minded politicians; while lighter-
skinned and wealthier Mexicans would opt for a closer cooperation with the 
industrialized world.  When World War II began, Mexico was simply an observer.  
However, the war was a key opportunity for President Ávila Camacho—the new 
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President whom took office in December 1940. 80  Camacho advocated a close 
relationship with the United States to spur on economic reform in his own country and 
the war caused an overlapping between his political goals for the country, the United 
States goals for solidarity, and ethical righteousness against fascism.81  Just from a brief 
and limited understanding of Mexican politics at the time, one can ascertain that it was 
also to the benefit of Camacho’s administration to have the United States quickly 
address or at least suppress the continued discrimination in the Southwestern United 
States. 
 Hull responded to Nájera about a week later; however, it is clear that he did not 
ascribe the same importance to the matter as the Mexican Ambassador.  The letter was 
no more than an acknowledgement that the Ambassador’s letter had been received and 
a message back stating that he was “communicating with the Governor of California.”82  
The last the State Department ever heard about the incident was ten days later, when 
Governor Culbert Olson responded that he was assigning Earl Warren, then Attorney 
General of the State of California, “to thoroughly investigate this matter and to take 
appropriate action against the parties and community involved should he find that they 
are violating provisions or Statutes of the State of California.”83  Essentially the State 
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Department was establishing a policy of federal government deferral to the individual 
states with regard to the sensitive issue of race. 
 Nájera’s letter regarding the Azusa incident was not the only racially-based 
complaint the State Department received in late 1940; two other incidents, both 
occurring in Texas, received a similar response.  The first incident was an attempt by 
LULAC to put international pressure on the United States “in an effort to stop this 
discrimination against this group of American Citizens.”84  LULAC chairman Ted 
Cazares targeted Concho Theatres, Inc. (a branch of R. & R. Theatres, Inc. centered in 
Dallas, Texas) in a hope that a boycott, in conjunction with outside diplomatic pressure, 
would convince the State Department to intervene.  Cazares sent a letter to the 
Peruvian Embassy requesting them to contact the State Department and included a 
clipping from the San Angelo Standard Times as evidence.  The article revealed the 
theatre’s blunt discriminatory policy and to emphasize his point Cazares underlined the 
offending clause: “Today the cost (of building the theatre) already had moved past the 
$40,000.00 mark and the seating capacity had been raised to 1,100, including 250 in 
the balcony where the colored and Latin American movie fans will be accommodated.”85  
The State Department monitored LULAC’s activity; however, no public or private actions 
were taken and the matter was simply reported to the Governor of Texas, W. Lee 
O’Daniel, for his discretion. 
 LULAC’s appeal to Peru represents the organizations internal decision to 
collaborate with Latin American governments in an attempt to apply the Good Neighbor 
Policy at home.  This close connection was mostly realized through Mexico as several 
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of LULAC’s leaders had forged relationships with the Mexican consulate offices in 
Texas.  In doing so, LULAC merged together what the State Department, and pretty 
much everyone else, viewed as two separate issues, the mistreatment of Mexican 
nationals and the mistreatment of Mexican-Americans.  During the war LULAC had four 
major campaigns under this joint banner: First was a push for equality and an end to 
segregation in schools which was the continuation of a campaign that began in 1930, 
second was addressing the denial of service in public places, third was a directed attack 
on the Texas Gulf Sulphur Company town of New Gulf (discussed further in chapter 
six), and finally was their support for the Caucasian Equal Rights Bill of Texas.   
LULAC’s involvement in promoting civil rights, its alliance with Mexico, and its 
adoption of the Good Neighbor Policy rhetoric in 1942 had a significant impact on the 
direction of ethnic diplomacy.  Initially, the federal government was suspicious of 
LULAC.  The San Antonio office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) even 
conducted surveillance after some strong comments suggesting that hemispherical 
unity was harmed by racial discrimination.  Over time however these concerns were 
assuaged, although it is a safe assumption that clean FBI reports probably helped.  
Washington officials in the State Department and the OCIAA by 1943 saw LULAC as a 
moderate civil rights organization—especially considering it emphasized Latin American 
whiteness as justification for challenging racial discrimination—and favored them as a 
participant in ethnic diplomacy.  Not only did this provide a reasonable ally for the State 
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Department, but it also elevated LULAC to the primary Mexican civil rights 
organization.86 
  The second complaint originating in Texas was concerning restaurants in the 
predominately white town of Hamlin, Texas. 87  A few select businesses opted not to 
serve Mexican-Americans and eventually the news made its way to Ambassador 
Nájera.  According to Nájera, his Embassy instructed the Mexican consulate in Dallas to 
courteously contact the Mayor, Joe Culbertson, to resolve the situation.  However, after 
two separate attempts the consulate got no response from Culbertson’s office and the 
discrimination in the restaurants continued.  Nájera used a similar pattern to his 
September letter concerning the Azusa incident, again using the inability of local 
authorities to address the problem as a justification for State Department intervention.  
The wording of Nájera’s letter is quite telling: 
The foregoing obliges me to write to Your Excellency, most respectfully 
requesting of you that the Federal Government interpose its great influence to 
the end that in the town of Hamlin, Jones County, in the State of Texas, it may be 
brought about that the humiliating differentiation of Mexicans may not be made, 
thereby providing that the Mexican colony in Hamlin shall not continue to suffer 
from this unjust situation.88 
 
Once again Mexico requested that the State Department intervene against a 
local government in the name of racial equality, and once again the federal government 
passed it along to the corresponding state government.  The text of Hull’s letter to 
Governor O’Daniel is practically identical to the letter sent to Governor Olson of 
California a few months earlier and the other letter sent to O’Daniel regarding the 
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LULAC appeal to Peru—there is no record of a reply from Governor O’Daniel in either 
circumstance beyond acknowledgment that the letters were received.89  In 1940, 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the State Department were consistently ignoring the 
racially centered complaints of Mexico and Mexican-Americans. 
Not surprisingly, the U.S. State Department’s lack of a response to racism is the 
Southwestern United States failed to appease Mexico.  Mexican consulate officers met 
in San Antonio on March 30, 1941 to discuss the consistently problematic issue across 
the U.S.-Mexico border.  The timing of the meeting was not accidental, as the Texas 
State Legislature was debating H.B. No. 909, better known as the Equal 
Accommodations Bill.  While the bill sounds quite progressive in name, it only defines 
public accommodation rights for Caucasians.  The bill was the brainchild of a number of 
multi-racial anti-discrimination organizations (including LULAC) and aimed to redefine 
Latin Americas as white; thereby allowing Mexicans equal access to public places in 
Texas.  The preamble openly states that the bill is “An ACT to assure full and equal 
accommodations, rights, and privileges to all persons of the Caucasian Race in all 
public places of business or amusement in Texas, repealing all laws in conflict herewith, 
and declaring an emergency.”90  While the racial classification that the bill is based on is 
interesting; internationally speaking, the most revealing text from the bill is found at the 
end of the document.  The purpose of the last section is quite mundane; the drafters 
added it in order to expedite the debate in an attempt to pass the bill quickly.  However, 
the justification for the expedited process reveals a major motivation behind the 
document: 
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The fact that the National Defense requires greater unity of interests between the 
peoples of North and South America and that at present there is no law in Texas 
which guarantees equal accomod-ations (sic), facilities, and privileges to the 
Nationals of certain republics in this hemisphere, [it] creates an emergency and 
an imperative public necessity that the Constitutional Rule….91 
 
The bill may have been the creation of Mexican-American activists; but, it was 
also noteworthy for U.S.-Latin American relations.  According to State Department 
records, the bill was largely heralded by Mexican newspapers as an example of United 
States progress combating their own racism—and therefore reinforced the Mexican 
government’s agenda for closer relations with the United States.  Unfortunately, it was 
also largely misunderstood and spun to appear more favorable than it actually was.  
They labeled it as a “fine step and have said [incorrectly] that it would apply to all 
Mexicans [including dark skinned Mestizos and Native Americans] although its wording 
does not so indicate.”92  The gap between the reality in Texas and the Mexican 
newspapers understanding of the bill was problematic and did not reflect what the 
Mexican Consuls described as the “exacerbation of racial prejudices against individuals 
of Mexican nationality and their descendants” in the Southwestern portion of the United 
States.93 
Therefore, the Mexican consuls’ meeting in San Antonio resulted in a letter and 
an attached memorandum—a compiled list of discriminatory acts against Mexican and 
Mexican-Americans in Texas—with the hope that Texas legislators would change the 
wording of the bill to include all Americans, as the Mexican newspapers (and therefore 
most Mexican people) already believed to be true. The letter is careful to mention that 
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the Mexican Government will not interfere with the Equal Accommodations Bill directly; 
however, it also states that  
…it has no hesitation in confessing that the Government of Mexico and public 
opinion in the United Mexican States view with the greatest sympathy the efforts 
which are being made in Texas, with the purpose of putting into effect an anti-
segregation law….  The Embassy of Mexico is sure that the Federal Government 
of the United States desire[s] to cooperate, in the most effective way possible, to 
do away completely with the humiliations, as unjust as they are cruel, which have 
been imposed for years on Mexican elements residing in various sections of the 
United States. 94 
 
The letter next argues that the Texas anti-segregation law should not be limited 
to Caucasians, citing recent changes in U.S. naturalization laws as a precedent—which 
allows for persons of indigenous races of the American continent to obtain American 
citizenship more easily.  The Mexican government desperately hoped that the Texas bill 
would include both Mestizos and Native Americans alongside the word “Caucasian.”   
The letter details the political outlook on the Texas situation in Mexico: 
…the need for obtaining suitable legislation to prevent racial segregation against 
Mexicans and their descendants, thus destroying once and for all, one of the 
strong arguments which enemies of the policy of continental cooperation can use 
in Mexico, with great advantage, to incite public opinion as a conglomerate of 
people which, without any kind of reason, segregates our nationals residing 
therein and subjects them to humiliations which in some cases, amount to 
instances of denial of justice.95   
 
The evidence that the Mexican Consuls in Texas collected is quite extensive and 
includes six pages of cases, including many instances where members of the Mexican 
Foreign Service were themselves the target of discrimination.  For example, Chancellor 
Felix Gonzalez Monteon from the San Antonio Consulate “was expelled with his wife 
and children from the Bourquins Swimming Pool in the town of Castroville, Texas.”  The 
memorandum also listed any failure from local government officials to respond to 
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complaints.  In the Castroville instance, local civic organizations and the Mayor were 
informed, but no answer was received. 
The response to the Mexican memorandum was consistent with the State 
Department’s previous view on international race issues at this point in time.  In a letter 
to Assistant Chief of American Republics Herbert S. Bursley, Undersecretary of State 
Sumner Welles wrote that “there would seem to be nothing which the Department can 
do in regard to the Bill….  I think this angle of the Mexican memorandum should be 
ignored and an innocuous reply sent.”96 Welles also believed that the specific cases 
brought forth by the Mexican Embassy were pretty weak and that “it is doubtful that 
there has really been any increase in discrimination against Mexicans [and Mexican-
Americans] in Texas.  It seems more likely that with the Good Neighbor movement 
going strong the matter just seems more flagrant to the Mexicans at the present 
moment.”97  It was Welles opinion that “Mexicans have always been treated in Texas 
more or less as an inferior race and this cannot be remedied except by a gradual 
process of educating public opinion.”  He also suggested that a possible propaganda 
campaign could be effective; but dismissed both ideas, reiterating that ignoring the 
memorandum and allowing the individual states to handle the matter was the best 
course of action.98 
The governors of both California and Texas (even though Texas was the primary 
target), given the recent segregation incidents, were contacted by the State Department 
regarding the Mexican Embassy’s memorandum; their responses could not have been 
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more different.  Texan Governor O’Daniel acknowledged receiving the letters and 
promised that the instances outlined in the memorandum would be investigated; 
however, he would not be pursuing the investigation himself.  He delegated the 
responsibility to the “only agency for making such investigations,” the Department of 
Public Safety, under the leadership of Colonel Homer Garrison Jr., a former Texas 
Ranger.99  In California, Governor Olson took a much more proactive approach.  In his 
timely three page response, (O’Daniel’s was less than one) Olson outlined a series of 
steps that he planed on taking to stamp out any isolated cases of discrimination—
including public addresses, meetings with California mayors and county 
representatives, and perhaps most interesting was his plan to make a speech on Pan-
American Day promoting racial unity between the peoples of America.100  He ended his 
response by stating his belief that, “Generally speaking, I can safely say that there does 
not exist any sentiment of racial prejudice against the Mexican population of 
California…”  Overall, the push for federal intervention against racial inequality seemed 
                                                           
99 The Texas Rangers, or Texas Ranger Division, is a statewide law enforcement agency that has served in a variety 
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  Pan-American Day is the unofficial holiday instituted in 1930 by the governing board of the Pan-American Union.  
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and people of the United States entertain toward the peoples and Governments of the other republics of the 
American Continent."  Organization of American States, "Minutes of the Permanent Council - Protocolary Sessions 
to Commemorate the Pan American Day," (Washington D.C.: Columbus Memorial Library, 2001). 
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to be an act of futility; the Equal Accommodations Bill was immediately defeated and the 
State Department remained unresponsive. 
The next nudge towards federal intervention was in fall of 1941, where a small 
group of Texans became quite vocal against discriminatory practices.  The renewed 
interest from the State Department began when San Antonio Mayor, C. K. Quin, 
introduced a measure to the city council calling for the revocation of all relevant licenses 
to any establishment that made racial distinctions.  In the preamble to his ordinance he 
wrote, “that this country desires the friendship of all the Latin American nations in view 
of the fact that the Western Hemisphere may be of tremendous influence in 
guaranteeing and maintaining the peace of the world.”101  In addition to Quin, La 
Prensa—the primary Spanish newspaper of San Antonio—published a series of 
editorials by Eduardo Idar, a prominent lawyer and political activist, with the heading, 
“The Oppression of the Mexicans in Texas.”102  Interestingly, Idar’s comments were not 
a blanketed criticism of racial injustices, but rather a condemnation of prejudices 
specifically targeting Americans of German ancestry.  At one point Idar states that 
young Mexicans who experience discrimination should seek out cities or “environments 
that are not the communities dominated by Germans and where a greater spirit of 
tolerance exists.”103  In a different article, “Ancestral Passion of a Race,” Idar came out 
even more strongly against the Germans.  Idar argued that Germans were a racially 
proud people with shrewd business skills; however, these skills were used by Germans 
for malicious purposes.  He believed that a German was only interested in accumulating 
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wealth and was “ever active in intrigues to overthrow the governments of the countries 
that have given him a home and opportunities.”104  To this end, if Idar was to be 
believed, Germans in Texas were the ones responsible for Mexican-American poverty 
levels and sought to keep them in a perpetual state of peonage.105  The State 
Department interest was different this time around due to the public attention of the 
issue and the increased tension of war.  Considering the context, the increased concern 
seems natural; the United States was practically at war by October 1941, with “shoot on 
sight” orders in the North Atlantic and the establishment of America’s first peacetime 
military draft. 
Following the public interest from San Antonio on November 22, 1941, just over 
one year after the very first discriminatory incident in Azusa was reported to the United 
States by the Mexican Ambassador, the State Department decided to commission an 
investigation of “racial discrimination against Mexicans in Texas.”106  Sumner Welles 
selected, wrote instructions to, and personally met with the man to whom the task fell, 
Herbert Blocker, American Consul General from Ciudad Juárez.   The survey was to be 
completely in secret, as Hull pointed out that “you should not divulge to any one that you 
are engaged in this survey.”  The investigation was also quite extensive, requiring 
Blocker to travel to Dallas, Austin, Galveston, Corpus Christi, Brownsville, San Antonio, 
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Del Rio, El Paso, and “Intermediate Points.”107  Hull also specifically outlines the 
motivation for Blocker’s investigation:  
Moreover, the Department receives complaints from time to time formulated by 
the Mexican Embassy, by Mexican Consular Officers and by private individuals 
regarding specific cases of alleged racial discrimination.  Obviously even isolated 
cases tend to impair friendly relations between the United States and Mexico or 
other countries.  Widespread acts of this character can be most prejudicial. 
 
Blocker’s report was compiled over approximately four months and was quite 
extensive, giving a number of insights into the origins of this year-old problem for the 
Department of State.   Blocker also kept a correspondence with updates from his 
travels—most of which would be copied into his final report.  The first of these 
correspondences recorded different instances of racial prejudice (via second hand 
report) and also described the underlying themes of the discrimination.  In his 
introduction Blocker pointed out that he believed this push against racial discrimination 
was premeditated by activists:  
“Unquestionably, the Mexican Consular Officers operating with the LULACS and 
the League of Loyal Americans are taking advantage of the times to bring what 
they term ‘certain racial discriminations against their people, including American 
citizens of Mexican origin’ to the attention of the Department and the Rockefeller 
Cultural Relations Committee.” 
 
The initial letter also investigated the claim that a disproportional amount of the 
discrimination stemmed from settlements with predominately Anglos of German 
ancestry.  Upon interviewing Mexican General Council Jimenez, Blocker learned that 
the General Council considered New Braunfels, Wharton, Lockhart, Fredericksburg, 
Fort Worth, and Houston to be the offending German communities; however, upon 
visiting the areas himself, he “found very little discrimination in any of the towns…and 
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such occurrences as were listed had in most cases been remedied.”108  Blocker’s 
findings concerning the falsity of the German myth—the supposed propensity for 
German-Americans to be antagonistic to Mexican-Americans—and belief that LULAC 
and other organizations were “taking advantage of the times” are quite telling.  He felt 
that the United States Good Neighbor Policy and preparation for war gave Mexico, and 
these interest groups, an angle in which to push their anti-discrimination agenda.  In 
fact, later on in the letter he clarifies this point,  
…I am inclined to believe from the investigations made so far that the LULACS, 
the League of Loyal Americans and the Mexican Consuls are a little bit too 
touchy on the subject and are inclined to search out instances and make 
molehills into mountains.  It appears to me that there has to be some missionary 
work done on both sides.109 
 
While Blocker was touring Texas and investigating the diplomatic importance of 
racism, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 transformed U.S. 
foreign policy.  While the State Department knew that relations with Japan were 
deteriorating over the past few years, the Pearl Harbor attack caused a major concern 
for continental security—the Japanese proved that they were capable and willing to 
attack United States soil, and now there were no substantial defenses between them 
and the Western Hemisphere’s West coast.  To make matters even more concerning, a 
German submarine sunk the City of Atlanta, a U.S. Freighter, killing 44 people and 
attacked two other ships off the coast of North Carolina just six weeks after Pearl 
Harbor.   The United States could no longer afford to ignore potential threats to 
American solidarity. 
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Signs of a Shift in U.S. Policy, 1941-1942 
While the Good Neighbor Policy had been in effect for years, the United States, 
post-Pearl Harbor, needed positive relations with Latin America more than ever before.  
In order to do so the United States opted to call a meeting, with the hopes of 
establishing a united, hemispheric front against the Japanese and German threats.  A 
mere three days after Pearl Harbor, December 10, 1941, the United States began 
diplomatic action to address these concerns; they sent a circular telegram to all other 
American Republics calling for the Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the 
American Republics to convene at Rio de Janeiro in the first week of January.110   
Nineteen of the twenty nations invited immediately agreed to the conference in Rio on 
or before December 15, 1941—Bolivia being the only nation to not respond 
immediately.111   In addition, Mexico and the other Central American Republics, most of 
which could be convincingly classified as being virtual U.S. protectorates, either officially 
broke relations with the Axis powers or declared war on them well before the 
conference began.112  The South American nations, with the exception of Colombia and 
                                                           
110 Interestingly enough the meeting was already agreed upon in principle at the Second Meeting  of the Foreign 
Ministers of the American Republics held in Habana. The location for the third meeting was agreed upon at the 
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de Janeiro, 1942, National Archive. 
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explanation for the delay is due to the extreme factionalism affecting the Peñaranda government in the 1940s; more 
research is needed into the U.S.-Bolivian relationship during World War II to clarify this point. For more 
information on this topic see Kenneth Duane Lehman, Bolivia and the United States : A Limited Partnership, The 
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El Salvador made no declaration of war nor broke ties with the Axis powers; however, 
they also did not wish to break relations with any of the other American republics.113 
On the surface, the Latin American response to the Rio meeting appears to be a 
direct sign that the Western Hemisphere was united and willing to follow the diplomatic 
lead of the United States; however, the meeting was much more complicated and 
involved careful negotiations between parties.  The U.S. agenda for the meeting was 
well planned and specific; the primary goal was to pass what would become “Resolution 
I” in the final act, an official severance of relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan.”114  
At first the U.S. hoped to get a Universal Declaration of War, and among the Caribbean 
nations this was a real possibility; the Dominican Republic actually informed the United 
States ahead of time stating that they intended on submitting such a proposal at Rio de 
Janeiro.  However, after correspondences with a number of countries, including Mexico 
and the majority of the South American countries, the U.S. realized that a unilateral 
declaration of war would not pass at Rio and opted for a more realistic goal—the 
severance of relations.  At the conference itself, the United States did not even have to 
submit the proposal.  Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia all submitted similar 
resolutions.  Other key resolutions were introduced by the Caribbean nations as well: 
For example, Cuba proposed eight resolutions concerning Inter-American economic 
cooperation, the Dominican Republic proposed equal access to key raw materials 
based on need, Haiti suggested Pan-American cooperation in defense of the continent, 
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and Mexico recommended four resolutions around the concept of economic solidarity—
further proving what their priorities were during the war.  The U.S. did submit other 
secondary proposals, all of which corresponded with strengthening security in the 
Western Hemisphere and stretching the reach of U.S. influence into Latin America in 
the name of cooperation.  These proposals included a resolution addressing a unified 
front against subversive activities, resolutions ensuring aviation rights and 
telecommunication between member nations, the improvement of health and sanitary 
conditions in vital industry locations, and guaranteed access for the Red Cross.  The 
United States also called for an Inter-American Committee on Juridical and Post-War 
Problems.115 
 While the United States’ primary and secondary resolutions were included in the 
Final Act, there were a number of additional resolutions that were not on the 
delegations’ radar prior to the conference itself—undoubtedly some give-and-take 
occurred in getting the final draft signed.  One example is Resolution XIV, “Commercial 
Facilities for the Inland Countries of the Americas.”  The resolution recommended that 
the American Republics, 
…study promptly the possibility of concluding a multilateral convention binding 
themselves not to claim, by virtue of the most-favored-nation clause, concessions 
and facilities which each of them may grant or may have granted to the 
commerce of inland countries of the Americas in order to eliminate or minimize 
the disadvantages inherent in the geographical position of such countries.116 
 
This resolution was in opposition of U.S. (and others) control of Bolivia and 
Paraguay and was not in the U.S.’s mindset of cooperation.  In fact, the U.S. actually 
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officially submitted a “Reservation” to Resolution XIV—a tactic American Republics 
were allowed if they did not agree with (or were unsure of) a particular issue but still 
wanted to accept the Final Act as a whole.117   
For the most part the Final Act was racially neutral, except for Resolution XX, 
“Reiteration of a Principle of American Law.”  This resolution was first introduced at the 
Pan American Conference in Lima, Peru 1938; it primarily addressed the principle that 
legal aliens cannot claim the condition of minorities.  However, in the 1942 version a 
new racially centered addition was made to the resolution, “In accordance with its 
historical, racial, political, and juridical tradition, there is and can be no room in America 
for the so-called racial, linguistic or religious ‘minorities.’”118   The concept behind this 
new phraseology corresponds with the ideology behind the hemispheric solidarity 
movement, being that since all Western Hemisphere peoples were “Americans,” there 
should not be any separation or inequality based on racial, linguistic or religious basis.  
In essence, it argued against inequality without specifically stating that is was against 
inequality—an eloquent political tiptoeing around a sensitive issue.119  Overall, the Rio 
Conference reveals that the United States was willing to appease Latin America, at 
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least to a certain extent that included acknowledging racial issues, once United States 
security and wartime production depended on cooperation. 
 
Ethnic Diplomacy, 1942 
 In the months following the Rio Conference, the United States took a much more 
proactive role against racial prejudice, nearly matching the Mexican government’s 
desire to get redress from the U.S. government in response to the incidents.  Spurring 
this activity was the submission of Herbert Blocker’s report on February 27, 1942.  
Blocker detailed the history of the Mexican population in Texas and pointed out that 
most Mexican-Americans living in the state were of “the peon class in whom Indian 
blood predominates.”120  However, with the advent of international highways came an 
increased number of Mexicans from the higher intellectual classes, something which 
upset the precarious socio-economic racial hierarchy in Texas.  Perhaps the most 
interesting aspect of Blocker’s report was the belief that Mexican-American interest 
organizations, specifically LULAC and the League of Loyal Americans, had teamed up 
with Mexico on account of blood ties to fight discrimination.  The report concluded that 
due to the increased American involvement in a global war, these groups were “duly 
taking advantage of the desire of the United States to promote the most friendly 
relations between Latin America and this country,” furthermore, he posited that “the 
Mexican Consuls and the local Mexican organizations are somewhat touchy on the 
subject and are inclined to search out instances with a view of making mole hills into 
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mountains.”121  Blocker’s understanding of the 
situation was that the Good Neighbor Policy was 
being used against the United States by these groups 
in order “to force special recognition of social 
privileges.”122  The LULAC’s and Mexican Consuls’ 
goal was to get one of two desired results. Ideally, 
they preferred the enactment of laws clearly 
outlawing discriminatory practices; however, if that 
was unattainable, the Consul General made it clear 
that they would also accept the unanimous local level 
understanding that it would benefit everyone to 
coexist more peacefully—pursuing the noble, but 
near impossible goal of changing the way every 
single Texan thought about race.  While this second 
goal was arguable less attainable than the first, small 
victories, such as a local mayor speaking publically 
against discrimination to a favorable news article 
condemning unequal public accommodations served 
as anecdotal evidence for progress towards this 
broader goal. 
Blocker’s analysis of racial tensions in Texas 
revealed his sympathetic mindset to the Hispanic-
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Figure 1: Herbert Blocker’s other 
recommendations, 2/27/1942 
#2 – “The Convincing of State law 
enforcement officers of the 
necessity during these times of 
world war that friendliness and 
courtesy to Latin American national 
and citizens of that blood will bring 
untold benefits to our national 
Government in dealing with Latin 
American governments.” 
#3 – “Use of such officers as 
propagandists among rural 
communities and towns….” 
#4 – “The use of luncheon clubs, 
such as Rotary, Lions, and Kiwanis, 
which are popular in Texas….” 
#5 – “The encouragement of mayors 
of cities where Mexican and other 
Latin American consular officers are 
located to publicly entertain them 
occasionally.” 
#6 – “The selection of American 
consular officers at border posts 
who are proficient in the Spanish 
language and who have been 
coached in the promotion of good 
neighbor work.” 
#7 – “That governors of border 
states, namely, Texas, New Mexico, 
Arizona and California, be 
encouraged to invite Mexican 
border governors to outstanding 
celebrations in their states and to be 
present themselves.” 
#8 – “That border consular officers 
be allotted a confidential fund by 
the Coordinator of Cultural 
Relations to be used in entertaining 
Mexican and American authorities 
several times in the year, thus 
bringing them together in a spirit 
over the banquet table.”(see FN106) 
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American cause and included specific recommendations which parallel the non-legal 
solutions suggested by LULAC and the Mexican Consuls.  The first recommendation 
Blocker made was a multicultural curriculum for rural Texans, implementing Latin 
American history and culture courses at every level of study—from elementary schools 
to universities.  The courses were to address all Latin American nations, but “particularly 
Mexico, emphasizing the accomplishments of these people in literature, the arts, music, 
and sciences.”123  In addition, Blocker believed that radio addresses and public events 
featuring sympathetic community leaders should be organized to supplement the 
education more visible in the public sphere.  The most interesting aspect of this 
recommendation was Blocker’s suggestion that the money should come from the 
Coordinator of Cultural Relations, in order to prevent “undue publicity.”124  Blocker’s 
focus on education and secrecy corresponds with the absence of any recommendations 
for legal action.  The leadership in Washington, all the way down the hierarchy to 
Blocker, understood that publicity concerning racial prejudices against a people of color 
was undesirable during a time of global war.  Blocker’s other recommendations followed 
a similar, cultural approach to the race problem (see figure 1).Blocker’s study became 
the basis for a more proactive policy towards racism in the American Southwest.  His 
recommendations, for the most part, were implemented in some way—ranging from an 
informal suggestion to directly funded programs.  His flagship plan of utilizing education 
was suggested by Lawrence Duggan to U.S. Office of Education Commissioner J.W. 
Studebaker.  Studebaker was “heartily in accord with the recommendations presented 
in Mr. Blocker’s report;” however, he felt that a Latin American friendly education was 
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already being implemented in the American Southwest, thanks in part to a generous 
“grant from the Coordinator of Inter-American Republics.”125  Studebaker bragged that 
that Nelson Rockefeller’s organization (the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American 
Affairs or OCIAA) had already funded “22 demonstration centers in which historical and 
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cultural materials concerned with Latin American countries are introduced into regular 
school curriculums.”126  While this was Blocker’s most important recommendation, the 
OCIAA’s prior involvement would deter much possibility for further action.  Instead, the 
State Department focused primarily on funding “an intensified program of cordial 
association with Mexican officials and private citizens along the United States 
border.”127  Essentially, the United States government decided to utilize its diplomats as 
goodwill missionaries for racial equality.  After a bit of internal debate concerning the 
specific amounts and source of the funding, Secretary of State Cordell Hull sent out 
seven letters to the border region American Consuls in Nuevo Laredo, Ciudad Juarez, 
Nogales, Agua Prieta, Mexicali, Piedras Negras, and Tijuana.  These letters gave each 
Consul less than two months to use the dedicated funds (with an understanding that it 
would serve as a supplement to the entertainment expenditures assumed to be taken 
from their generous income) and the instruction that these funds should be used “in 
such activities as will your judgment constitute a positive contribution in the mutual 
improvement of relations [between Americans and Mexicans].”128  The Secretary also 
strongly suggested that half of the supplementary funds, which ranged from $40-$100, 
should be utilized to host an event in a public place with Mexican citizens as the guest 
of honor.129 
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The Consuls each utilized their funds and reported back successful results to 
Washington.  Consul Stephen E. Aguirre of Mexicali was perhaps the most inventive, 
organizing the International Desert Cavalcade Parade in celebration of “I am an 
American Day,” a new holiday created by the American Congress in 1940.130  In 
addition, Aguirre hosted a large party with over 250 prominent citizens from Mexico and 
the United States, and a small, yet similar, private gathering at his own home.  Aguirre 
pointed out in his letter back to Washington that these events were both appropriate and 
necessary.  He believes citizens of the nearby American City of Calexico, California did 
not realize “the significance of maintaining the closest of friendly relations with our 
neighbor,” in addition, Aguirre believes “there is still more to be desired but some 
progress has been made.”131 
Despite the influence of Blocker’s research in a more proactive approach to 
preventing racial problems from interfering with diplomatic relations, the United States 
also shifted their policy in addressing incoming reports of racial discrimination.  Instead 
of waiting for threatening letters from LULAC or Ambassador Nájera, Washington began 
to monitor acts of discrimination and collect reports from their consuls across the U.S.-
Mexican border and government officials—at times seeing them through to a public 
apology and resignation as in the case of Allen Grambling.  The first time the State 
Department shifted, from ignoring or dismissing serious complaints to attempting to 
quell even minor concerns over racism, was in response to a letter dated January 30, 
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1942 from Miss V. Dominguez of San Bernardino, California—a mere few days after the 
Rio de Janeiro conference concluded.132  Miss Dominguez was concerned about a 
particular theatre in her hometown that would not admit persons of color, including 
Mexican-Americans.  While this sort of general letter to the Secretary of State was not 
entirely uncommon, the State Department’s response was unprecedented.  George H. 
Winters, Assistant Chief of the Division of the American Republics, responded with a 
return letter to Miss Dominguez.  The letter did not give Miss Dominguez any specific 
solution, nor did it likely appear to Miss Dominguez as anything beyond bureaucratic 
nonsense; but, the letter clearly reveals the United States government’s new concern 
for prejudice against Mexican-Americans.  Winters told Dominguez, “I can assure you 
that discriminatory practices are a matter of concern to this Department, which is deeply 
interested in the best possible relations between citizens and residents of the United 
States and those of other countries and of the other American Republics in 
particular.”133  Starting with Miss Dominguez, the United States government no longer 
deferred racial problems to the State level—racial prejudice against Mexican-Americans 
had become a federal concern. 
While the Blocker’s report was the first and probably most impactful research on 
the subject, the State Department, OCIAA, and FEPC all pursued more information.  All 
three organizations agreed that they needed to explore “extending the Good Neighbor 
Policy” into the United States itself.134  Through these studies, the State Department, 
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133 Letter to Miss V. Dominguez from George H. Winters, Assistant Chief, Division of the American Republics, 
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134 Zamora, Claiming Rights and Righting Wrongs in Texas : Mexican Workers and Job Politics during World War 
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OCIAA, and FEPC hoped to assess the level of social tension in the American 
Southwest, confirm the presumed level of poverty, record instances of economic and 
social inequality, and further map out the geographic extent of discrimination.  
Ultimately, the collecting of this data was intended to allow the purveyors of ethnic 
diplomacy, in this case especially Sumner Welles and Nelson Rockefeller, to discern 
how this situation could impact the war and then speculate on the likelihood that the 
racial discrimination could erupt into racial violence, creating an insecure border.135 
The first of these additional reports came from the Office of Facts and Figures, 
which was contacted specifically for this task.  The Office of Facts and Figures chose 
southwestern historian and librarian for the New Mexico Military Institute, Paul Horgan, 
to conduct the report.  Horgan’s report was provocative and raised major concerns back 
in the State Department.  He claimed that the U.S.-Mexican border was very vulnerable 
to German aggression and, while he did not provide any evidence, stated that the 
Germans were actively working to set the Mexican population against the United States.  
He even went so far as to suggest that the Germans were promising Mexico the return 
of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California “as the fruits of a successful alliance 
against the United States” just like they did back in 1917 with the Zimmerman note.136  
Horgan also explained that the Axis were using shortwave radio towers in Mexico to 
spread Axis propaganda across the southwest.  The broadcasts made the case that the 
United States was anti-Catholic, anti-Mexican, and generally racist.  Horgan 
recommended the immediate creation of an “Americanization” campaign directed 
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toward Mexican-Americans to counteract the Axis propaganda, but also suggested that 
the campaign target the broader American public to improve the general view of 
Mexicans.  He believed the campaign should emphasize “American” qualities that 
Mexicans-Americans and Anglos had in common, especially their wartime cooperation 
efforts.  Finally, Horgan suggested that the State Department, OCIAA, and FEPC work 
with Mexican civil rights groups—especially LULAC—in the campaign. 
A month after the Horgan report, the OCIAA commissioned its own independent 
study by hiring out David J. Saposs.   Saposs, a labor economist by trade, traveled to 
Texas, California, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and Illinois to study discrimination 
and its impact on U.S. wartime policies.  Overall, Saposs’s conclusions were much 
more detailed and better researched than Horgan.  He wrote that Mexican-Americans 
were “probably the most submerged and destitute minority in the United States.”  He 
believed that discrimination was the leading cause behind the low wages, poor school 
attendance, illiteracy, unemployment, chronic illness, migratory work, juvenile 
delinquency, and substandard housing among the Mexican-American population.  The 
report continued to point out that Mexican-Americans experienced the harshest 
discrimination of any American minorities in public places and that this was not an 
isolated phenomenon; in general, he said Anglos everywhere he visited treated 
Mexican-Americans as “inferiors.”  After summarizing the extend and troubling racism in 
the American southwest, he analyzed the connection between this discrimination and 
U.S. relations with Mexico.  He suggested that discrimination indeed jeopardized 
hemispherical solidarity and that racial unrest, which he believed was likely without 
some form of intervention, would disrupt wartime industries and hurt the war effort.  
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Shortly after submitting his report, Saposs changed from spectator of racism to 
participant in ethnic diplomacy as he accepted the position as director of the OCIAA’s 
Minorities Section (discussed at length in chapter five).137 
The last report was submitted to the FEPC and was written by southwestern 
author Vincenzo Petrullo.  Petrullo interviewed a number of Mexicans and Mexican-
Americans and determined that they were generally frustrated with the racial prejudice.  
He also agreed with the conclusions of the earlier reports that the discrimination was a 
threat to U.S. security and U.S.-Mexican relations and greatly hindered the Good 
Neighbor Policy.  Similarly to Saposs, Petrullo stated that the discrimination against 
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans “is [often times] greater than that practiced against 
Negroes.”  He also addressed the Nazi threat, seeing it as a major component of the 
problem.  He could not prove the connection, but in his choice of words it is clear that he 
believed the connection existed.  He stated that the unrest “cannot yet be definitely 
labeled as the penetration of foreign political movements.” Petrullo also reported that 
the unrest in the Southwest was being pushed along by Mexican right-wing political 
groups such as Sinarquistas and the Acción Nacional.  Finally, Petrullo, like the 
previous investigators before him, suggested working with LULAC to address the 
problems.138 
Over the span of four months, four different investigations of racial prejudice in 
the American southwest were commissioned, conducted, and submitted to the State 
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Department, OCIAA, Office of Facts and Figure and FEPC.  They all agreed that 
discrimination against Mexican-Americans was a major problem for U.S.-Mexican 
relations and represented a direct threat to the U.S. ability to make war.  These reports 
not only gave the State Department the data it needed to justify the start of ethnic 
diplomacy, it represented four separate, but shared, reports from four different U.S. 
federal agencies calling for immediate action.  Ethnic diplomacy was officially in 
existence and it would come from several government agencies. 
Pan-American Day, April 14, 1942, was an ideal opportunity for the United States 
government to generate positive media coverage for U.S.-Mexico relations along the 
border. The Junior Chamber of Commerce of El Paso presented a luncheon at the Hotel 
Cortez as part of Pan-American Day—a prime example of the State Department 
partnering with local civic organizations as suggested in Blocker’s report.  The holiday, 
both in general and in El Paso, in 1942 was designed to promote strong U.S.-Mexican 
relations.   In this spirit, the Junior Chamber of Commerce asked the local ranking 
Mexican official, Vice-Consul Elias Urrea, to speak at the luncheon and American State 
Department Vice-Consul Sabin J. Dalferes to attend as a distinguished guest.  Given 
the recent Rio Conference, growing economic partnerships forged to combat Axis 
fascism, and the United States new policy to directly address racial issues in the 
Southwest United States, one would expect the relationship to be at an all-time high and 
the luncheon to go smoothly.  However, Urrea had a secondary agenda; one which 
American Consul General Blocker assumed was passed on “upon instructions from 
their [Mexico’s] Foreign Office.”139  Urrea spent a considerable amount of time detailing 
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specific cases of discrimination that came across his desk when he was the Mexican 
Consulate General at Houston, Texas.  In addition, Urrea also called for “the man on the 
street to do his bit and suggested that the members of the Junior Chamber of 
Commerce might very well undertake to begin, where official efforts [in ending racism] 
had not as yet been successful….”140While the Mexican government was careful to 
utilize the highest level of communication before Pearl Harbor and the Rio de Janeiro 
Conference; afterwards, such as at El Paso, it seemed to Herbert Blocker that “they 
[Mexico] are, undoubtedly, taking every opportunity to bring this question before the 
American public.”141 
While the sheer number of racially sensitive instances that the State Department 
was tracking after the Rio de Janeiro meeting is impossible to adequately represent 
within these pages, one particular case stands out as having higher stakes than the 
others.  Senator Dennis Chavez of New Mexico, the first person of Hispanic origin to 
ever be elected to a full six year term, was quite active combating prejudice and 
reported some disturbing news to Cordell Hull on April 30, 1942.  Chavez had been 
using his own political weight to fight racism; however, a few specific cases had become 
outside his realm of control and he decided to copy Hull on a letter he sent to Mr. 
Waterbury, Personnel Director for Consolidated Aircraft Corporation in San Diego, 
California.142  The first issue that Chavez addressed directly related to the Consolidated 
Aircraft Corporation, a major manufacturer of aircraft and an important contributor to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Consul General Blocker was not in attendance at the Junior Chamber of Commerce Meeting of El Paso; however, 
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140 Ibid 
141 Ibid. 
142 The Consolidated Aircraft Corporation is well known for contributing the PBY Catalina and the B-24 Liberator 
during World War II. 
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U.S. wartime production.  According to Chavez, Mrs. Peggy Clayton of Consolidated 
had refused to hire three Mexican-American women who sought employment at the 
company.  According to Chavez’s source, the three women were highly qualified and 
competent; however the women were turned down “just because their names happen to 
be Lopez, Castillo, and Delgado.”143  Chavez pointed out that this sort of activity is 
against the spirit of the Good Neighbor Policy and is damaging to the U.S. relationship 
with Latin America.  Near the end of the letter, Chavez suggestively reminded 
Waterbury that his senatorial duties include positions on the Committee on 
Appropriations and the Sub-Committee on Appropriations for Military Affairs—perhaps 
the two most important committees for disseminating military contracts.  While this letter 
already describes an extremely volatile issue, Chavez reveals Germany as an active 
player pushing for a negative U.S.-Latin America relationship.  Chavez gave a radio 
broadcast from Washington D.C. in Spanish under the auspices of the OIAA to 130 
stations south of the U.S. border.  Chavez “tried to tell those people of our noble ideals 
and traditions and the fact that this certainly is the land of opportunity.”144  The problem 
arose when Germany answered Chavez’s talk with a short-wave broadcast from Berlin 
in Spanish, completely denying Chavez’s assertions and pointing to the unfair treatment 
received by Americans of Spanish decent throughout the Southwest.  Chavez 
concludes, “Isolated cases...are what give the Germans and our enemies the 
opportunity of talking about the meanness of the Americans with those of Spanish 
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ancestry.”145  The State Department went into a small panic after hearing of the German 
broadcast and potential labor issues.  This letter got the undivided attention of Cordell 
Hull, Sumner Welles, and Lawrence Duggan.  In addition, the incident prompted a 
correspondence to Nelson Rockefeller, whose people had already been investigating 
Mexican-American labor problems. Sumner Welles requested Rockefeller look into the 
matter and let them know if there were “possible steps that might be taken to correct 
what appears to be a very bad condition.”146  While no clear connection is ever drawn, 
this instance occurred the week before the final decision was made to give 
supplementary funds to the consulates.   
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Mr. Allen Grambling of El Paso 
was racially prejudiced at an inopportune time—his incident occurred on May 26, 1942, 
well after the policy had changed and following a number of other unfortunate racial 
incidents including the 1942 Pan-American Day luncheon in El Paso and the 
broadcasting of Nazi propaganda to Mexico.  After Grambling justified his stance 
against the building of a new nursery school at the school board meeting by arguing that 
“the children in the nursery school probably would be 90 per cent [sic] Mexican,” a flurry 
of newspaper articles appeared in The El Paso Times.  This caught the attention of 
William Blocker, who reported to Cordell Hull as the events progressed, Blocker 
followed the events for the following week and even met with Grambling for a formal 
conversation. 147  On May 31, 1942 Grambling bowed to mounting LULAC pressure and 
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apologized for his “slip of the tongue.”  His statement included a nod to U.S.-Mexican 
relations,  
…I should avail myself of this opportunity to publically express my friendship for 
and admiration of the Spanish-American people of our sister Republic to the 
South, who will soon be standing side by side with us in the war which threatens 
the freedom of all people of this hemisphere.148 
 
The State Department’s monitoring of the Grambling incident and the direct 
involvement of William Blocker represents a noticeable change in policy and serves as 
an appropriate bookend to the three stages of a shifting policy.  Whereas, in past years 
this would have been ignored or passed on to the corresponding state government—if it 
was actually reported in the first place—in the time of active war (and before Mexico 
had officially declared war) this case was worthy of multiple American diplomats’ time.  
Negative press and racially charged politics was not a means to U.S. solidarity in the 
Western Hemisphere, which was a primary concern of all Americans in the time of 
international war. 
 
 
So What? The Implications of Ethnic Diplomacy 
 The peculiar interest of the U.S. State Department into the affairs of Mexican-
Americans is an intriguing historical case; however, it also raises larger questions 
regarding the willingness of the U.S. government to respond to racism and the 
implications from only limited results.  It is clear that the United States government 
made a concerted effort to give redress to victims of racism while promoting racial 
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harmony during the war period.  Many of these efforts included attempts which 
overlapped with practical strategies to end racism entirely, such as education programs, 
public apologies, and celebrating diversity at large social events.  On the other hand, 
the opportunistic timing of the policy and the dogmatic avoidance of national attention to 
the issue reveals that the State Department was only willing to step against racism 
when it aligned a dire foreign policy goal.149  While it seems logical that the State 
Department would only intervene when racism was relevant to foreign policy; the timing 
needs to be scrutinized.  Why did the United States wait until after Pearl Harbor and the 
Rio de Janeiro conference, when the Good Neighbor Policy had been the official policy 
for a number of years?  The answer discerned from this case study shows that the 
United States would not move on such a domestically controversial issue as race until it 
was absolutely essential to have Mexico’s support.   
Because of this contracted effort at combating racism, it is important to note that 
Mexico was able to influence U.S. foreign policy during World War II to a certain extent.  
Typically, histories of U.S.-Latin America relations argue that the Latin American nations 
were subjected to the United States policy, not the other way around.  In this sense, the 
case represented here reveals how race can serve as a means to wield international 
power in a non-traditional manner. 
 Another interesting aspect of this case study is the limited long-term results; this 
point is best understood with a comparison of Mary Dudziak’s Cold War Civil Rights—
which argues that Cold War politics and pressure from the international community were 
instrumental in the relative long-term successes of the Civil Rights Movement.  In the 
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case of the ethnic diplomacy directed towards Mexico as described in this paper, there 
were no major legal victories, federal legislation, or national movements to end racism 
in the American Southwest. The differing international environments of the Cold War 
and World War II help explain the contrary long-term results.  World War II did not offer 
an arena for underdeveloped nations to play two superpowers against each other.  
Instead, Mexico was attempting to get what concessions they could from their highly 
influential neighbor.  In addition, Mexican President Camacho’s desire to work closely 
with the United States and a lack of other viable economic partners affected the level of 
dedication to the issue.  While the Cold War and World War II instances of ethnic 
diplomacy vary due to a variety of circumstances, the comparison offers a deeper 
methodology for hypothesizing how the United States government deals with race and 
what sort of circumstances need to exist for permanent legal changes to occur. 
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Perhaps one of the most memorable sound bites from the 2008 presidential 
campaign came from comedian Tina Fey.  Fey, in a much heralded move, returned to 
Saturday Night Live in order to play the satirical role of Republican Vice-Presidential 
nominee Sarah Palin.  In one particular skit, roughly based off of a real interview, Fey 
was asked about her experience in foreign policy. Fey, in her best Alaskan accent 
retorted, “I can see Russia from my house!”  The line resulted in outrageous laughter 
and became arguably the most memorable moment from the episode.  While it was 
hilarious to the audience, it took a very real toll against Palin’s credibility as a serious 
Vice-Presidential candidate as it made its way around the national media circuit.  In 
reality, the comment was derived from a September 11, 2008 interview with ABC’s 
Charlie Gibson.  Palin’s exact words were, “They’re our next-door neighbors and you 
can actually see Russia from land here in Alaska, from an island in Alaska.”  Thanks to 
their similar appearance, many Americans assumed it was actually Palin on the video 
clip and immediately the quote began popping up around the internet as attributed to 
Palin herself.  Interestingly, their similar appearance still confuses many Americans as 
evidenced by a Fox News blunder confusing the two as late as 2011.150  To make 
matters worse for Palin, the quote appears to be attached more to her than Tina Fey in 
popular culture.  One can even purchase a refrigerator magnet with a picture of Palin 
firing a gun and the quote “I can see Russia from my house!” plastered in bold letters.151 
 While Palin came under a great deal of criticism for her actual comment and Tina 
Fey made it infamous, she brought to light an interesting prospect: can a governor or 
state government create their own, help shape, or influence the national level of foreign 
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policy when they are geographic neighbors with a foreign country?  In terms of 
international relations motivated by race, the answer is a resounding yes. 
While typically historians only look at the federal level of international relations, 
some scholars have identified non-traditional actors in foreign relations; one notable 
example is David P. Forsythe’s Human Rights in International Relations which 
discusses the importance of non-governmental organizations and “soft-law” in terms of 
international diplomacy towards human rights issues.  Under the rubric of ethnic 
diplomacy, there is another non-traditional actor in international policymaking: individual 
states.  During World War II, the relationship between Texas and Mexico was different 
than the relationship between the United States and Mexico.  The state leadership of 
Texas was an agent of international relations in two separate ways: First, as a major 
player in the U.S. Department of State’s ethnic diplomacy strategic plan, and more 
interestingly, as a separate political entity removed from the rest of the United States 
due to Mexico’s isolated punishment of Texas’s racial discrimination.  
The onset of ethnic diplomacy began at the federal level after Pearl Harbor; 
however, many of the intricacies of ethnic diplomacy often played out at the state level.  
Texas and California were constantly under scrutiny by the State Department—mainly 
Sumner Welles and Cordell Hull—and served as a major strain in the relations between 
the United States and Latin America.  While typically historians only look at the federal 
level of international relations, there are instances where individual states step into a 
role of diplomacy. 152  In this case, since the primary goal was to combat racial 
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prejudice, the State Department was forced to at least partially collaborate with state 
and local leaders in order to address specific racially charged incidents.   These 
interactions operated as part of the larger policy shifts previously discussed for the State 
Department. 
Overall, Texas was willing to cooperate with the State Department in an effort to 
combat racism, although the policy changes which occurred in order to do so came 
much more reluctantly.  The first stage of Texan ethnic diplomacy correlates exactly 
with the first State Department phase and is exemplified by racially charged incidents 
occurring before Pearl Harbor.  Governor W. ”Pappy” Lee O’Daniel (and for a couple 
months Governor Coke Stevenson) largely ignored any racial matters that came their 
way, and at most only passed them off to some lower level of government.  During this 
first phase, the State Department was also passing along the incidents to the 
appropriate governor’s office; therefore, by deferment the federal government was 
ignoring these incidents as much as Texas.  In essence, racial policy for people of Latin 
American decent prior to Pearl Harbor in Texas was being determined by local mayors, 
policemen, sheriffs, and judges.   In early 1942, when the State Department began to 
show more concern for a better relationship with Mexico, Texas records show a 
reactionist response to Mexican complaints of discrimination which slowly began to 
correspond with the ethnic diplomacy stemming from Washington.  Governor Stevenson 
finally began to respond when prodded by Cordell Hull and made marginal efforts to 
improve race relations when asked.  At first Stevenson still opted to pass along the 
incidents to local officials, but over time his office demanded accountability from those 
he passed responsibility to: including local level politicians, local law enforcement, and 
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the Texas Rangers.153  This slow shift continued until the spring of 1943, when Mexico’s 
bracero labor ban against Texas became the main focus of Texan growers, which 
suddenly forced Texas to realize its status as a purveyor of their own foreign policy.  By 
looking at Texas’s interactions with both Mexico and the U.S. State Department 
between 1941 and 1943, it is possible to see how their role in racially motivated foreign 
policy went through three stages: Apathy without accountability up through early 1942, a 
gradual compliment to the State Department ideology until Mexico excluded them from 
bracero labor, and finally a period of attempting to appease Mexico once the poor 
diplomatic relationship was hurting the state in areas outside of discrimination. 
 
Apathy without Accountability 
The first key figure for Texas’s “apathy without accountability” in terms of ethnic 
diplomacy—or lack thereof—was Wilbert Lee O’Daniel.  “Pappy,” as most people knew 
him, took over the Texas Governor’s office on January 17, 1939 after a successful 
career in the flour milling business.154  O’Daniel’s initial decisions established a policy of 
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non-responsiveness against Mexico’s initial complaints to the State Department about 
racial prejudice.  At this point it is important to note where this episode falls within the 
corresponding ethnic diplomacy policy timeline for the State Department.  In 1939, 
neither Hull nor his department was interested in proactively combating racial prejudice 
in Texas themselves; instead, they were operating within the long-withstanding policy of 
transference of the issues/requests from Mexico to the state level.   So, with this 
contextual knowledge, O’Daniel was serving as the decision-maker for all racial 
incidents with potential for international implications occurring in Texas. 
 O’Daniel’s record on race is notoriously segregationist.  He is remembered as 
someone who supported racist policies and endorsed prejudiced ideas.  The most 
notable evidence for this view on O’Daniel comes from his record after his time as 
governor and U.S. Senator (1941 to 1948).   He attempted to break back into the 
political scene via the Democratic primaries of 1956 and 1958 with strong anti-
communist and anti-integration messages in an effort to win white supporters.  In his 
most infamous remark he blamed racial violence on a communist plot, claiming that the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision was a red conspiracy. 
 Surprisingly, O’Daniel’s racism during his governorship was not as absolute as 
one might guess from his anti-integration ideas a few years later.  At the end of 1940 a 
number of concerned citizens and a county judge petitioned O’Daniel to act against the 
Texas Poll Tax—a Jim Crow law leftover from the late 19th century.  Bringing this 
petition to O’Daniel was not unexpected.  During the campaign O’Daniel publically 
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revealed that, in opposing the Poll Tax, he was in the minority of the Texas Democratic 
Party.  One West Texas newspaper revealed that 74% of Texans supported the poll tax, 
18% wanted to abolish it, and 8% wanted to keep the tax as a support for public 
schools—but  would make allowances for those that could not afford the payment.155  
Once O’Daniel was in power however, his opinion seemed to shift constantly, 
supporting whatever politics seemed to be popular.  His records show that he 
responded to citizens both for and against the poll tax in a sympathetic fashion, always 
customizing his return letter to side with that particular person’s viewpoint.156  O’Daniel 
ultimately bowed to the requests to end the Poll Tax, but only half-heartedly.  He polled 
the Texas State Legislature to explore the issue, and unfortunately for the Texas poor, 
the legislators were unresponsive.  The Poll Tax was upheld and O’Daniel’s office was 
both unwilling and in reality incapable of altering the outcome.157 
While O’Daniel’s overall record on race is overwhelmingly disappointing, he did 
react to racial discrimination against Mexicans or Mexican-Americans when pressured 
by the State Department—albeit in a minimal manner.  Perhaps the best example is 
O’Daniel’s first interaction with Secretary Hull.   After only two weeks in office, O’Daniel 
was forced to deal with a fragile situation left over from his predecessor, Governor 
James Allred.  On July 6, 1938 controversy struck when Deputy Sheriff McKennon, 
working out of Fort Bend County, allegedly threatened the life of the Mexican Consul in 
Houston, Lewis L. Duplan.  Cordell Hull contacted Governor James Allred on January 
                                                           
155 San Angelo Weekly Standard, December 29, 1938. 
156 Correspondence. RG 2001/Governor W. Lee O’Daniel Papers, Texas State Archives. 
157 McKay, W. Lee O’Daniel and Texas Politics, 102.  It is also important to note here that the Texas Governor had 
an extremely small staff in the 1940s.  During Civil War Reconstruction, Texas and other southern states attempted 
to circumvent northern control by limiting the influence of the governor’s office, one way to do this was shrinking 
the governor’s staff.  O’Daniel, with his outsider status and a small staff definitely followed this tradition to a certain 
extent. 
100 
 
5th via telegraph, showing concern about the issue after being prodded by the Mexican 
Ambassador.  Allred had someone hastily investigate the episode before leaving office. 
Ultimately, Hull was unhappy with this investigation which was submitted on the night 
before Allred left office on January 17, 1939.  Hull then contacted O’Daniel on the 25th 
via telegraph, asking him to make his own review of the Allred file and “take such further 
action as the facts may warrant,” and to give Hull “assurances that every appropriate 
measure will be taken by the local authorities….”158  Despite the strong language in the 
telegram, there was never any federal involvement in Texas. 
O’Daniel’s response, sent the next day, is quite revealing.  In a single paragraph, 
O’Daniel acknowledged the telegram and stated that he would review the file as 
instructed.  In addition, O’Daniel assured Hull that the Texas Rangers and the local 
authorities of Fort Bend County would protect the Consul and “every Mexican involved 
in the controversy.”159  While the five sentence response was the status quo for the 
time, it unfittingly ordered the same organization which employed the deputy 
responsible for the initial death threat to protect the Mexican Nationals in Houston.   
O’Daniel failed to follow up—besides the initial telegram—with Hull concerning 
the investigation and therefore Hull never followed up sufficiently with Mexico.  While 
both the Federal and State leadership of the United States were preoccupied with other 
matters, the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs at the time, Eduardo Hay, and his 
office was unwilling to let the near-murder of one of their Consuls go unaddressed.   On 
May 30, the Mexican Ambassador in Washington contacted Hull again, asking him to 
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once again intervene. In April, Hull subsequently wrote O’Daniel to find out what 
became of his investigation.160  Thanks to the internal correspondence of O’Daniel’s 
administration, it is clear why O’Daniel never responded—he had handed off the 
assignment to his personal secretary, Reuben Williams.161  O’Daniel ultimately reported 
back to Hull, again dismissing the issue as unworthy of his personal attention by 
referring Hull to the Department of Public Safety.  For a Democratic Governor to not 
handle a specific request by the prominent Cordell Hull (twice!) and to ask him to 
contact one of O’Daniel’s agencies for more information is a major slight and 
remarkably revealing.  However, given the State Department’s similar and consistent 
referral of racial problems to state governments it is perhaps expected. 
In the midst of Mexico reopening the McKennon episode, Mexican Under-
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Licenciado Ramon Beteta Quintana, decided to visit San 
Antonio for a short vacation.  The visiting of a Mexican dignitary was not especially 
noteworthy to O’Daniel, who was notified ahead of time—as was protocol—by the State 
Department.  The reality of the situation was that a number of prominent Mexicans often 
made their way into Texas.  In fact, the Quintana visit was quite unassuming since he 
had studied at the University of Texas at Austin and still had contacts in the state 
capital.  On April 7th he crossed into Texas at the Laredo border crossing and an 
unfortunate altercation occurred.  He was attacked and beaten by what local news 
called a “highwayman” or bandit.   Local law enforcement investigated, but no arrests 
were made nor were there any forms of apology or higher level investigations (formal or 
otherwise) coming from the state government of Texas.  Also, given that the incident 
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occurred in 1939, the State Department was not yet invested in ethnic diplomacy and 
left the near-death of the Mexican Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs to O’Daniel’s 
administration.   Texas’s inaction in this case would prove to be politically regrettable.  
Quintana, already an established name in Mexican politics, went on to manage the 
1946 campaign of Miguel Alemán Valdés (who succeeded Manuel Ávila Camacho) and 
became his Secretary of Finance.  The very idea that the second highest level Mexican 
diplomat could be nearly beaten to death on Texan soil without so much as a flinch from 
the Texan Governor or federal government is telling of the state of ethnic diplomacy in 
April of 1939. 
Ambassador Najera did more than simply send complaints to Cordell Hull, which 
the State Department then forwarded to the relevant state governors, concerning the 
mistreatment of Mexican officials; he also made official grievances over the general 
mistreatment of Mexican nationals.  The previously discussed town of Hamlin, Texas 
(see chapter 2) was one location that earned special attention in late 1940.  While the 
federal government decided to pass this off to Governor O’Daniel, we learn by looking 
at the state documents that at this point in the timeline the governor left incidents like 
this to the local authorities.  The Mexican ambassador attempted to contact the mayor 
of Hamlin, Mr. Joe Culbertson, on two separate occasions; however, no one from the 
town ever responded.  When O’Daniel received a copy of the ambassador’s letter with a 
request from Hull to investigate it further, his secretary responded saying that they 
would indeed look into it.  After an exhaustive search of O’Daniel’s files there was no 
other mention of this incident. 
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Unfortunately, as O’Daniel’s years passed as governor, the discriminatory 
climate against Mexican-Americans and Mexican nationals only continued.  On March 
1, 1941 Mr. Victor Iturbe, Chancellor of the Consulate of Mexico in Corpus Christi, was 
“struck and jailed” by a police officer named William Foerster.162  Iturbe and two others 
had stopped for a Coca-Cola at High Hat, an open-air café on Staples Street, and 
intended to drink them in his automobile.  At the time Coca-Cola’s cost a nickel a piece, 
but when he asked for a bill the waitress stated that he owed thirty cents.  The 
reasoning for charging them double was “…that the Mexican clientele was not desirable 
and that they did not wish to have them at their establishment.”163  Iturbe debated the 
bill with the waitress and the manager, offering to pay the amount if they provide him 
with a receipt.  The one caveat was that the manager or waitress had to write the 
specific reason for the double charge—being Mexican—not just the amount of the 
bill.164  This disagreement resulted in High Hat’s manager calling the police.  Eventually 
three policemen arrived and Iturbe identified himself as a diplomat.  The manager 
relented and asked him to pay the fifteen cents and then leave the property.  When 
Iturbe cited that it was the principle of discrimination against Mexicans that was his 
concern, not the amount, Officer Foerster rudely stated “that he did not wish to hear any 
explanation” and that “it made no difference to him what position he had.”  Instead he 
said he should pay the fifteen cents or get taken off to jail.  Iturbe attempted to explain 
once again; but, as promised a moment before, this led Foerster to grab hold of Itrube 
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and thrust him into the scout car.  He then changed course and pushed him toward the 
patrol wagon instead, delivering “a strong push and a blow on the nape of his neck” on 
the way into the car.165  He was then taken immediately to jail and held until the city 
attorney deemed the entire ordeal a mistake by the police department.  In the end, no 
permanent damage was done to Iturbe, the City of Corpus Christi suspended Officer 
Foerster for fifteen days, and he was ultimately fired.166 
On the surface this example shows a positive resolution to a problem of racial 
discrimination, suggesting that perhaps O’Daniel and the State of Texas had become 
more apt in resolving these sorts of incidents.  However, in reality neither the 
Governor’s office nor the Public Safety Department were investigating or controlling the 
situation.  The local city leaders in Corpus Christi were responsible for resolving the 
issue, not the state of Texas.  In addition, word about the incident reached Governor 
O’Daniel via Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary at the time.  In other words, O’Daniel 
learned about discrimination in his own state from the State Department.  In the 
Mexican Ambassador’s letter to Cordell Hull describing the entire episode, he ended 
with a very telling statement which, if taken in context, was also a backhanded 
compliment directed toward the State Department.  For after years of asking different 
levels of United States government to intervene on behalf of race, it was the 
municipality of a border town that responded: 
I have decided to inform Your Excellency of the above facts because while 
desiring that the Government of the United States be advised in each case of the 
conflicts occurring on the border from purely racial causes, I wish at the same 
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time to state to you my personal pleasure at the energetic and efficient manner in 
which the local authorities of Corpus Christi acted in this case, which is certainly 
the only way of bringing it about that incidents such as that involving Chancellor 
Iturbe should not be repeated in the future.167 
The response to the mistreatment of Mexicans in Texas is just one way to 
understand the way that the U.S. State Department, Texas, and Mexico helped shaped 
policy.    As the later phases of State Department policy demonstrate, a cultural 
approach promoting mutual understanding can be quite effective in generating goodwill 
among foreign nations.  In this regard, Governor O’Daniel did not do himself or his state 
any favors.  On April 14th, 1941—the tenth anniversary of Pan-American Day—Herbert 
Blocker helped organize the American and Mexican Consulates in order to hold a major 
celebration in San Antonio. Blocker and a woman’s activist group known as the Pan 
American Round Table committee setup a “Round Table” meeting as the main event of 
the festivities and invited foreign dignitaries with the understanding that Governor 
O’Daniel would lead the U.S. delegation.168  Mexico agreed to send three officials: 
Alfredo Chavez, Governor of neighboring Chihuahua, Gustavo P. Serrano, Mexican 
Boundary Commissioner and emissary of the Foreign Affairs Office, and General Jaime 
Quinonez.169  Despite trying to ensure Governor O’Daniel’s attendance months in 
advance, the committee was only able to get an answer out of the Governor’s office five 
days before the event.  The letter cordially stated that the governor would be unable to 
attend.  
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While not attending the high profile Pan-American Day in San Antonio was a 
mistake, it was severely compounded by the Governor’s decision to attend the 105th 
commemoration of the Battle of San Jacinto just days later.  Instead of attending a 
holiday that would improve relations between Texas, Mexican-Americans, and Mexico 
just down the road in San Antonio, O’Daniel opted to attend an event near Houston 
celebrating the battle where Texas defeated Mexico.  Not only was the battle a bad 
memory for Mexico, but many Mexicans viewed it as the first step towards the Mexican-
American War and the loss of one-third of their territory.  The Pan American Round 
Table Committee predicted that the scheduling of these two events would pose a 
problem for the governor and even warned him months in advance in a letter asking him 
to “Please bear in mind that as yet many of the Mexicans are resentful to the 
observance of the Fiesta held here each year, commemorating the Battle of San 
Jacinto, and they would not understand you coming for that and not coming for April 
14th, Pan American Day.”170  Choosing which public events to attend as a political 
dignitary may seem inconsequential, but this particular choice equated to a public slap 
in the of Mexican-Americans and Mexico by the State of Texas.  In foreign policy terms, 
Governor O’Daniel failed to act as a dutiful ambassador of goodwill, and instead he 
acted more like a governor, since attending the Battle of San Jacinto commemoration 
would likely win him more votes since Mexicans were not voters in Texas and many 
Mexican-Americans were still being shut out of the ballot box.  Unfortunately for Texas 
and Governor O’Daniel, Mexico viewed Texas as a separate political entity from the 
United States, especially when it came to matters of racial inequality.  O’Daniel did not 
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put much thought into his state’s relationship with their neighbor to the South.  It is fair 
to summarize O’Daniel’s governorship as a time when there were no proactive concerns 
by either the federal government or the state government of Texas in regards to the 
racial aspect of the diplomatic relationship between Mexico and the United States.  
Eventually, O’Daniel took an open Senate seat, and the task of managing 
Texas’s relationship with Mexico fell to Governor Coke R. Stevenson.  Stevenson, 
initially, did not change much when he took over in August 7, 1941.  His first experience 
handling a racially charged international incident occurred only a couple of months into 
his first term and concerned a dry dock in Galveston.  Mr. Rafael Linares, a member of 
the Mexican Foreign Service, alleged that he was assaulted by “Policemen 118” (his 
badge number) with a blackjack on the wharves of the Todd Galveston Dry Dock, Inc.  
In addition, the policeman made “disparaging remarks” about Mexico and its Consular 
Service.171  The Mexican Foreign Service first tried to remedy the problem by dealing 
directly with the Mayor of Galveston; however, by the end of the month nothing was 
resolved, and the issue was escalated to the Mexican Ambassador who reported the 
incident to Secretary Hull.  Since the State Department was still passing off complete 
responsibility for these incidents to the state government, it was turned over to Governor 
Stevenson.172 
The responsibility went full circle as Stevenson contacted the Mayor of 
Galveston, Brantly Harris, for information.  After a brief correspondence Stevenson 
reported back to Hull that the “policemen” in question was actually a security guard for 
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the Galveston Wharves and had been discharged.  In some ways, Stevenson handled 
the problem of a foreign diplomat being assaulted better than his predecessor:  He 
promptly followed up with the State Department, and his office followed the incident’s 
resolution rather than passing off the responsibility to the Public Safety Department.  
Unfortunately for Texas’s standing with Mexico, Stevenson failed in the eyes of the 
Mexican Foreign Service.  He was unaware of the situation until Cordell Hull informed 
his office, and despite the numerous copies of letters mailed back and forth, he 
ultimately did nothing more than back up the City of Galveston, which was the very 
municipality that caused Mexico to take this case to the federal government in the first 
place.  In Mexico’s letters to Mayor Harris it is clear that it was not satisfied with the 
conclusions made by the chairman, George Sealy, of the Galveston Wharves Company.  
These were the same conclusions that the local, state, and (and through deferment) 
federal government ultimately accepted.  Sealy’s version of the story put more of the 
blame on Linares, claiming that Linares first pushed the officer in the stomach and also 
asked him to disobey orders.  He admitted that eventually the gateman indeed hit him 
with a flapjack, but only with an appropriate amount of force to detain Linares.173 
Stevenson was also tested in these early months by the Monterrey, Mexico 
Chamber of Commerce, a notably influential group for the entire region’s economy.  The 
issue concerned the Valley Evening Monitor, a newspaper in the border town of 
McAllen, Texas.  The article’s subject matter was seemingly innocent; it was a story 
about a new flying school opening in nearby Mission, Texas.  The problem arose when 
the author decided to include a company official’s opinion on keeping payroll information 
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private.  The article read: “Fearful of Mexican bandits who might come over here and 
hold up [steal] our payroll, E.D. Combs, official of the Hill and Combs Company, 
declined to divulge payroll figures.”174  This off-the-cuff comment instantly created 
controversy as Mexicans and Mexican-Americans equally took offense to the fear of 
racially stereotyped “Mexican bandits.” 
Monterrey’s relationship with McAllen was already a focal point for Texas-
Mexican relations at this particular time.  A few weeks prior to the Combs comment in 
the Monitor the Monterrey-Reynosa Highway was completed.  The highway itself 
represented a cooperative effort between Texas and Mexico and was a major positive 
mark in an otherwise recently imbalanced ledger of the Texas-Mexico relationship.  To 
commemorate the occasion, the governors of four neighboring Mexican states went to 
McAllen with a group of “outstanding citizens,” many of whom were part of the 
Monterrey Chamber of Commerce, to participate in a number of festivities.  On the 
Texas side, Governor Stevenson opted not to attend, but instead sent Texas House 
Speaker and local icon Hon. Homer Leonard to represent the governor’s office.175  
During the ceremony, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy was used by the Texas officials to 
identify the ideological foundations for the cooperation.  The Monterrey Chamber of 
Commerce still had the words of the Texan leadership in mind when the E.D. Combs 
discriminatory remarks were found in the Monitor a couple of weeks later.  One specific 
thing they recalled in their complaint was a Texan speaker, who they did not specifically 
identify and who supported “mutual understanding and comprehension between our two 
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countries and people.”176  The duality of good-will rhetoric existing alongside racist 
comments in a newspaper was particularly difficult for the Monterrey group to accept.   
The rocky history between Texas, Mexico, and the United States, especially given their 
recent history, made this sort of rhetoric already a difficult notion for many Mexicans to 
believe in 1941.  Therefore, when two weeks later the Valley Evening Monitor published 
racially prejudiced comments, the Monterrey Chamber of Commerce were not just 
disillusioned, but it affirmed their suspicions that Texas had not really changed just 
because of FDR and a new highway.177 
Governor Stevenson’s reactions to the incident were not inappropriate and 
definitely succeeded in de-fusing racial tension in the short term.  With urging from Hull, 
Stevenson responded apologetically to the Monterrey Chamber and attempted to 
explain away the newspaper comment as an exception rather than the rule of how 
Texans perceive Mexicans.  The Monitor also apologized, although masterfully 
managed to do so without taking any blame themselves.  The editor was adamant that 
their newspaper was not racist, but only reported what others believe.  While Stevenson 
met the minimal expectations of the State Department at this time (pre-Pearl Harbor), 
overall he was inept in diplomatically dealing with Mexico’s racial concerns in his state. 
The most revealing episode regarding the Texas state government and racial 
prejudice prior to Pearl Harbor was its reaction to a 1941 state bill concerning racial 
equality.  Governor O’Daniel left office while this racially charged bill worked its way 
through the Texas legislative process for the first time.  Activists from civil rights 
organizations, League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the League of 
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Loyal Americans (LLA), convinced Pagan Dickson, a state representative from San 
Antonio, to introduce House Bill 909 to the statehouse.  Dickson’s proposal was met 
with harsh resistance, or as the San Antonio Light termed it, “laughs, murmurs of 
disapproval and a few shouts of dissent.”178  The bill, which became known as the 
“Racial Equality Bill” stated: “All persons of the Caucasian Race within the jurisdiction of 
the State are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and 
privileges of all public places of business or amusement.”179  The bill specifically did not 
include private establishments as places of racial equality, which raised concerns 
among Mexican diplomats who saw it as an incomplete solution.180   The bill additionally 
outlined that a “Caucasian” who suffered from discrimination could sue for the actual 
damages plus one hundred dollars.  It is important to note here that LULAC and the LLA 
were not trying to give equal public accommodations to all citizens; in fact, the 
terminology was chosen carefully in order to ensure that African-Americans would 
remain segregated and utilized whiteness as a civil claim for civil rights. 
The most important, and interesting, aspect of House Bill 909 was the use of the 
word “Caucasian.” The term brings up the question of which racial category the United 
States placed Mexican-Americans and any person from the vast array of Latin American 
heritages.  LULAC and the LLA believed that “Caucasians” included all mestizos 
(mixed-race); however, other Texans believed otherwise and many others were simply 
confused.  Over the next few years Governor Stevenson received a smattering of letters 
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from concerned citizens asking whether or not they were considered “Caucasian.”  The 
writers ranged from Italian and Irish immigrants to Mexican-Americans with a variety of 
different backgrounds. 181 The simple existence of these letters reveals the complexity 
of the “Caucasian” classification to Texans, but also reinforces the subjectivity of the 
social construct of race itself. 
 By taking a look at the long legal history of Mexican-Americans, a greater 
understanding of their racial status in the 1940s is revealed.  The first time the Mexican 
population in the United States was considered in its entirety by the United States is in 
the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ending the Mexican-American War, where they 
were guaranteed citizenship without regard to any specific racial classification.  As time 
went on there remained no legal distinction, so the racial identities of Mexican-
Americans and other Latin American immigrants were simply formulated at the border.  
Border officials eventually fell into the practice of writing “Spanish Race” or “Mexican 
Race” on their official immigration papers.  The lighter skinned individuals received the 
“Spanish” moniker and the darker skinned immigrants received the “Mexican” label.  
Even in the beginning, the pre-existing white majority in the United States had a difficult 
time placing people from Latin America in the non-white and white racially structured 
dichotomy found in the United States.182 
In 1896, the issue of Mexican-American race finally made its way into a United 
States federal courtroom when Ricardo Rodriguez applied for naturalization in San 
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Antonio, Texas.  The lawyers that sought to deny him citizenship attempted to elicit 
testimony from Rodriguez labeling himself either “Spanish” (and therefore white) or 
“Indian.”  In appearance, the court records state, “As to color he may be classed with 
the copper-colored or red men. He has dark eyes, straight black hair, and high cheek 
bones.”  Rodriguez rebuffed every attempt by the lawyers to associate him within the 
white/non-white dichotomy; instead he simply argued that he was a “pure-blooded 
Mexican.”  The trial became quite the spectacle when numerous local San Antonio 
politicians submitted amicus briefs attempting to scientifically prove that Rodriguez was 
of Native American ancestry based on his appearance and the authority of “scientific 
experts,” therefore suggesting he was ineligible for citizenship. 183  Despite an array of 
testimony against him, Ricardo Rodriguez earned his naturalization thanks to the fact 
that the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo did not specify citizenship requirements 
concerning race.  The judge’s final decision concluded that Rodriguez was probably not 
white, but nor could he be excluded from citizenship.  In other words, the court decided 
to treat Rodriguez as though he was Caucasian legally, while agreeing that he most 
definitely was not white. 
This sort of uncertainty remained until 1935, when a federal judge ruled that 
three Mexican immigrants were ineligible for citizenship because they were not white.  
Mexico complained and Roosevelt decided to act.  He circumvented the court decision 
by simply having all government agencies classify Hispanics as Caucasians.  This was 
even reflected in the 1940 census, where the category “Mexican” was eliminated and 
“Mexican Decent” was included as Caucasian.  This precedent of Caucasian until 
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proven otherwise existed at the time House Bill 909 was introduced; therefore, people of 
Latin American heritage were included in the term “Caucasian” for equal rights within 
public accommodations.  However, while the law may have been inclusive, the state 
legislature and the citizens of Texas, like the Texas court 45 years before, did not see 
Mexican-Americans or even Mexican nationals as truly white in everyday life.184 
The activists behind the bill worked hard to rally support for their cause and they 
clearly understood the difficulty of getting this type of bill passed.  Washington insider 
and LULAC member Alonso Perales attempted to get the State Department and the 
President behind the bill, while regionally based LULAC councils wrote their local Texas 
Congressmen.  These activists did not stop with their own government.  Other members 
contacted the Mexican press, the Mexican embassy, and even coordinated with racial 
activists in Mexico in order to apply foreign pressure.  Their support in Mexico was 
ultimately impressive.  The Mexican Embassy and several prominent Mexican 
newspapers pushed for the bill and attempted to influence the Texas legislature’s 
decision by pressuring the State Department.  As one scholar has noted: 
Novedades, one of Mexico City's largest and most respected newspapers, 
opined: "The Bill presented before the Legislature of Texas ...  constitutes a just 
compensation for the many indignities which our citizens residing in the southern 
part of the United States have sustained." El Universal, another large Mexico City 
newspaper, agreed in an April 23, 1941, editorial: "We salute the Texas 
legislators in the forward steps . .. which they have taken so that all obstacles 
may be eliminated from the road that leads to a true and mutually advantageous 
understanding."185 
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On the northern side of the border, the letters written to Sumner Welles and FDR 
were less successful.  In this way, the U.S. federal government was consistent in its 
policy towards racial prejudice prior to Pearl Harbor—it was up to Texas to decide. 
Despite the vast amount of effort behind the bill, it quickly died in the state legislature 
much to the chagrin of Mexico, groups like LULAC, and the hardworking civil-rights 
activists. 
 
 
Gradual Alignment with the State Department 
Even though December 7th 1941 was a pivot point for several different histories 
within World War II, this was not the case for Governor Stevenson’s stance on racial 
discrimination and Texas’ relationship with Mexico.   While the federal government 
began pushing ethnic diplomacy after Pearl Harbor, and even more strongly after the 
Rio de Janeiro Conference in January, the state of Texas was much slower to change 
its policies.  A better description of this shift in policy would be a “slow climb” rather than 
a true change of course.  Texas may have been slightly more diplomatic to Mexico 
under Stevenson than O’Daniel; however, he and other state leaders only committed 
the minimal amount of effort, and then only when prodded by the State Department and 
Latino-rights activists.  Over the next year-and-a -half Stevenson’s reactions to racial 
incidents become gradually more pronounced.  Stevenson was dutiful in fulfilling the 
demands made on him, but he was not as quick to adjust his own policies as the State 
Department.  Stevenson’s own policy was a gradual and cautious alignment with 
Cordell Hull’s ethnic diplomacy beginning after Mexico shut out Texas from the Bracero 
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Program, climaxing in his signing of House Concurrent Resolution 105, another attempt 
at an Equal Rights Bill in the Texas legislature.  In all fairness to Stevenson, from his 
perspective the extra attention to racial issues was not emphasized as directly as it 
could have been.    
In December of 1941, immediately following Pearl Harbor, the incongruence 
between Texas and federal policy was evident.  Governor Stevenson was once again 
called upon by the State Department in response to a racially charged incident; 
however, this time Secretary Hull’s tone had changed.  They were not simply passing 
off responsibility for mistreatment of a Mexican Consul to the Governor; instead, Hull 
wanted Stevenson to investigate specific reports concerning Mexican-American 
segregation in Texas.  At this stage ethnic diplomacy had not evolved into an on-the-
ground policy, but only existed as an ideology.  The State Department sought to be 
proactive on cultural goodwill while still deferring the problems to the state level.  A new 
era had begun at the department, but it would take some time and the right opportunity 
for their pro-active cultural good-will to be translated into positive action in the American 
Southwest.  In Hull’s letter to Stevenson, the Secretary clearly explained his justification 
for why these types of investigations were necessary: “At this particular time, it is 
imperative that we try to maintain the most cordial relations with our neighbors below 
the Rio Grande.”186  No Texas governor had ever been asked to investigate 
discrimination against Mexican-Americans before and Stevenson was still relatively new 
to the job.  Stevenson forwarded the first, post-Pearl Harbor assignment to the mayors 
of both Hamlin (which had a previous incident in 1940) and Knox City, the two places 
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mentioned specifically by Hull and the Mexican Ambassador.  In other words, he 
handled the issue as he did previous incidents involving Mexican diplomats, making his 
stance on the plight of Mexican-Americans consistent with his dealing with prejudiced 
Mexican diplomats, deferment without accountability. 
This approach, however, would not last.  Over the next year-and-a-half 
Stevenson slowly aligned himself more and more with the State Department’s ethnically 
motivated diplomacy.  This change in policy was reactive in nature and failed to contain 
the proactive cultural goodwill found in federal government policy.  From an 
organizational standpoint, Governor Stevenson’s office began to file paperwork 
concerning racial discrimination in an intriguing new way.  Prior to December 1942, the 
governor’s office organized paperwork of this nature by general correspondence 
headings, such as “Secretary of State” or “Mexico.”  Under the new system, paperwork 
related to Mexican nationals, Mexican-Americans, or any other person of Latin 
American descent was classified as “Interracial Discrimination,” while a separate file, 
“Racial Discrimination” kept all records pertaining to discrimination against African-
Americans.187  This simple organizational reclassification shows, at a minimum, a new 
way of looking at people from Latin America.    
The first incident which occurred during the “interracial discrimination” period 
involved a roller rink in the border town of Harlingen, Texas, just a short drive north of 
Brownsville and Matamoros.  The rink’s owner had left town and his son, who was left in 
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charge, had hung signs that read, “No Mexicans Allowed.”  The governor’s office first 
heard of the problem via one of the usual entities, the Mexican government.  On 
December 4, 1942 the Mexican Embassy in Washington, the State Department, and 
Governor Stevenson were simultaneously informed about the problem by the 
Brownsville Mexican Consul, Francisco Torres Pérez.  Stevenson never responded.  
Twenty days later, Pérez wrote Stevenson again: 
Because the Mexican Embassy in Washington…is interested in knowing the 
steps taken by your office in order to correct the irregular situation in Harlingen 
so far as the Mexican nationals is concerned….I am taken (sic) the liberty to ask 
you to please inform me of your decision in this matter.188     
A newspaperman from the Brownsville Herald also decided to inform Governor 
Stevenson of the discriminatory signage on December 28, since there had been no 
state level response.  It is important to emphasize that Stevenson was acting 
independently of any State Department request for action.  While Hull’s office was made 
aware, instructions were never sent to Stevenson.  Shortly after the second request, 
Stevenson had his assistant pen an order to the Mayor of Harlingen.  The message was 
brief, but pointed, “…the Governor requests that you use your influence in having this 
sign removed.”  The reasoning was also clearly stated, “…in order that it may not in any 
way strain the friendly relation between the United States and Mexico.”189  While the 
roller rink signage would have been passed over by Austin just a year earlier, Texas 
and Coke Stevenson were beginning to fall in line.  A complaint about one sign was now 
considered by the governor’s office as “interracial discrimination.” 
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One of the interesting side effects of Governor Stevenson’s action in Harlingen is 
that a few days after the incident was resolved other citizens in the region began to 
speak out in support of equality for people of Latin American ancestry.  Most notable 
among them was County Judge Oscar C. Dancy of Brownsville.  Dancy was familiar 
with the region and in a two-page letter to the governor provided a number of examples 
of bars and restaurants refusing service to Latin Americans or American citizens with a 
Hispanic appearance.  He informed the governor that he “would not knowingly issue a 
permit (liquor license) where I know such discrimination is going to be.”  The Governor’s 
assistant responded with an acknowledgement which included, “You know, of course, 
that it is the governor’s policy to do everything within his power to further the Good 
Neighbor Policy instituted by Secretary Hull.”190 
 
 
Attempting to Appease Mexico? 
The most important factor for Texas aligning with Ethnic Diplomacy was the 
Bracero Program.  Mexican officials and journalists had warned the United States that 
discrimination was an issue for years by the time the first bracero agreement was first 
being negotiated in February 1941.  The U.S. Embassy in Mexico City learned that the 
Bracero Program hinged on the expansion of the Good Neighbor Policy and sent a 
“Suggested Method of Improving the Situation” to the OCIAA’s Coordination Committee 
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in Mexico and the State Department back in Washington.191  In this way, the U.S. 
Embassy contributed to the piling evidence, including the four reports discussed in the 
previous chapter, that ethnic diplomacy was needed.  These early negotiations yielded 
no results.  The two sides were unable to agree and negotiations stalled until June.  
Mexico’s Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Jaime Torres Bodet, made the same 
argument.  He stated that when Mexicans worked in the United States, due to 
discrimination in wages they were “worse [off economically] after they returned than 
before they went.”  He also alluded that Camacho’s administration was taking a risk in 
making an agreement with the United States.  Ultimately, the Mexican negotiators 
demanded that the United States address the discrimination. 
Retrospectively, it is easy to see Mexico’s growing discontentment with Texas in 
the negotiation of the Bracero Agreement.  In July of 1942, Secretary of Agriculture 
Claude Wickard was sent to the Inter-American Conference on Agriculture in Mexico 
City, where he continued the negotiation over the Bracero Program with Mexican 
officials.  Foreign Minister Padilla was still very reluctant due to recent exploitation and 
discrimination against Mexican-Americans and Mexican nationals in Texas.  Despite 
this, thanks to the existence of ethnic diplomacy and the U.S. conceding on the 
discrimination stipulations, on August 4, 1942 the first Bracero Agreement was 
approved.  This allowed about 4000 Mexican workers, mainly from large southern cities 
like Mexico City or Guadalajara, to work in the United States in any state but Texas.  
The braceros were not the only Mexicans working in the United States however, 
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thousands of illegal farm laborers, who eventually became known as “wetbacks” had 
poured across the border.  This predicament and the logistics of organizing such a 
program led to subsequent agreements.192 
The importance of race to Padilla is even more evident in the more highly 
publicized April 1943 Bracero Agreement.  Under this second agreement about ten 
times more Mexicans joined the Bracero Program, putting the total at about 44,000 
workers.  Four general guidelines were created for the program: First, Mexican contract 
workers would not engage in any United States military service.  Second, and most 
notably, Mexicans entering the United States under these provisions would not be 
subjected to discriminatory acts of any kind.  Third, the workers would be guaranteed 
transportation, living expenses, and repatriation.  Fourth, the Mexicans entering under 
these conditions would not be employed as replacements for domestic workers or in an 
effort to reduce domestic wages.  Most importantly, Mexico made certain to specify that 
all bracero contracts were between the bracero and the United States government, not 
individual farmers.  These contracts would then be supervised by the Mexican 
government.  With this sort of organization, whenever a bracero expressed grievances, 
they could now direct them to the United States federal government, not to some local 
politician (or even governor) who might have power over a particular farmer.193 
According to the Labor Statistics Bureau, the withholding of Mexican labor in 
Texas was a major problem for Texan farmers.  In 1939, Texas employed 300,000 
migratory laborers, almost all of whom were of “Mexican extraction.”   The wartime 
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demand for labor and the draft reduced the number available to 150,000 by 1943.  This 
meant that migratory laborers were in huge demand as the need for labor was only 
increasing alongside the rest of the United States economy.  Housing, treatment, and 
wages for these workers were typically very poor; and in addition, as these laborers 
migrated to different parts of the state, their presence often set off racial disputes.  This 
made for major problem for the governor’s office. Not only were Mexican-American 
activists spreading the word about racial injustices, but Mexico was unwilling to allow 
braceros into the state.194 
1943 had produced a bumper crop of cotton in Texas and farmers were 
constantly after the governor to find more laborers.  A real fear developed when farmers 
pointed out that a potentially large portion of their crops would go un-harvested at a time 
when the government had given them higher quotas.  Stevenson tried a number of 
different solutions, including utilizing prisoners of war, that is until it was reported to the 
Labor Department, but ultimately there was no substitute for Mexican migratory labor.  
In order to maximize Mexican labor, Stevenson needed Mexico on his side.  In some 
ways, one could argue that Mexico coerced Texas into having an international mindset 
in regards to race.  In the spring of 1943 Texas growers petitioned Stevenson, the U.S. 
State Department, and even Padilla himself in an effort to get Mexico to lift the ban.   At 
this point Coke Stevenson sprang into action, consulting directly with State Department 
officials, the OCIAA, a district judge who represented growers in the cotton rich counties 
of Nueces and San Patricio, and perhaps most importantly, Padilla himself.195 
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The new pressure from Texas growers resulted in a number of policies to 
improve race relations.  On the surface things seem to have really changed for Texas 
between December 7, 1941 and May 6, 1943.  Most notably, the Caucasian race bill 
was re-introduced, and this time successfully made its way through both houses and the 
governor but not as a law, but as an unbinding resolution on May 6th.  The existence of 
a re-introduced bill is once again credited to the hard work of many key Mexican-
American leaders and groups such as Alonso Perales, George I. Sánchez, M.C. 
Gonzales, Carlos Castañeda and the Committee on Inter-American Relations (an 
OCIAA funded organization).  This time, in the midst of war and western solidarity, the 
bill was reframed as a wartime necessity to promote the administration’s hemispheric 
solidarity plan.  These non-traditional foreign relations voices once again used a foreign 
relations angle in 1943 rather than a humanitarian plea for racial equality and to an 
extent it worked even better than last time.  Their strategy was to market the Equal 
Rights Bill as adhering to the Good Neighbor Policy.   Again, similar to 1941, the 
Mexican embassy and the Mexican press also added momentum to the bill at the 
national level, contacting the State Department with the hope of increasing federal 
pressure.  This time however, the State Department was receptive, and while unwilling 
to seriously mettle, they did pay special attention to the bill.  
Thanks to this lobbying and a larger group of activists, the bill had a lot more 
momentum than the 1941 attempt.  The initial progress was promising; the house bill, 
Bill 68, passed unanimously.  Unfortunately, in the state senate, the comparable 
legislation, Bill 203, did not have the same success.  Representative Ben Ramsey of 
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San Augustine questioned the definition of “Caucasian race,” and shrewdly moved the 
bill to his subcommittee for an investigation.  Ultimately, Ramsey rejected it and never 
allowed it out of the State Affairs Committee.196  Both houses offered an alternative after 
the bill died: a resolution, which holds no legal ramifications and was essentially 
meaningless, except to perhaps serve as a political barometer on the topic.  In a heavily 
edited format, the Racial Equality Bill became House Concurrent Resolution 105, was 
quickly passed by both houses, and was signed by Governor Stevenson on May 6, 
1943.   
Interestingly, this resolution reveals an interesting limitation to ethnic diplomacy.  
The State Department supported action in terms of curbing Latin American racial 
discrimination, but aimed to do so without public controversy.  Therefore, it was 
somewhat surprising that an OCIAA organization and the State Department both 
backed the bill since groundbreaking legal solutions were not something the State 
Department typically supported under the rubric of ethnic diplomacy.  Ultimately getting 
a bill passed in Texas was worth the risk of a public backlash, although the bill was 
admittedly written to be minimally controversial, since the bracero ban had major 
economic implications for Texas.  When the bill became a resolution and lost the fines, 
this became more acceptable to the State Department.  One internal note to Sumner 
Welles and Laurence Duggan from Department Latin American specialist J.F. McGurk 
emphasized satisfaction that the bill lost its teeth in its final form.  
There is probably disappointment in some quarters because of the removal of 
penalties from this legislation.  Nevertheless, it is of some importance as a 
declaration of policy, and in its present form it no doubt stands more chance of 
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being salutary than it would if aggravating sanctions were provided as an internal 
part thereof.197 
 
Stevenson’s insensitivity regarding the poor treatment of Mexican-Americans and 
Mexicans caught up with Texas with this ban.  While the ban began with the first 
Bracero Agreement In the fall of 1942 , it was not until the spring of 1943 that the ban’s 
significance was felt.  This gap in time from when the ban started and when Texas 
seemed to care seems odd; in fact, the “Texas Ban” does not come up in the 
Governor’s files at all until spring of 1943.  However, this is easily explained by 
contextualizing international racial politics alongside the Texas agricultural calendar.  
The ban occurred in the midst of the 1942 harvest season, a grower’s busiest time of 
year, and when labor was already secured.  Once growers had more time to consider 
political issues and the spring planting season began, bracero labor was suddenly very 
important.  Organized efforts to overturn the ban soon followed.  The Texas Farm 
Bureau embodied this group of Texan growers who were pushing hard for the ban to 
end.  Many thought that Resolution 105 could end the ban and appease Mexico’s 
seemingly distaste for Texas.  Instead, Mexico decided to reemphasize its ban against 
Texas. 198  In a June 17th memorandum Foreign Minister Padilla’s reasoning was 
articulated by the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, George Messersmith. 
[Padilla expressed] regret that this order had been issued which would not make 
possible the going of any Mexican workers under the agreement to Texas.  He 
said, however, that they had these reports of increasing discrimination in 
Texas….he referred to a recent bill in the Texas Legislature which would have 
prevented such discriminations or imposed penalties in case thereof, and he said 
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that the failure of the Legislature to pass the bill has created a bad impression 
here [Mexico].  He understood that the Legislature had contented itself with a 
mere resolution which was ineffective.199 
 
In another note to a State Department official, Messersmith clarified the 
significance of Texas’s exclusion: 
 
To my mind the Mexican government has seized upon the issue with which the 
State of Texas is very much concerned in order to try and get something done 
about discrimination.  I think Dr. Padilla feels that if anything is ever to be 
accomplished with regard to discrimination it must be done during the war when 
our needs from Mexico are so great and so urgent.200 
Had Stevenson responded to the initial banning in 1942, the argument could be 
made that Stevenson was conscious of his state’s relationship with Mexico and as his 
role as a player in international relations.  Instead, he responded only when Texas 
growers pressured him to find a solution and Concurrent Resolution 105 only made 
matters worse.  After passing the Resolution, Stevenson wrote Padilla with help from 
George Messersmith, Ambassador to Mexico.  They emphasized Texas’s commitment 
to the Good Neighbor Program and asked for a lift on the bracero ban.  Padilla was not 
receptive.  He was critical of 105 being only a resolution, the lack of substantial fines 
and punishments, and the Caucasian wording.201  Despite the failure of the resolution, 
at this moment that Governor Stevenson had clearly become proactive in his state’s 
racial problems with Mexico and started on a path that perhaps even surpassed the 
ethnic diplomacy stemming from Washington.  The period of slowly and reluctantly 
aligning his state with the ethnic diplomacy foreign policy of the State Department was 
over. 
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After a lack of progress, Stevenson attempted to repair the ill-will stemming from 
the poorly received Caucasian Equal Rights Resolution by once again taking action.  On 
June 25th he made the “Good Neighbor Policy Declaration” stating FDR’s foreign policy 
to be the “public policy of Texas” and tried to reinforce House Concurrent Resolution 
No. 105 by directing all Texans to abide by it.  In July he directly addressed all law-
enforcement in Texas “to be especially vigilant in order to prevent discriminations 
against Mexicans.” 
Stevenson again tried reasoning with Dr. Padilla directly in a July 12, 1943 letter, 
in what is arguably his first attempt at conducting diplomacy directly by himself.  In the 
seven page letter (see Appendix 1 for full text) he began by admitting that he had only 
recently learned of the Texas bracero ban.  This being the case, the purpose of the 
letter is obvious, Stevenson tried to convince Padilla to remove the ban.  While he 
states this multiple times throughout the letter it is most directly stated in the closing 
paragraph where Stevenson declared his “desire further to assure Your Excellency 
(Padilla) that the people of this State will await with the highest interest the decision of 
the Mexican Government which I hope will permit Mexican workers to come to Texas in 
order to work on our farms, where they are so desperately needed.” Stevenson uses a 
number of different themes to implore Padilla to reverse his decision.  The first point is 
that the racism problem is being fixed.  The Governor argued that “every effort is being 
made to wipe out discrimination as may exist...” and that all Mexican residents and 
Mexican nationals were “entitled to full protection under its laws.”  He pointed out a 
number of specifics such as Concurrent Resolution 105, his proclamation to have all law 
enforcement crackdown on racial discrimination, and a handful of recent goodwill events 
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backed by the OIAA.  Unfortunately, his lack of understanding of Mexico’s position is 
clear when he included his own history of handling incidents of racial discrimination as 
further proof: 
In this connection, I am pleased to advise Your Excellency that not only my 
Office but all branches of the State and Municipal governments in Texas are on 
the alert to ameliorate any misunderstandings that may arise or may have arisen 
through so-called class or race distinction. I am glad to say that Federal and 
State officials have already successfully ironed out a number of such instances, 
which after all Your Excellency must admit have been but a few in comparison to 
the many thousands of Mexican citizens, or U.S. citizens of Mexican descent 
who reside happily in this State.  I may point out the number of cases which your 
Embassy filed with the State Department and which subsequently came to my 
attention have been amicably settled, or are in process of settlement. (I can 
assure Your Excellency that my administration is heartily in sympathy with the 
Good Neighbor policy). 202 
 
While using one’s own record may be smart in a campaign, it was not the best 
strategy to use with Padilla.  The Texas ban originated from Mexico’s perpetual 
disappointment with the Texas leadership’s handling of specific incidents of racial 
discrimination. 
A few days later, Dr. Padilla responded (see Appendix 2 for full text) and while 
remaining formal, he did not mince words.  He setup his argument by making the point 
that Mexico would actually prefer to send braceros to Texas in the spirit of solidarity.  In 
fact, he believed that the two nations recently “have given eloquent and repeated proofs 
that they are building up a new structure of reciprocal understanding founded on solid 
and enduring friendship.”  However, he then directly addressed the hurdle to their 
cooperation.  He informed the Governor of the “situation actually prevailing in the State 
of Texas.”  Padilla then gave a recent example of racial discrimination and stated how 
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prevalent discrimination truly was in Texas.  Furthermore, he made the outstanding 
point that while Consuls report some incidents to the authorities, “newspapers and 
dwellers on the Texas border gather and transmit information directly reaching the 
whole people of the Republic of Mexico.”  These reports, he continued, have “aroused a 
feeling of righteous indignation” among the Mexican people; which suggests that the 
issue for Texas was not only appeasing the Mexican Government, but appeasing the 
Mexican people.   
After explaining why he could not lift the ban, Padilla offered a suggestion for 
how Stevenson might solve this “thorny” problem, “What remedies are available for 
solving this conflict? They are laws, wholesome propaganda, and penalties.”  Padilla 
suggested that Mexico would support any efforts the governor was willing to make to 
improve the race relations or international relations as a whole. 
While Stevenson did not achieve a diplomatic victory with his letter, Padilla’s 
response definitely left the door open. Stevenson therefore continued to follow through 
with his proactive policy against racial discrimination.  Perhaps the most long-lasting 
impact brought about by this change was the Good Neighbor Commission that 
Stevenson referred to in his letter but did not identify by name.   The Commission, which 
was established on August 9, 1943 with $17,000 in funding from the OCIAA, consisted 
of six members, each of whom was appointed by the governor.  If a new complaint 
came into the governor’s office concerning discrimination, the council was forwarded the 
letters.  In addition, they often took the lead in promoting goodwill and preemptively 
trying to curb racial prejudice (this commission is discussed more thoroughly in a later 
chapter). 
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The most visible example of cultural-goodwill exhibited by Governor Stevenson 
was a two-week long tour of Mexico.  This visit was carefully planned out Padilla, the 
State Department, the OCIAA, and the newly formed Good Neighbor Commission.  In 
addition, the OCIAA made sure it was received an extraordinary amount of press 
coverage, creating ample opportunities for news reel clips.  The strategy was similar to 
modern-day politicians who make several short appearances a day to maximize their 
local news coverage.  The notes for one newsreel which played in Monterrey, Ciudad 
Victoria, and Mexico City reveal the tightly controlled presentation of Stevenson to 
Mexico: 
Governor and delegation arrive by bus at Monterrey.  Pretty girl in party carries 
banner (close-up) reading in Spanish “Greetings, Friends—from the Valley of the 
Rio Grande.”  Governor is greeted by Mexican dignateries (sic).  Long shot of 
Governor and party in balcony of Gran Hotel Ancira.   
Party leaves for the State of Tamaulipas, to attend the local Agricultural 
Exposition (at the town Tamatán) in Ciudad Victoria (Tamaulipas).  Governor 
Stevenson is greeted (with speech) by the Governor of Tamaulípas, Senor 
Magdaleno Aguilar.  The two governors proceed to Exposition grounds and look 
around.203 
 
The climax of Stevenson’s time in Mexico was his participation in Mexico’s  
 
Independence Day.  This too was not coincidental.  Stevenson and the State 
Department were hoping to come down sooner in a hope to resolve the issue as soon 
as possible and before the fall harvest season.  However, Padilla insisted on 
Stevenson’s appearance on the 16th of September celebration to maximize the effect. 
President Ávila Camacho and key members of his cabinet, including Padilla, appeared 
at the celebration event with three very special North American guests: Governor 
Stevenson, OCIAA Director Nelson Rockefeller, and U.S. Ambassador to Mexico 
George Messersmith.  The pairing of Stevenson with two extremely vocal proponents of 
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the Good Neighbor Policy was not an accident.  The trip was a calculated effort to show 
a policy change in Texas and to attain more Mexican workers to harvest Texas cotton.  
Governor Stevenson had finally put himself fully on board with the Good Neighbor 
Policy.204 
 Unfortunately for Stevenson, the results he wanted were not the resulted he 
achieved.  Truly ending discrimination is much harder than making a few public 
appearances and issuing declarations.  The 1960s Civil Rights Amendments proved 
that even making laws as Padilla suggestion cannot truly change the way people think.  
As for what Stevenson seemed to care about the most, the bracero ban against Texas 
lasted until 1947.  Even then it was only rescinded because it had become ineffective.  
Texan growers had been recruiting laborers from the Mexican side of the border for 
quite some time, but beginning in 1945 large numbers of Mexicans began migrating 
north making the process much easier. 
 
 
 
Conclusion: So What? 
The importance of Texas’s version of ethnic diplomacy is two-fold: It reveals how 
a state can, or refuse not to, conduct its own foreign policy and it provides further insight 
into reasons why the United States government acts against racism.  In an historical 
irony, Texas in wartime became diplomatically somewhat like they were politically 
during their time as a republic: independent, yet closely connected to the United States.  
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In its relationship with Mexico during World War II, Texas had a foreign policy of its own, 
but the best way to understand it is by its level of adherence to the State Department’s 
stance on the same issue.  Texas’s governors during the 1940s initially acted 
independently from the State Department in terms of their relationship with Mexico 
concerning racial prejudice; however, Texan action, or inaction at first, is only 
understood as independent when compared with the federal government’s ethnic 
diplomacy which began after Pearl Harbor.  After a couple years of conflicting foreign 
policies, the priorities—although not the reasoning these priorities—of Coke Stevenson, 
the State Department, LULAC, and even Mexico aligned to the point where all parties 
could agree on the pursuance of cultural goodwill and a strategy for handling racial 
prejudices in Texas.  Stevenson wanted the ban lifted, the State Department wanted 
good relations with Mexico, LULAC wanted Caucasian standing for Latinos, and Mexico 
wanted better long term relations with the United States and racial equality.205 
Both federal and state level versions of ethnic diplomacy were motivated 
differently.  As previously discussed, the federal policy went through a multi-phase shift.  
The primary motivation behind ethnic diplomacy for the State Department was 
sustaining hemispherical solidarity and the security and access to resources that come 
from such “good neighbors.”  On the other hand, Texas policy was more reactionary in 
manner.  Once Mexico flexed its diplomatic power and prevented Texas from 
participating in the Emergency Farm Labor (bracero) program, Texas leadership 
became proactive themselves in currying Mexico’s favor.     
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On the subject of whether or not an individual state can conduct its own foreign 
policy, Texas practiced ethnic diplomacy once Mexico decided to treat Texas differently 
than the rest of the United States.  This serves as a very interesting case-study of a 
Latin American nation attempting to coerce a state to adhere to their terms.  Thanks to 
the unique position of Mexico being able to influence the labor needs of Texas 
agriculture, they were able to affect something all politicians care about—large blocks of 
voters.206  As a whole neither the federal government nor Texas decided to address 
racial prejudices with the purpose of simply ending their existence for that sake alone.  
Instead, action required both activists who were willing to advance the cause and 
additional political goals which overlapped with the concept of ethnically centered 
diplomacy or public policy.  Indeed, it does take more than just seeing Russia from your 
house to influence foreign policy. 
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 In 2011, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated that about 15.2 million people—or 
40% of the population—identified as Hispanics or Latinos in California.  51 years prior, 
California also had a notably large Hispanic population (second to Texas).  It was less 
than half a million people, but this still accounted for 16% of the population.  This 
number grew rapidly throughout the war, and by its end, it is estimated that California 
had the largest Hispanic community in the United States.  Given the relatively large 
population in 1940, and its rapid growth, it is not surprising that California experienced 
the most visible incidents of racial prejudice against Hispanics during World War II—
after all, it would not be the first time California served as a catalyst of conflict between 
Mexico and the United States.  However, despite negative historical memories, 
incidents such as the Sleepy Lagoon Murder and the Zoot Suit Riots, California did not 
garner the same disdain from Mexico as Texas.  California was not subject to a bracero 
ban like Texas, nor did the Golden State garner the same political focus from Mexico’s 
foreign affairs office as the Lone Star State.  From a simple comparative standpoint, the 
racial violence in California was much more offensive than any violence that occurred in 
Texas and yet California was not punished by Mexico.  California’s ethnic diplomacy, 
which worked in close conjunction with the State Department was the difference. 
 Similar to Texas, during World War II California’s version of ethnic diplomacy was 
largely determined by two governors: Culbert Olson and Earl Warren.  Unlike the 
situation in Texas however, Olson and Warren were not from the same political party; in 
fact, they were political rivals who differed on a variety of issues.  What makes this 
relationship most compelling is that Warren served as Olson’s Attorney General before 
winning the seat himself and was the given the responsibility of implementing Olson’s 
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policies against racial prejudice.  The two had long been less than cooperative, but after 
Pearl Harbor their feuding hit an entirely new level.  Irving Stone’s biography of Earl 
Warren puts a lot of the blame onto Olson, stating that “Governor Culbert Olson 
distrusted all Republicans, reasoning that their one objective was to defeat him at the 
next election….very soon he came to the conclusion that the Attorney General’s 
movements throughout the state were aimed at building a political machine which would 
enable Warren to supplant him in 1942.”207  Olson’s biographer on the other hand 
explains the distrust as something that became more exacerbated as Olson continued 
to leave Warren out of California’s wartime planning and defense.208 
 The historical records of these wartime governors are extremely interesting as 
they relate to their polices on racial prejudice.  Warren’s career is paradoxical.  He is 
best remembered for the landmark Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka case as 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; but, as governor his stance on racial prejudice is 
notoriously tied to Japanese internment.  FDR’s Executive Order 9066, which made 
internment a reality, came in February of 1942 with a large amount of support from then 
California Attorney General Earl Warren who was tasked with implementing the order.  
As the gubernatorial election unfolded over the next few months, Governor Olson and 
the hyper-active Attorney General clashed over the internment of approximately 
110,000 people.  Most historical literature—including some apologetic biographers—
places Warren as the major advocate of the order.  While internment officially began 
under Olson’s tenure, his support was reluctant and he initially believed that the camps 
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were unnecessary.  This provided ammunition for Warren who took ownership of the 
program.  Warren’s campaign emphasized this difference in racist and colorful 
language, labeling Olson as a “Jap Lover.”209  If one is to believe Warren’s campaign 
literature, Olson was busy entertaining Japanese delegations as late as 1942, while 
Warren was rounding up Japanese dissidents.210  Warren also targeted Olson’s plan to 
utilize interned prisoners to meet the labor shortage.  Instead, Warren wanted to “shut 
the door” on the camps.  This political attack garnered substantial press coverage.  
Within days, embellished headlines such as "Olson Assailed for Jap Plan: Use of 
Orientals for Farm Labor Called 'Unthinkable,'" and "Olson Called War Failure” made its 
way into California’s newspapers.   Perhaps the most aggressive attack from Warren’s 
camp came when a group of interned prisoners requested absentee ballots.  While this 
appears to have been an independent effort on the prisoners’ part, Warren’s people 
accused the Olson administration of trying to secure a few extra votes from the 
Japanese prisoners—further painting Olson as “soft” on securing the Pacific coast.  
Olson and Warren definitely had different ideas about race, especially when it came to 
security.  However, just as in Texas, a single (albeit highly controversial) example does 
not provide enough evidence to make a blanket generalization about their roles in ethnic 
diplomacy.   
While Olson and Warren were rivals, they had similar strategies for promoting 
ethnic relations between California and Mexico.  After all they did formulate the initial 
strategy while working together as colleagues.  While they had similar results, Culbert 
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Olson and Earl Warren had different approaches to managing California’s relationship 
with Mexico: Olson was led by idealism and his support of FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy, 
while Warren carefully balanced his state’s farm labor needs, the views of his 
constituents, and the diffusing of a potentially explosive racially-charged environment. 
 
Culbert Olson, The Sleepy Lagoon Murder, and Mexican Friendship Day 
 Unfortunately, at this point in time dissecting Culbert Olson’s specific actions in 
terms of dealing with racial prejudice against people of Latin American ancestry is very 
difficult.  The internal records for his term in office are practically nonexistent.  
Thankfully, a combination of federal records, speeches, proclamations, and a published 
collection of his papers shed enough light onto the topic to comprehend his ideology, his 
commitment to FDR and his policies—especially the Good Neighbor Policy, and the 
State Department’s ethnic diplomacy.211 
Culbert Levy Olson is perhaps one of the most interesting and resolute 
governor’s in California’s history.  He has the distinction of being the first Democrat to 
hold the office since the 19th century.212  His path to the governorship began with a state 
senate seat as part of the Upton Sinclair’s End Poverty in California campaign in 1934.   
While Sinclair, the famed former Socialist Party leader, lost his bid for governor as a 
recently converted Democrat, Olson won his seat representing Los Angeles and went 
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on to win the 1938 gubernatorial election with Roosevelt’s endorsement.  In an 
interesting comparison to Texas Governor, W. Lee O’Daniel, Olson also had a difficult 
time in office from the very start.  His personal life was shattered only days after his 
inauguration where he deemed the defense of civil liberties his “sacred duty.”  He 
collapsed and was diagnosed with an ailing heart, while not long afterwards his wife 
died.  Politically, things went just as poorly.  Olson was a victim of extreme partisanship, 
being blocked at nearly every turn as his progressive views met resistance from the 
largely Republican state senate and the conservative Democrat controlled house.  In 
addition, his atheism ostracized him further from California’s Christian population.213   
While his time as governor was not the most productive, he was a very prolific 
public speaker and his opinions on racial discrimination are well recorded.   One topic 
that he occasionally discussed was tolerance.  This was vocalized on a number of 
occasions; however, never more clearly than in his April 5, 1941 speech entitled, 
“Council Against Intolerance in America:” 
But in our country, where from the earliest days, people came to escape one sort 
or another of suppression and oppression, where, since earliest settlement, 
people of all races and creeds and shades of belief came in search of freedom; 
freedom of mind and religion as well as economic freedom; we have found 
constant and continuing need for tolerance within our own land.  We needed it in 
order that we might live together as neighbors, as Good Neighbors.214 
While no records exist to corroborate his usage of the term “good neighbors” in 
this speech, given his highly partisan record and coattail relationship with FDR it would 
be an extraordinary accident if Olson was not implying a double meaning of good 
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neighbors within the United States and the United States as a “Good Neighbor” with 
Latin America. 
Olson was also ahead of his time in his support of Pan-American Day, supporting 
the holiday at a time when the holiday did not stretch to the American southwest.  In a 
1939 proclamation he extolled the unity of American nations through a “common bond 
of mutual understanding and mutual cooperation.”  He went on to point out that “…all 
follow the same general pattern of self-government.  Our economics are basically alike.  
Our culture provides stimulus to all of us, one with the other.  Standing firm on this rock 
of mutuality, we need not fear, singly or collectively, penetration of ideologies foreign to 
our inherent conceptions.”215 
Even though Olson was a liberal on race relations, his public addresses starting 
in 1942 became more specific with regard to cultivating better race relations and a 
greater understanding between all Americans.  The most notable reasons for this 
change in policy were the beginning of World War II, the State Department’s increased 
emphasis on ethnic diplomacy, and most specifically for California, the Sleepy Lagoon 
murder.  A better understanding of the Sleepy Lagoon incident is necessary to fully 
understand trend towards ethnic diplomacy. 
   The Sleepy Lagoon case began as a straightforward yet violent crime, but ended 
as a major element in the wartime relationship between Mexico and the United States.  
The visibility of this type of case was something that the State Department had been 
trying to avoid since the inception of ethnic diplomacy.  In a letter that circulated through 
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the Division of American Republics, the El Paso Consul asked the Washington D.C. 
office about holding hearings against racial discrimination as a way to ameliorate 
relations with Mexicans.  The response, penned by Laurence Duggan right hand man 
and Assistant Chief of the Division of the American Republics George Winters, was 
clear, “I am strongly opposed to the holding of public hearings in the Southwest on 
racial discrimination for the following reasons….”  Winters goes on to argue that 
education and investment in Mexico were the two things he believes will help the two 
countries reach a better understanding.  He also pointed out that “I feel that public 
hearings, with accusations and testimony from both sides (and there are two sides) 
would be certain to increase the existing ill feeling, just at a time when we are trying to 
diminish that feeling.”  He also reasoned that a record of public hearings would give 
ammunition to “Axis agents” who were “seeking to discredit us in Mexico.”  When this 
letter made its way to Laurence Duggan’s desk, a key advisor on all U.S.-Latin 
American relations at the time, he added that “I thoroughly agree with your conclusion,” 
and asked Winters to prepare a letter specific to Roosevelt.216 
 Despite the State Department’s best efforts, the murder trial in Southern 
California became a racially charged spectacle.  It ultimately became significant for its 
symbolism, motivation for political activism, and international public interest rather than 
for the crime itself.  The victim, twenty-two year old José Díaz, unfortunately became 
more of a footnote as the case became increasingly politicized.  Despite the polarization 
that occurred in Los Angeles—and eventually across North America—Diaz’s story 
definitely qualifies as a true murder mystery.   
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Díaz decided to attend a neighborhood party thrown by the Delgadillo family in 
honor of their daughter Eleanor’s birthday; however, the story is instantly intriguing as 
the record indicates that Díaz, prior to his departure, had told his mother that he had a 
strange feeling about attending the party.  Díaz then walked the short distance to the 
party amidst the meager ethnic-minority housing of rural Los Angeles County on 
Williams Ranch near a swimming place nicknamed “Sleepy Lagoon,” where he was 
greeted as an invited guest.  Díaz knew that this would likely be one of the last times he 
saw his friends and neighbors, but not because of his impending death.  Instead Díaz, a 
native Mexican, had volunteered to fight for his adopted country and was to report to a 
local recruiting center on Monday.  This being the case, Díaz uncharacteristically drank 
until late in the night, leaving with a couple of men at about one o’clock in the morning.  
He staggered away from the Delgadillo’s home, but once he was out of range of the 
single porch light he was viciously attacked, suffering several blows to his face, arms, 
and head until he was eventually punctured twice in the stomach with an ice pick.  He 
died a few hours later in Los Angeles General Hospital.217 
Even before the suspects were indicted, Díaz’s death was polarizing.  The Los 
Angeles Times in the 1940s was still a conservative paper in regard to social values, 
including racial boundaries.218  Its coverage of Díaz’s death hit the front page; however, 
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it was only covered as part of a larger article that generalized a particularly eventful 
weekend of violence in East Los Angeles.  East Los Angeles in this context referred to 
the industrial neighborhoods near the railroads, specifically the mixed race 
neighborhoods which began in the African-American dominated Central Avenue district 
and went eastward to Boyle Heights, Brooklyn Heights, and Lincoln Heights.  The “in 
between” racial status of Mexican-Americans put them in an interesting place as a 
social group; Mexican Americans were technically “Caucasian” and were not 
susceptible to the same restrictions as African Americans and therefore had more 
freedom in choosing where they lived.219  Most dwelled in the aforementioned Eastern 
racially diverse neighborhoods, but thanks to their inclusion as “Caucasians,” others 
were able to move into areas dominated by whites, making them a much more visible 
minority to whites during the war. 
Thus, when the Times featured an article about violence in East L.A., citing 
Díaz’s murder as evidence, it was sending a very specific message.  The coverage of 
the Sleepy Lagoon Murder was part of a larger campaign against “juvenile crime” that 
began a few months earlier in the spring of 1942.  At the same time that Executive 
Order 9066 was being carried out in Los Angeles through the rounding up of Japanese 
Americans, this campaign exaggerated the extent of juvenile crime amongst Mexican-
Americans.  Newspapers like the Los Angeles Times and Hearst’s Examiner carried 
article after article embellishing the reality of the racially estranged.  As Carey 
McWilliams, eventual chairman of the Citizens’ Committee for the Defense of Mexican 
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American Youth and then Commissioner of Immigration and Housing in California, 
wrote retrospectively in Southern California: An Island on the Land, “they soon had the 
public clamoring in semi-hysterical fashion, for ‘action’ and ‘strong methods.’”220 
 By the time of Díaz’s murder, Los Angeles Area law enforcement, led by the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD), had answered the media and the white 
population’s outcry by cracking down on Mexican youth violence.  It was this heightened 
awareness of youth violence that initially made the case so high profile.  The law 
enforcement agencies proceeded to make an example out of this particular episode and 
questioned hundreds of young men and women over the next few weeks, eventually 
announcing that twenty-two members of the 38th Street Gang were responsible for the 
murder. 
 The legal portion of this incident, known as People v. Zammora, began in 
October 1942.  Looking at the case from a broad perspective, and comparing it to 
countless other racially charged legal cases, the initial result was not surprising.  A 
hard-nosed judge known as Charles “San Quentin” Fricke was assigned the case, 
noteworthy since he had sent more men to San Quentin than any other judge in 
California history. The final verdict came in January of 1943 and tallied seventeen guilty 
young Mexican-Americans.  However, it was hardly a verdict handed down by a jury of 
“peers.” The twelve white jurors had been openly hostile towards the defense’s legal 
team and had been allowed to read the one-sided press coverage while the trial was in 
progress.  While it may not have been as blatantly racially obtuse as Pace v. Alabama 
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(1883) or the two cases regarding Japanese internment: Hirabayashi v. United States 
(1943) and Korematsu v. United States (1944), there was most definitely a racial 
division in Los Angeles which affected the defendant’s fate.221 
The key aspect of the Sleepy Lagoon incident is the connection between race, 
grass-roots politics, and governor-U.S Foreign Policy politics.  Much of the Mexican-
American community in Los Angeles, along with Mexican-American civil rights groups, 
and Mexican officials were upset with the outcome of the People v. Zammora.  Aware of 
the potential unrest, Walter Laves, director of the OCIAA’s Inter-American Division 
arrived in Los Angeles in October to observe the trial (more on Laves and the Inter-
American Division in the next chapter).  Laves and a representative from the Office of 
War Information met with journalists and local officials in an effort to restrain 
discriminatory views and diffuse the tense situation.  Laves also met with leaders from 
within the Los Angeles Mexican population and promised to intervene to improve their 
social standing and address the racism.  The OCIAA had a notable presence in Los 
Angeles during the trial and throughout the rest of the war. 
It was not just the federal government acting however.  With the blessing of 
Laves, a handful of progressive thinkers from this community decided to organize in the 
wake of the Sleepy Lagoon incident.  They formed the Citizen’s Committee for the 
Defense of Mexican American Youth (also known as Sleepy Lagoon Defense 
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Committee) before the case’s final remarks were made.  Their goal was to appeal the 
expected verdict and “procure justice for the boys.”  Their initial letter for support read, 
“We are not being pessimistic, just factual.”222  A key method to their success was 
making the case nationally-known and utilizing the unique wartime situation to harness 
international pressure. 
 The first major publication to come from the Citizen’s Committee for the Defense 
of Mexican American Youth was The Sleepy Lagoon Case, a free-to-distribute pamphlet 
first published in June 1943, outlining their viewpoint on the case.  The committee was 
quite effective at gaining support for their cause, arguably more successful than any 
previous group in California with racial-equality minded goals, and even got Orson 
Welles to write the foreword.  At the time this was quite the endorsement, given that 
Welles had just released Citizen Kane in 1941 and The Magnificent Ambersons in 
1942.223  Another interesting way of viewing Welles’s involvement, besides just a 
Hollywood endorsement, is that it was a direct attack on William Randolph Hearst due 
to his newspaper’s adversarial role in the case; not as public or memorable as those 
found in Citizen Kane, but political and controversial nonetheless.224   Welles had also 
personally played a role with Nelson Rockefeller’s Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs Motion Picture Division.  Welles shot a feature film consisting of three 
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short stories: "My Friend Bonito," "Carnaval" (or "The Story of Samba"), and 
"Jangadeiros" 225  The three segments were shot entirely in Mexico and Brazil and 
promoted a greater appreciation of Latin America; unfortunately, Nelson Rockefeller left 
the board of directors of the film’s sponsor RKO Radio Pictures, and the film project was 
terminated.226  Welles’s contribution to the pamphlet was only a single page, but it 
directly addressed the problem of racial prejudice against Mexican Americans.  He 
simply recalled something that had stuck in his head about “The Pachuco Murder” from 
waiting in line at the Army induction center.227  A seemingly random encounter with 
gentleman identified as Pete Vasquez told Welles,  
The fellas down in our section—there's nothing bad about them, no more than 
anywhere else. But things are tough. There's nowhere to go—no place to play 
games—or nothing—. If the cops catch you on the street after 8 o'clock, usually 
they run you in—or rough you up, anyway. If you look like a Mexican you just 
better stay off the street, that's all—. And where can you go? It's real bad. I'm 
going into the Army, and it's all right with me. I'm glad to be going. Things'll be 
better in the Army, and I'm glad of the chance to fight. It makes it hard, though, 
for a lot of our fellas to see things that way. They want to fight for their country, all 
right—but they want to feel like it's their country.228 
While Welles’s experience with Vasquez was probably more of a discussion over 
the Zoot Suit Riots than the Sleepy Lagoon trial, his concern for the cause made for a 
credible opening among the thousands who received a copy. 
The international approach in the Citizen’s Committee’s argument is obvious 
from the very beginning of the pamphlet’s text; in fact, the prologue essentially argues 
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that Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy was at risk thanks to the trial’s (and all other acts 
of) racial injustice.  A particularly interesting point is how the prologue’s author, 
Executive Secretary of the Council for Pan American Democracy Marion Bachrach, 
related the almost-year-old Sleepy Lagoon trial to racial violence across the nation, 
including against African-Americans.  The Council had previously published a pamphlet 
in 1940 detailing the Havana Conference and would later fund another about the rise of 
fascism in Argentina.229  She pointed out how “just as the first edition of this pamphlet 
was rolling off the press…in widely scattered parts of the country, those insurrections 
which President Roosevelt declared ‘endanger our national unity and comfort our 
enemy’ were indeed taking place.”  She specifically mentioned Mobile (Alabama), 
Beaumont (Texas), Los Angeles and Detroit; however, even more interesting was the 
fact that she believed these instances “made clear to the whole nation the pattern of 
Axis plans for the disruption of the home front at a time when the perspective of a speed 
victory abroad was opening….”230  Bachrach believed this Axis plan of racial 
divisiveness began with the unjust Sleepy Lagoon verdict.  Bachrach and her Council 
for Pan-American Democracy would later be discovered as Communist fronts.  Marion 
herself was the sister of John Abt, the chief counsel to the Communist Party USA and 
the Council for Pan-American Democracy which would be officially labeled a 
“Subversive Organization” by Attorney General Herbert Brownell Jr. in 1955. 
While an underground Axis plot to racially divide the United States is conspiracy 
theory at its best, Bachrach labeled of the Zoot Suit Riots as “anti-Mexican pogroms” 
                                                           
229 Dr. Charles Obermeyer, “The Havana Conference“ Council for Pan-American Democracy. 1940. Ricardo M. 
Setaro, “Argentina, Fascist Headquarters,” Council for Pan-American Democracy. 1944. 
230 Ibid. 
149 
 
and their international implications proved to be accurate.  She believed the racial 
prejudices found within the United States “produced a situation which continues [to be] 
dangerous to hemisphere unity and to the war effort.”  In addition, she reminded readers 
of Mexico’s most impactful tool for exerting pressure onto the United States—the U.S. 
need for Mexican labor: “Foreign Minister Padilla of Mexico has been obliged to make 
the further migration of Mexican agricultural workers to the United States dependent on 
firm measures to assure that they are not discriminated against when they cross the 
border.”231 
Bachrach also cited Roosevelt and Ávila Camacho from their face-to-face 
meeting on April 20, 1943.  She gave a few lines from each speech, proving how the 
two leaders see their nation’s founding fathers as—in Roosevelt’s words—“men of the 
same stamp.”  As many political critics do, Bachrach took a public statement and 
associates it with his present situation—the result was an immediate contradiction due 
to racial prejudice: 
The conviction of the 17 boys in the Sleepy Lagoon case is based on the "theory" 
that the Catholic priest Hidalgo and the Indian liberator Juarez, far from being 
"men of the same stamp as Washington and Jefferson," were "biologically 
inferior." And that their descendents can find no common cause with the "Anglo-
Saxon" children of Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln.  
The immediate and unconditional pardon of the 17 boys would therefore 
represent an important victory over that "theory" and over the chief propagator of 
racist nonsense—Adolf Hitler. The demand for their pardon is more than a matter 
of simple justice—it has become a weapon for victory.232 
While the State Department already had a vested interest in ending racial 
prejudice, it is obvious that from the very beginning community organizations—with 
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varying degrees of communist influence—advocating racial equality for Mexican-
Americans were able to leverage this connection between foreign policy and racism in 
the United States to their advantage.233 
Unfortunately, the issue of race in southern California as it relates to international 
relations was not as straightforward for the State Department as it was in other 
locations.  The threat of Sinarquismo made simply quelling, appeasing, or holding 
cultural events an inadequate response given the wartime situation.  Sinarquismo, or 
Mexican Synarchism, was a strong challenge to the ruling party of Mexico, the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (popularly known in Spanish with the acronym PRI) and 
was rooted in the extreme right of the Catholic church.  Many political commentators 
have likened their ideals to fascism.  The concern truly became relevant to this narrative 
on September 11, 1941, when President Ávila Camacho authorized the right-wing (and 
often assumed Nazi sympathizing) Unión Nacional Sinarquista (UNS) to form a colony 
in Bahía Magdalena, Baja California in a shortsighted effort to get them far away from 
the capital.234  This was especially controversial because Mexico had built up its military 
defenses in the area prior to the war, making it the focus of their Pacific defense with a 
new naval base and five airfields in the region.235  Therefore, when the Pearl Harbor 
attack caused political and military scrambling across the entire American Pacific coast, 
the founding of the UNS colony, named María Auxiliadora, five days later on December 
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12th raised some major concerns in American West.  Why would Mexico authorize the 
group of Mexicans most politically similar to the Axis powers, to settle near the U.S. 
border alongside the nation’s biggest supply of military equipment on the Pacific 
Ocean?  This reality, combined with Mexico’s delayed declaration of war against Japan 
and Germany in May 22, 1942, and only after multiple Mexican vessels were destroyed 
by German submarines, as compared to most Central American and Caribbean 
neighbors which declared war within days of Pearl Harbor.  To make matters worse, 
many U.S. leaders believed that the Mexican-American immigrant population was filled 
with rightists, some even estimated 50,000 UNS members lived in California.236 
The impact of Sinarquismo on ethnic diplomacy complicates the direct 
connection of racial prejudice with U.S. foreign relations and makes California’s case 
unique.  Once newspapers, especially Heart newspapers, began chronicling the 
misbehavior of the Mexican youth and the Sleepy Lagoon case in Southern California 
there was an immediate interest from the national government that had more to do with 
preventing a Mexican-American based, UNS led, fifth-column than improving race 
relations for the sake of international cooperation.  Fear of fascism in the 1930s and 
early 1940s was not uncommon in the United States and was definitely not isolated to 
Southern California.  The American Left often associated political threats from the Right 
with fascist thought: People such as Henry Ford (anti-labor union), Charles Lindbergh 
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(isolationism), and William Randolph Hearst (reactionary newspapers) became targets.  
To those who viewed fascism with this loose definition, the Mexican-American injustice 
in Los Angeles was an example of fascism spreading at home, an attempt to perpetuate 
the exploitation of an entire race of people.  For believers in conspiracy, Hearst’s 
involvement and the seemingly exaggerated coverage of Mexican-American gang 
violence proved the existence of a Sinarquista plot.237  In many ways, the United States 
government feared Sinarquismo as they did the Japanese-American population, proving 
yet again that racial categorization was a legitimate means of addressing security 
concerns.  A major FBI investigation surrounded the juvenile delinquency of Los 
Angeles in 1942, with special attention paid to Sinarquismo.  In the end of course, the 
report found the threat to be falsely represented.  The Mexican-Americans involved 
were not fascists, and they were not in league with the people printing the hysteria-
causing articles in the newspaper, and most importantly they were not trying to 
overthrow the United States. 
The Los Angeles Grand Jury had a major responsibility in regards to the 
upcoming Sleepy Lagoon Trial.  They were living in a highly racialized area, during a 
highly racialized time period and sought outside consultation.  Before the initial People 
v. Zammora  trial (October 19, -  January 12, 1943), which was the largest mass trial in 
California history at the time, the Los Angeles County Grand Jury heard the testimony of 
Guy T. Nunn, Field Representative of the OCIAA collaborating War Manpower 
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Commission’s Minority Groups Service.  Nunn hoped to set the tone for the entire trial 
and began by congratulating the L.A. Grand Jury for “its public spirited determination” to 
learn about “the basic facts underlying the ‘Mexican’ juvenile delinquency problem.”238  
Nunn’s testimony was a broad take on the Los Angeles juvenile delinquency 
problem, relating it to more general causes and contextualizing it internationally.  He 
began with some numerical analysis of the Mexican-American population—mainly data 
from the 1940 census.  He estimated that 3.5 million people of Spanish-speaking 
descent lived in the United States and “approximately 50% of them are still nationals of 
Mexico or are incompletely naturalized.”  More importantly than this type of 
ethnographic data was his assertion that “whatever the national or racial origin of this 
population group, it is improper, misleading and dangerous, to deal with juvenile 
delinquency among them as though it were a ‘Mexican’ problem.”239  Instead, he 
blamed delinquency on “poverty, excessive housing concentration, social and economic 
discrimination,” which in his opinion was far more characteristic of the Spanish-speaking 
minority than “juvenile delinquency.”  Therefore he argued that a juvenile delinquency 
problem did indeed exist, but was not caused by skin color.  Instead, the situation was 
caused by limited employment opportunities “which this group has been confined by a 
combination of historical coincidence, deliberate design on the part of certain employing 
classes, and gross-neglect or short-sightedness on the part of many community and 
government agencies in their handling of Spanish Americans.”240 
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239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid. 
154 
 
With this more sociological paradigm of Los Angeles’s racial strife, Nunn made a 
series of notable suggestions to the Grand Jury—which taken as a whole is a form of 
ethnic diplomacy—a phrase he practically stated himself: 
Of more immediate importance than any of the steps previously mentioned, 
however, would be the creation, under the auspices of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs, of an administrative apparatus especially geared to serve the 
needs of Spanish-speaking people within the United States.  No more effective 
gesture of international good will could be made in the direction of Latin 
America.241 
 
Some of his suggestions were extremely radical for the time.  They included  
 
desegregating schools and government sponsored vocational labor programs for 
“delinquent youth.”   
As the months passed and the trial’s guilty verdict arrived, it seems as though 
Nunn’s suggestions fell on deaf ears inside the courtroom.  However, the government 
leaders who believed in ethnic diplomacy, including Governor Olson, seemed to have 
paid closer attention.  While the lack of documentation leaves a hole in understanding 
Olson’s exact involvement; thankfully, Governor Olson made a visible shift in his public 
actions.  Olson’s increase in awareness of Latin American heritage is notable beginning 
in 1942, particularly after the Sleepy Lagoon murder.  The best examples are his 
adoption of Cabrillo Day, Mexican Friendship Day, and an official proclamation against 
racial discrimination.   
Olson sought to bring a certain level of understanding to his state when it came 
to race.  Beginning in 1942 this took an ethnic diplomacy turn when he made interesting 
comments on Cabrillo Day.  Olson sought to promote a stronger cultural awareness 
through events such as Cabrillo Day, but he still did so carefully.  The last thing Olson 
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needed in an election year was more political fodder for Warren’s camp, his Cabrillo 
Day speech is a good example of this balance.  The celebration commemorates the 
Portuguese explorer, Juan Rodriguez Cabrillo, and his “discovery” of what is today San 
Diego Bay.  In his September 28 radio address, Olson began by crediting Cabrillo with 
the “discovery of California,” but then qualified the statement by pointing out that he 
“was the first white man to set foot on California soil.”  He also further diminished 
Cabrillo’s importance—which is unusual for an address designed to praise the 
explorer—by pointing out that he “stayed only six days, barely long enough to make 
friends with the native Indians, replenish his fresh food and water supplies….”  By 
today’s standards Olson may seem traditional in his praise for a European explorer; 
however, by 1942 standards his remarks were quite progressive. 
While the Cabrillo Day celebration provides some insight into the way Olson 
handled racial strife in a state with an increasingly racially diverse population, his 
proclamation of Mexican Friendship Day provides a better example of his role as a 
purveyor of an international relationship with Mexico.  Set on Mexican Independence 
Day, September 16, the proclamation also called for public ceremonies “celebrating 
Mexican independence and honoring the government, the people and the President of 
Mexico” in Los Angeles in front of the State Building.  The location and timing were 
largely a culturally diplomatic way to respond to the recent racial strife.  The message 
here is very clear: 
Our Nation is at war against powerful and ruthless enemy nations and peoples.  
At our side in this great struggle stand the government and the people of our 
good neighbor republic, the United States of Mexico…Hundreds of thousands of 
Mexican citizens reside in California.  Thousands of Californians reside in 
Mexico.  The very cultures and histories of the two states have much in common, 
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even unto their origins.  Commercially we are very dependent on one another…. 
Therefore, the friendship that exists between the people and the governments of 
the two states, Mexico and California, is strong because it is natural, and real 
because it is mutual.  Moreover, it is of the greatest possible importance to us all, 
now that our people are “brothers in arms.” 242 
 
 
The celebration was highlighted by a speech given by Vice President Henry A. 
Wallace, entitled Three More Freedoms.243  Wallace gave the speech in Spanish and hit 
on many of the key points.  He first summarized Mexican history since their time of 
independence, emphasizing the relationship between Christianity and the revolution.  
Then he touched on the relationship between Mexico and the United States, using his 
previous meetings with Mexican President Ávila Camacho to substantiate his claim that 
“We can all be glad to see the increasing cordiality in relations between our two 
countries.”  While he left out the Mexican-American War in his historical account, he did 
address the less than congenial past relationship: 
The Mexican people are showing that whatever misunderstanding may have 
existed in the past is disappearing, and that a solid friendship based on mutual 
respect and understanding is taking its place. Nowhere is this friendship more 
strikingly demonstrated than right here in California, where several hundred 
thousand persons of Mexican ancestry are American citizens. Mexico and 
California have the same heritage, the same ancient tradition. The acquisition of 
California as territory of the United States was a part of the frontier history of both 
countries. The present offers a unique case, here in California, of what might 
have been a sore spot—an "Irredenta"—but which actually has become instead a 
fusion ground for two cultures. Hitler could never understand that.244 
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Wallace also addressed the present relationship between Mexico and California, 
stating that “they have a special kinship at the present time because of the bonds of a 
common peril.” He goes on to describe how each nation has helped in defending the 
western coast of the continent.  The most interesting aspect of this speech was his 
vision for the future relationship between California and Mexico: 
I like to look into the future when our common bonds will be of a more tangible 
nature than at any time in the past, when Californians will find it possible to drive 
from Nogales to Guadalajara and thence to Mexico City and Acapulco. I like to 
think of ten times as many Californians speaking Spanish as are able to do so 
today. I like to think of them enjoying the Mexican music, understanding the 
words of the Mexican songs when they hear them. I like to think of Californians 
investing money in Mexico, not on a coyote basis, as Mexicans would say, but on 
a fair and decent basis.  Dollar diplomacy died ten years ago. Coyote 
investments also will die, and so will all other forms of imperialism, direct or 
indirect.245 
 
Wallace then quickly turned the focus of his speech onto the economic 
relationship.  He argued that “Mexico is of great service in our united war effort by 
producing to the limit of steel, mercury, copper, tungsten, strontium, zinc, lead and all 
the other metals with which she is so richly endowed and which are needed, so badly by 
the war industries of our own country.”  He also reiterated Ávila Camacho’s point.  That 
Mexico's role in the war may not be fighting on foreign battlefields, but the operating of 
industries, farms, mines and forests.   He also addressed the bracero labor agreement 
which was only recently passed at the time: 
This mutual war effort is giving our two countries an opportunity to cooperate in 
countless ways….Or take the cooperative arrangement by which Mexican 
workers will come into the United States to help harvest our crops and do other 
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war work—not on the basis of low-wage competition as in the past, but with the 
whole-hearted assistance and protection of the two governments. Just as dollar 
diplomacy has become a thing of the past, so also let us hope that the 
arrangements entered into by our two governments will definitely end exploitation 
of and discrimination against Mexican labor.246 
In his closing remark, the Vice-President looked to the hypothetical post-victory 
world, where he felt the “New World ideals” would be needed even more to preserve a 
world-wide peace.   He understood that this peace would not be won immediately, 
instead, “That fight will go on down the years. It will be fought in California and in Texas 
and in every one of our 48 states. It will be fought not only in the United States but in 
Mexico and in every one of our United Nations.”  In this case, the selection of California 
and Texas was not accidental.  He chose the two places where Mexico and the United 
States were mixing at the fastest rate.  Where the future of a racially equal 
hemispherical liberty would be tested and where—despite Wallace’s positive 
description—it was presently in jeopardy. 
 Governor Olson’s August proclamation against employment discrimination 
directly addressed an issue that affected a number of different minorities.  This 
proclamation was a reverberation of FDR’s Executive Order 8802, stating that any 
discrimination based on “race, creed, color, or national origin” was “against established 
public policy.”  The California proclamation was similar to 8802 in the sense that it 
carried no legal weight, only guidelines and a small governing body to investigate 
reports of discrimination in the workplace.  While FDR had his Fair Employment 
Practices Committee (FEPC), Olson created his own committee in the California 
Department of Labor.  While both FDR’s Executive Order and Olson’s proclamation 
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were far from effective in ending discrimination, both served the purpose of attempting 
to create wartime unity across all races in the workplace and created bureaucracies with 
staff capable of implementing ethnic diplomacy.  Compared to his contemporary from 
Texas, Governor Lee O’Daniel, Governor Olson definitely utilized a cultural approach in 
an effort to improve race relations with Mexico and Mexican-Americans and made a 
very real effort to promote wartime racial unity.  As seen in previous chapter, these 
types of steps were not seen in Texas until about a year later when cotton growers 
began pressuring Coke Stevenson for braceros.  Generally speaking, Olson’s fragile 
governor’s seat combined with his progressive ideals pushed him close to Roosevelt, 
which helped him preserve a certain level of awareness of national and hemispherical 
unity in California.  On the other hand, Texas Governor Lee O’Daniel was a more 
conservative Democrat governing a constituency that was less likely to embrace 
progressivism.  These two leaders, while dealing with similar problems, could not have 
been further apart within the Democratic Party’s political spectrum. 
 Specific complaints of racial prejudice from the State Department—via the 
Foreign Affairs Department of Mexico—came to Governor Olson just like they did to the 
Texas Governors.  While Olson admittedly saw fewer, but still a significant amount of 
complaints than O’Daniel, Olson always responded.  Olson himself is not remembered 
as a tactful politician or diplomat, but when cases were passed from the State 
Department, he asked Earl Warren to follow-up with each individual complaint.  As with 
other areas of Olson’s administration, the documents for these specific incidents are not 
available, but through a comparison with Texas it is still possible to determine Warren’s 
aptitude in quelling racial strife.  From both the Mexican and State Department’s 
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perspectives, California’s responses in these early years were satisfactory.  In Texas, 
there were multiple examples of Mexico asking for further action from Texas and the 
State Department was often unsatisfied with Coke Stevenson’s inaction.  These sorts of 
complaints do not exist when it comes to California’s ethnic diplomacy.247 
While some of the differences between Texas and California can be attributed to 
the high level of civil rights activism in Texas and the LULAC alliance with Mexico and 
the Mexican Consuls; it does notchange the fact that Olson was clearly handling the 
situation more favorably in the eyes of Mexico, the State Department, and the OCIAA.  
In fact, a March 24, 1941 (prior to Sleepy Lagoon) memorandum from the Mexican 
Embassy to the State Department helps clarify the differences between O’Daniel and 
Olson.  The memo requested that State Department act against the increasing amounts 
of discrimination in California and Texas.  It specifically requested 
the Department of State [to] address the Governors of the States of Texas and 
California, making them see the urgent necessity of taking measures to avoid the 
development, in their respective jurisdictions, or any form of hostility against 
Mexicans or their descendants, to the benefit of the good understanding of the 
populations of our two countries, which understanding constitutes the 
fundamental basis of cooperation between the Governments.248 
 
 In a follow-up memorandum sent to Acting-Secretary Welles, Latin American 
specialist Herbert Bursley points out that Governor Olson promptly followed up.  The 
Governor agreed to work against discrimination and sent a copy of his draft to Welles in 
order for the State Department to officially respond.  From the very beginning, Olson’s 
California was willing to let the State Department take the lead in their relationship with 
Mexico.  Olson and the State Department both observed that Texas was not on the 
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same page.  Latin American specialist, Herbert Bursley pointed out “that Governor 
(O’Daniel) apparently has made some statements favorable to good relations with 
Mexicans, or at least giving lip service to the cause.  However, he (O’Daniel) has not yet 
replied to our letter of March 27 and his failure to cooperate in the recent Pan American 
Day celebrations at San Antonio apparently has caused unfavorable impression upon 
Mexicans….”  He goes on to quote Consul General Blocker’s report, which argues that 
O’Daniel’s failure to attend was “Regrettable, especially in view of the fact that Governor 
Chávez of Chihuahua gave his wholehearted cooperation to the celebration and went to 
San Antonio in the understanding that the Governor of Texas would also be in 
attendance.”  In Blocker’s understanding, this was “glaringly impolite.”  The State 
Department at this point in time was just beginning to research and collect information 
concerning ethnic diplomacy.  In the minds of the people who crafted ethnic diplomacy 
Texas was largely ignoring the issue, but California was willing to follow the direction of 
Sumner Welles.249 
The final piece of evidence concerning Olson’s view of Mexico came in 1944.  
Still being active in politics, Olson attended a key meeting with President Roosevelt as a 
Democratic National Committee member.  During the meeting several points were 
debated, including FDR pursuing a fourth term.  However, as a side note to the 
newspaper’s chronicling of the event was the statement that “ex-Governor 
Olson…wanted to become Ambassador to Mexico” in FDR’s fourth term.250   
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 The post-Pearl Harbor era continued relatively peacefully after the Sleepy 
Lagoon murder from a perspective of Mexico’s official complaints.  This is due primarily 
to a change in strategy from Mexico, but from the California perspective fewer 
complaints was validation that they were doing something correctly.251  In the election, 
Earl Warren pulled in 57% of the vote in his 1942 victory and ethnic diplomacy in 
California transitioned seamlessly to the new administration in January of 1943 where 
issues were now dealt with by Warren’s Attorney General, Democrat Robert W. Kenny.  
California ethnic diplomacy, in large part due to Warren’s hands on role as California’s 
Attorney General, remained unchanged until the Zoot Suit Riots in the spring of 1943. 
 
 
The Zoot Suits Riots and Governor Earl Warren 
 The “Zoot Suit Riots” is a reference to two violent clashes between large groups 
of military personnel and civilian youths, some of whom were donning zoot suits, in Los 
Angeles.  The first, and lesser known incident, occurred in Venice Beach, Los Angeles.  
For some time before the actual violence, racial tensions were high as some Latino 
young men walked the boardwalk in their zoot suits four abreast with their arms 
interlocked.  Civilians were concerned about their presence and viewed them 
negatively.  One informant even noted that, “all concerned would make dirty cracks” 
about the young men in their zoot suits which were deemed unpatriotic.252   
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A group of Mexican-Americans congregated one Sunday in May for a dance at 
the Aragon ballroom on Lick Pier and a large crowd gathered outside the building.  It 
began as a group of high school boys who were determined to “straighten things out” 
and take back the waterfront.  Things got a bit more hostile when a few sailors arrived 
with the false news that a sailor had been stabbed.  When the dance ended, the crowd 
of approximately 500 chased the Mexican-Americans, whether they were wearing zoot 
suits or not, down the boardwalk yelling things such as, “Let’s get the chili-eating 
bastards!”  The fighting continued through the night, with one particularly violent episode 
occurring at the end of the pier.  Eventually the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), 
military police, and shore patrol broke up the riot primarily by jailing the Mexican-
Americans for their own “protection.”253 
The violence spread through Los Angeles by the end of the month.  Eventually, 
by June of 1943, military men were ripping zoot-suits off of boys and often beat them 
with clubs if they failed to cooperate.  This violence even moved beyond zoot-suits as 
the perpetrators targeted anyone who could remotely be associated as a Pachuco.  The 
LAPD response was the same as in Venice, jail the Mexican-American (and African-
American) victims instead of trying to arrest the servicemen themselves.  When the riots 
finally ended, all levels of government were concerned about whether or not this “race 
riot”—as Eleanor Roosevelt termed it—could happen again. 
  
 Warren’s response to the racial unrest in California was somewhat of a political 
cliché, he created a committee and put his Attorney General in charge.  The committee, 
known as The Southern California Council of Inter-American Affairs, sought to “bring 
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about a better understanding and more cordial relations between our people and all of 
the Latin Americans, including the People of Mexico.”254  This was done in conjunction 
with an Advisory Committee of thirty Mexican leaders and resulted in a vast array of 
events and programs.  The committee created a motion picture film service which 
created English and Spanish sound tracks and circulated them among imported 
Mexican labor camps in Southern California.  The Council also influenced the Los 
Angeles School District to expand its adult education programs to include Spanish-
speaking Americans.  As for events, the Council sponsored a number of conferences.  
They helped bring Mexico’s foremost architect, Carlos Conreras, to California for a 
series of conferences and also sponsored a conference on the Vocational Future of 
Mexican-Americans. 
 The city and county governments of Los Angeles also stepped up their “good 
neighbor” appearance.  Both the city and county of Los Angeles school systems worked 
together to create a summer institute called The Mexican Work Shop.  This was 
designed to create more culturally sensitive teachers for schools with large Mexican 
enrollments.   Perhaps more interesting was that the Civil Service Departments of these 
two government entities initiated a study with the intention of attracting more Mexican-
American personnel for public service.  Additionally, they created special advisory 
boards to deal with any future problems involving Mexican-Americans.255 
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 News of the Zoot Suit riots was quickly spread in Mexico; however, news of 
Governor Warren’s response was also of interest south of the border.  A Mexico D.F. 
based organization known as Frente Pro-Aliados (Pro-Allied Front) served as the 
Mexican parallel to the Southern-California Council of Inter-American Affairs.  It sought 
“to contribute to the better approachment (sic) and understanding between the Mexican 
and American people.”256  In November of 1943 the Pro-Allied Front began work on a 
publication which discussed the treatment of Latin Americans in the United States and 
emphasized what the authorities in the United States were doing about the problem.  
The Governor’s Office was happy to assist, and forwarded this letter to the California 
Attorney General’s office so he could explain the work of the Southern California 
Council on Inter-American Affairs in greater detail. 
 
 The Coke Stevenson created Good-Neighbor Commission in its infancy realized 
that California and Texas were experiencing similar problems with racial discrimination; 
but in Texas, the outcomes were different.  The first Executive Secretary of the 
Commission, Pauline Kibbe, was considering legislation as being an answer and was 
promoting the Caucasian Equal Rights Bill at the time..  She wrote Earl Warren in an 
effort to learn more about California’s anti-discrimination legislation.  Kibbe understood 
“that California has adopted a law prohibiting discriminatory practices in public places of 
business and amusement against persons of Mexican extraction, nationals of the other 
American republics, or Spanish-speaking persons, solely upon the basis of such 
extraction, nationality or language, and we are greatly interested to know how that law 
was received by the general public and law enforcement officers, whether or not it has 
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been successfully applied, and what obstacles were met in securing its enforcement.”257  
Warren responded through Assitant James H. Oakley.  Oakley pointed out that the 
California Civil Code of 1905 protects the “civil rights of individuals irrespective of race 
or color and prohibiting under penalty of civil damages.” Code numbers 51 through 54 
outline that, 
All citizens within the jurisdiction of this state (California) are entitled to the full 
and equal accommodations, advantages and privileges of inns, restaurants, 
hotels, eating houses places where ice cream or soft drink soft drinks of any kind 
are sold for consumption on the premises, barber shops, bath houses, theaters, 
skating rinks, public conveyances and all other places of public accommodation 
or amusement…. 
 
For each offense the guilty parties may be held responsible for damages plus one-
hundred dollars.  He pointed out that these codes had not caused any major 
disturbances and had received support in the courts. 
 A major similarity for both Texas and California during World War II was the need 
for farm laborers.  While Texas never achieved adequate relations with Mexico to allow 
braceros into their state during the war, California also strived to maintain good relations 
to prevent a ban.  Early in 1943, immediately following Warren’s inauguration, the large 
growers in need of agricultural labor petitioned for assistance.  Warren attempted to fix 
the labor shortages by calling a special joint session of the California Congress.  The 
goal of the session was to deal with the “war farm labor problem.”  The legislation that 
came out of it was known as the Food and Fiber Production Act.  A main aspect of this 
act was the creation of a council that would serve as a liaison to the federal 
government.  The Farm Production Council was born, and Warren assigned highly 
respected fruit grower Charles C. Teague to run it.  The Council helped maximize 
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laborers and even explored ideas such as utilizing public servants after their work-day 
hours and student labor during after-school hours.  Even these creative solutions were 
not enough as groups of famers continually petitioned Warren for more Mexican 
laborers.258 
Unfortunately, the Farm Production Council’s ability to attain enough workers 
was complicated by a federal level international conflict concerning the bracero 
program.  About the same time Warren was taking his oaths, Ambassador George 
Messersmith received instructions from Washington to pursue an expansion to the 
bracero agreement that would bring Mexican workers to the United States to work in 
nonagricultural industries (instead of strictly agriculture).  After some success in 
negotiations with the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE), Messersmith returned 
to Washington briefly.  Things quickly turned however, and upon his return he found the 
bracero program in pieces.  The Mexican Secretario de Agricultura, Marte Rodolfo 
Gómez, had long been against the bracero program and thanks to support among other 
leading Mexican officials was able to suspend the recruitment of Mexican laborers 
during Messersmith’s absence.  His main objection was based on the belief that the 
Mexican agricultural sector could not afford to lose many laborers.  Eventually President 
Camacho and Dr. Padilla intervened, convincing Gómez that wartime cooperation with 
the United States was of higher importance than a few thousand agricultural laborers.  A 
few years later, Messersmith would finally see success in the expansion of the Bracero 
Program and under a separate treaty braceros would be utilized in railway 
construction.259 
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This brief interruption of the Bracero Program quickly caused farmers in 
California to panic, fearing they too had received the “Texas Ban” from Mexico.  A mere 
few days later agriculture interest groups had letters sitting on Warren’s desk 
demanding an answer.  Luckily for Warren, he was able to confidently answer that this 
was not the same situation as in Texas.  In fact, Mexico assuaged California’s concerns 
by directly addressing the issue in California.  They blamed the bracero hiatus as a 
labor shortage in Mexico and clearly delineated that it was not due to any incidents of 
racial prejudice.260   
The Bracero Program was also in jeopardy from inside the U.S. capitol building.  
House Joint Resolution 96, an initiative heavily supported from the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, sought to switch control and recruitment of braceros to individual states.  
The State Department, Mexico, and the California Farm Production council opposed this 
measure. In the blunt words of Ambassador Messersmith, they felt that “some of the 
members of Congress and some of the farm people at home think that Mexico is a sort 
of subject state and that we can come down here and herd labor and bring it into our 
country, do with it as we please.”261  Clearly the State Department, the OCIAA, and War 
Manpower Commission were all extremely opposed to the resolution.  Eventually, the 
State Department even threatened to terminate the Bracero Program completely should 
the resolution pass.  Thankfully for California’s farmers, House Joint Resolution 96 had 
too much opposition and the Bracero Program remained intact.    
In 1943, approximately 45,000 Mexican workers crossed the border into the 
United States as braceros, over 11 times more than the previous year.  The largest 
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share of braceros, 30,000 by Governor Warren’s account, worked in California in 
1943.262  While the braceros did not experience a great working environment—either 
socially or physically—the satisfaction of President  Ávila Camacho and Governor 
Warren was evident by the end of the harvest.  Warren earned credit for averting a farm 
labor crisis and in October of 1943 sent what is best described as a “thank-you note” to 
Camacho: 
I (Earl Warren) make this report to you in acknowledgment of the fact that had it 
not been for your cooperation and the cooperation of thousands of our neighbors 
of the Republic of Mexico who came to California to assist us in harvest activities, 
no such cheering report would have been possible…. Be assured that California 
is highly appreciative of the fine example of good neighborliness shown us by the 
splendid citizenry of the Republic of Mexico. 
 
In his response, President Camacho returned the pleasantries: 
 
In a time of mutual sacrifices like that in which we are now living, the help of the 
Mexican workers sent to the United States of America and in particular to the 
State of California is one of the most outstanding forms of devotion that animates 
all the people of my country who are effectively contributing to the common 
victory of the democracies….Like fraternity constitutes the best assurance of the 
spirit of confidence and the friendly reciprocal assistance that will be necessary 
to adjust permanently the relations of our people. 
 
One telling issue which arose during the 1943 California fall harvest season was 
a meat shortage.  The rationing quotas did not allow for an additional 30,000 agricultural 
workers in California; therefore the braceros were seeing very limited rations and hardly 
any meat.  As news of this spread, the Farm Labor Council immediately pressed 
Warren to act.  The Governor immediately exchanged a few telegrams with the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture and had the ration quotas changed to reflect the additional 
bracero population.  His approval reflected his understanding of how important the 
treatment of braceros was for the good relations with Mexico: “Immediate action in the 
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removal of meat quota restrictions is necessary to avoid international complications.  All 
California requests is the opportunity to give these workers the fair treatment they 
deserve by supplying them with sufficient food in proper quantity.”263  When bad press 
threatened California’s relationship with Mexico, and in turn California’s agricultural 
labor supply, Warren proved he would act by giving his support to the Farm Labor 
Council.  From a diplomatic standpoint, the rest of the wartime harvest seasons were 
equally successful.  The governor continued to support the California Farm Labor 
Council and continued to oversee their primary concerns himself, which is quite telling 
given his inclination to focus on national issues as part of his aspiration for higher office.  
The proof of his hands on approach to the issue is possible thanks to quality archival 
preservation.  Warren’s hand written notes on correspondence with the Farm Labor 
Council are easily identified and his hand writing was confirmed with multiple archivists 
by the author.  Overall, Warren’s diplomacy with Mexico was aligned tightly with the 
State Department.  He inherited a state that attempted to promote good relations and 
when controversy arose he promoted good relations and successfully kept California 
open to braceros.   
 
 
So What? 
While the history of California’s ethnic diplomacy is interesting in its own right and 
reveals information about California during World War II, I believe it provides insight in a 
broader context—or in other words, answers the question “so what?”  Olson and 
                                                           
263 Telegram to Marvin Jones, War Food Administration, from Earl Warren. Earl Warren Papers. California State 
Archives, File 21:711. 
171 
 
Warren’s complimentary versions of ethnic diplomacy serve as case-studies in two 
separate questions: What is a state’s ability to create their own diplomacy and when is 
the U.S. government motivated to act against racial prejudice? 
California was less independent than Texas in forging their own diplomatic 
relationship with Mexico; however, they also were not coerced into a relationship with 
Mexico via a Bracero Program ban either.  Olson and Warren were both conscious of 
their state’s diversity, their role as purveyors of their state’s diplomacy with their 
southern neighbor, and arguable had a stronger concern for national politics given their 
post-office political aspirations.  That being the case, Olson and Warren by considering 
Mexico while making policy decisions and dealing with racial prejudice showed how a 
state can serve as a key cog in United States foreign relations.  While much of 
California’s ethnic diplomacy was done in conjunction with the State Department, it 
definitely went beyond simple cooperation.  Both governors proved they would make 
policy decisions in support of ethnic diplomacy without federal intervention.  Olson’s 
cultural blitz against discrimination after the Sleepy Lagoon incident was not 
orchestrated by the State Department and Warren’s insistence that the Bracero 
Program remain in federal hands was something which most agriculturally-based states 
were opposed.  In addition, they did not require the deep level of OCIAA and State 
Department oversight that was present in bracero banned Texas.  The two California 
Governors also listened when the State Department informed them about racial 
prejudice incidents and racially centered diplomacy.  The extent of their response 
proves their roles as participants in diplomacy and forgers of California’s identity among 
Mexicans and (perhaps more importantly) Mexican Officials. 
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Olson and Warren had at least partially different motivations behind their Ethnic 
Diplomacies.  Olson was a self-pronounced progressive and idealist, whom cynics 
argue had a coat-tail relationship with FDR, and therefore was more likely to follow the 
federal government’s lead in diplomatic affairs.  Warren was intimately involved in the 
policies established by Olson and he was notably more interested in appeasing 
California farmers as Governor; however, this was done while carefully considering the 
state’s relationship with Mexico.  Farmers noted this difference on multiple occasions.  
One interest group described the lack of support “during Olson’s misadministration” to 
attain Mexican labor as a major obstacle to California agriculture.264  Warren’s 
inclination to end racial prejudice for moral purposes was less obvious than Olson, but 
his time later in life as Supreme Court Justice provides ample examples of idealism.  
Overall, both men had at least some inclination to combat racial prejudice but chose to 
become more active when additional motivating factors overlapped with their personal 
preferences.  In this way California’s policy differed from Texas, which only saw 
idealism from grass-roots organizations like LULAC, but was similar to the Latin 
American specialists like Laurence Duggan and Sumner Welles in the State 
Department. 
California, along with Texas, during the 1940s is a good example of the multiple 
layers that exist within ethnic diplomacy.  The racially motivated policies stemmed from 
more than just the State Department and depended on more than just grass roots 
activism for motivation.  Without the Californian government, the U.S. relationship with 
Mexico would not have been as sound. 
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In the most challenging moments of World War II Franklin Delano Roosevelt may 
not have been as focused on Latin America as other regions of the world; however, he 
still spent a considerable amount of time thinking about his neighbors to the south.  As 
the German threat grew in Europe, he became intensely focused on the security of the 
Western Hemisphere.  These threats were not merely imagined.  Germany was highly 
invested in Latin America; by the 1930s they had purchased large quantities of Latin 
American commodities and paid for them with currency that was only accepted in 
Germany.  To protect their interests both before and after the war, Germany had a 
network of spies in the Caribbean and in other key countries.265  Furthermore, the large 
number of German-descent citizens in the Americas was worrisome to the United 
States as a potential hemispherical “fifth column.”   Perhaps most troubling was the 
memory of the Zimmerman Telegram from the previous World War, it was a known fact 
that Germany had been urging for Mexico’s support for quite some time.  These fears 
were realized again in the 1930s when German propaganda was discovered in Latin 
America, which alongside Germany’s increased economic influence in the region 
represented a significant amount of influence.  A large network of German banks, 
cultural centers, athletic clubs, schools, and community groups attempted to win the 
hearts and minds of Latin Americans.  In addition, well-funded Nazi news agencies 
produced movies and created radio stations that criticized the United States. The most 
prevalent Nazi argument against the United States found in Latin America Nazi 
propaganda is also the most ironic: the U.S.A. was full of racists.266 
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FDR’s administration responded to this threat by launching its own public and 
cultural diplomacy campaigns.  During the war, the United States funded extensive 
campaigns which targeted both the average Latin American citizen and Latin American 
governments with the goal of improving wartime cooperation, increasing trade, fighting 
fascism on the home front, reinforcing hemisphere solidarity, and—most importantly for 
this work—promoting racial equality.  These efforts ultimately overshadowed the 
previously discussed elements of ethnic diplomacy due to the size and scope of the 
bureaucracy born out of this movement.  While this chapter is addressing the breadth of 
cultural diplomacy during World War II in Latin America, it will emphasize those 
programs which can be considered part of ethnic diplomacy. 
The Nazi propaganda was troubling to U.S. officials and accentuated FDR’s 
concern about securing the Western hemisphere in the face of World War.  The United 
States dedicated considerable resources to ensure the rest of the hemisphere was on 
its side.  This cultural battle for Latin America plays a major role in the United States’ 
goal to limit racial prejudice within its borders and win the support of Latin America for 
the war.  While the State Department and state governments practiced their own 
cultural diplomacy, other bureaucracies played a more significant role in the promotion 
of hemispherical unity which eventually included attempts to end prejudice in the United 
States.  The Pan American Union set a precedent in the late nineteenth century as it 
initiated a modest version of hemispherical cultural diplomacy; however, it was 
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eventually replaced under FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy by a Cultural Relations Division 
within the State Department and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs 
(OCIAA).  The Cultural Relations Division was ultimately eclipsed by the OCIAA, but 
throughout their existence cooperated on many of the same projects.  The OCIAA was 
designed with goals far wider than cultural diplomacy, specifically the industrialization 
and “modernization” for the sake of resource extraction of many Latin American cities 
and regions; however, the cultural side of the OCIAA proved to be an instrumental piece 
in successful ethnic diplomacy—addressing the most notable diplomatic concern from 
Mexico during the war and revealing Latin America’s importance to the United States at 
the time.  In terms of the diplomacy of race relations, the following history of the OCIAA 
and its antecedents reveal a dedication to cultural interchange, education reform, 
support for minorities, and an attempt to curb racial prejudice against Latin Americans in 
the United States. 
 FDR was not the first statesman to consider hemispherical unity.  In fact, the U.S. 
had promoted unity in a somewhat marginalized fashion well before even FDR’s distant 
cousin Theodore held the highest office.   The United States was a member of the Pan 
American Union beginning in 1889.  While the Union’s level of effectiveness is subject 
to much scrutiny, by 1939 the Union had built up quite the bureaucratic infrastructure. 
Within the Pan American Union were several divisions; most noteworthy for 
ethnic diplomacy was the Division of Intellectual Cooperation.  This division specifically 
was tasked with the “disseminating of information on American art, education, literature, 
scientific development, etc.”  For example, a specialist in education worked for the 
Division.  One of his primary tasks was to index articles “of permanent value on Latin 
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American education.”  His collection was designed to support anyone interested in Latin 
American education in the United States.  Secondly, the education specialist also 
sought to inform Latin Americans about educational methods within the United States.  
The Division facilitated numerous professor and student exchanges and also brought 
together scientists and cultural scholars with comparable interests.  The Division 
boasted an impressive number of publications; however, just like their activities, these 
were only aimed at people already interested in Latin America—predominantly 
academics.267   
Two other Pan American Union Divisions also promoted cultural exchanges.  The 
Columbus Memorial Library in Washington D.C. which shared its books with thirty other 
Latin American libraries by the end of the 1930s, and the Office of the Counselor which 
organized four music programs each year where the United States Army, Navy, and 
Marine bands played Latin American music.268  The musical performances were held in 
the Pan American Union building itself and were unfortunately, for the aims of ethnic 
diplomacy, more popular among Latin Americans who traveled to see the show than the 
greater Washington D.C. population.  The Office of the Counselor also assisted musical 
artists in their travel to Latin America—and vice versa—but only if they were contacted 
by the artists themselves beforehand. 
The Pan American Union was limited in its scope, operating more as a service 
than an outreach program.  Under FDR’s watch, official hemispherical unity and 
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cooperation took several giants steps forward, eventually trying to impact the general 
populations both above and below the southern border.  The first was done within the 
Department of State.  On July 27, 1938, Departmental Order No. 367 created the 
Division of Cultural Relations of the Department of State.  The order deemed its 
purpose was “to encourage and strengthen cultural relations and intellectual 
cooperation between the United States and other countries.”  The Division was 
instructed to address all nations, but the first few years of activity were overwhelmingly 
focused on Latin America.  The Division promoted a variety of activities under the 
“cultural relations” banner, many of which were similar to what the Pan American 
Union’s Division of Intellectual Cooperation was already doing.  In a moment of 
government-bureaucratic irony, Secretary of State Cordell Hull was technically in charge 
of both of these partially redundant agencies; unfortunately, prior to late 1941 the only 
time his name shows up in the documents—revealing his lack of personal 
involvement—was at the top of both agencies letterhead.269   
The primary difference with the State Department’s Division versus the Pan 
American Union’s was authority.  The Cultural Relations Division was given authority 
over “the strengthening of international intellectual and cultural relations.” This included 
“the preparation and interpretation of treaties in this field….  It drafts and reviews 
correspondence with foreign governments… and collaborates with the Office of 
Education and other Government Departments…and Foreign Missions.”  Meanwhile, 
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the Pan American Union had to work within all laws and policies from the State 
Department or other authorities.270   
With this increased authority came increased activity.  The Division of Cultural 
Relations was much more active than the Pan American Union’s Intellectual 
Cooperation Division with its promotion of student, teacher, and professor exchanges.  
This was one of the agreements clearly defined at the Convention for the Promotion of 
Inter-American Cultural Relations in Buenos Aires in December 1936.  Each of the 
ratifying countries participated in a professor and graduate student exchange every 
year, which was funded, for the first few years, by the Cultural Relations Division. This 
Buenos Aires treaty was the basis for much of the Cultural Relations authority in the late 
1930s.  The Division also conducted activities similar to the Pan American Union: They 
embraced music, art, literature, and other intellectual activities and formulated and 
distributed some representative works (and their translations) in the United States and 
Latin America.  In regards to sharing knowledge, they often promoted book exhibitions.  
In one instance, they collected over 2,000 book donations from thirty-one different U.S. 
publishing houses in order to sponsor a traveling book fair across Latin America.  When 
it was over, the books were donated permanently to various libraries.  While this kind of 
pro-active event was a noticeable change from the type of cooperation promoted by the 
Pan American Union, the first exhibition in Buenos Aires only saw “almost 1,000 
persons” attend.271 
The Division of Cultural Relations was not only more active in the areas that the 
Intellectual Cooperation Division already operated; they also expanded the scope of 
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cooperation.  Particularly interesting was the establishment of temporary hospitality 
centers during the New York and San Francisco Fairs, to welcome distinguished guests.  
Additionally, they were the first ones to utilize film.  They worked with federal film 
agencies to find appropriate films for display abroad.272 
 While the Division of Cultural Relations was a noteworthy step forward in the 
Good Neighbor Policy and Hemispherical Cooperation, its impact was still minimal.  It 
did not specifically target the common population, nor did it have any specific purposes 
beyond promoting unity. 
As war looked inevitable, a more thorough approach to hemispherical unity was 
sought.  In June of 1940, FDR forwarded an open memorandum written by Nelson 
Aldrich Rockefeller to the Secretaries of State, Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture.  
This particular note was described as “one of many memoranda” sent on this subject.  
The message was fairly simple.  The U.S. wanted to protect its relationship with Latin 
America with economic measures that would be “competitively effective against 
totalitarian techniques.”  The memorandum also outlined what became the 
administration’s new policy towards Latin America; specifically, that the security and 
economic position of the U.S. in Latin America should be reframed to promote 
hemispherical interdependence and cooperation.  This was to be a full-scale 
commitment with connections to all Latin American governments and increased 
economic commitments.  The official History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs states that it was, “to secure raw materials and to aid in maintaining a 
balance of trade.”  More interestingly however for ethnic diplomacy was that the 
                                                           
272 National Committee of the United States of America on International Intellectual Cooperation. [from old 
catalog], Preliminary Survey of Inter-American Cultural Activities in the United States. 
181 
 
memorandum also advocated “a vigorous program of educational and cultural relations 
[that] should be pursued concurrently with the economic program.” 
 The responsibilities of managing such a large undertaking would be a 
cooperative effort of both private enterprise and the government; however, the 
memorandum recommended an advisory committee pulled from the private sector to 
oversee the process and prevent departmental rivalry.  This group would report directly 
back to the president himself.  This memorandum outlined what would become reality 
shortly thereafter with the creation of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American 
Affairs (OCIAA) via Executive Order 8840.  Fittingly, Nelson A. Rockefeller was chosen 
as Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA).  Deeper economic connections and a 
much broader educational and cultural program with Latin America were deemed 
necessary by Roosevelt, and Rockefeller was his choice to oversee the process.   
 Interestingly, the earliest title used for the OCIAA was the Office for Coordination 
of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics (OCCRBAR).  
As one reviewer quipped, this would “run high in any list of foolish titles.”  Thankfully, the 
name was changed, but the original name is a telling reminder of its purpose.  The first 
half of these responsibilities, the Commercial Relations, is the more recognizable legacy 
of the OCIAA.  While very little scholarly work has been done on the OCIAA in general, 
the infamous Gerard Colby Zilg of Dupont: Behind the Nylon Curtain fame wrote a 
condemning account of Nelson Rockefeller.  His work, Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest 
of the Amazon: Nelson Rockefeller and Evangelism in the Age of Oil, argues that the 
OCIAA was part of a longer imperialist process by the United States government, 
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working with private U.S. companies, which ultimately oppressed, exploited, and even 
murdered millions of predominantly indigenous Latin Americans.273 
 Colby’s discussion of the OCIAA is interesting.  It represents an immense 
amount of work and provides information that was only uncovered thanks to exhaustive 
research.  Unfortunately, Thy Will Be Done is not telling the entire story when it comes 
to the World War II period.  Instead the discussion of the OCIAA is told within a larger 
neocolonialism lens, arguing that Nelson Rockefeller and some select U.S. private 
businesses were building an empire with little regard for its impact on anyone outside of 
their circle.  This larger purpose does not allow it to appreciate the important changes 
that occurred within U.S.-Latin American relations under the Good Neighbor Policy and 
more specifically World War II.  This missing context is troubling.  The authors frame the 
OCIAA within the context of Nelson’s past experience with Native Americans.  It begins 
with an introduction to Rockefeller’s lack of attention to Native Americans in 1940.  He 
cites two examples, one where FDR “ordered him to stop stalling” to arrange federal 
funding for the new National Indian Institute in 1940 and another where the same 
attitude is assumed for support of a nutrition study for the Otomi (a Mexican indigenous 
group).  Unfortunately no footnote is provided on the latter.  This information by itself is 
indeed interesting about Rockefeller, but it leads to an unfair conclusion.  The next lines 
state that “only public pressure and presidential intervention turned Rockefeller around 
[on native Americans].  Rockefeller’s interest in Indians was expedient.  He was 
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primarily concerned with extracting the minerals and natural resources from Latin 
America needed by the U.S. war machine.”  While both of these statements can be 
debated, they are sweeping generalizations that are not telling the full story of the 
OCIAA.  Colby ignores the larger picture of the Coordinator Office, the chain-of-
command, the organizational timeline, and perhaps most importantly, the governments 
of these Latin American nations themselves.   In addition, all non-economic policies of 
the OCIAA, that are mentioned later on, are assumed to be a front for the economic and 
physical abuse suffered in the Amazon.  While the U.S. economic empire in Latin 
America was undoubtedly boosted by World War II, the cultural relations of the OCIAA 
are too easily dismissed and the benefits among the upper class in Latin America are 
not addressed.274  One staff member’s memory sets up an interesting dilemma for 
Colby’s work when he is forced to confront the cultural relations side of the OCIAA: 
Most problems,” one OCIAA staff member remembered, “were approached from 
a business point of view first.  They reflected a viewpoint…that you mustn’t do 
anything to disturb business.  Whenever anybody had a new idea, Rockefeller’s 
first reaction was to ask whether it would hurt business—not his own personal 
business mind you, but the business community generally.  Only Pearl Harbor 
changed all that. 275 
 
 Colby dismisses the possibility that the OCIAA changed after Pearl Harbor.  He 
admits that the OCIAA after Pearl Harbor “Became one of the largest and most 
glamorous bureaucracies in Washington, with art exhibits, university professors, 
dancers, singers, and authors touring in almost every country in the hemisphere, 
coordinated by branch offices in every U.S. embassy in Latin America.”  However, he 
believes that the budget for these programs was suspiciously high and that it had to 
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have a “hidden economic agenda.”  He then goes on to point out that the commercial 
committees of the OCIAA were filled with industry titans.  In reality, the OCIAA was 
simply engaging in ethnic diplomacy alongside the economic mission.  In fact, the Pearl 
Harbor statement corresponds with the State Department policy shift discussed in 
chapter three.  Colby and Dennett got so caught up in the larger story of North 
American imperialism in Latin America that they missed the fact that the OCIAA, despite 
all of its faults and abuses, also represented a shift in U.S.-Latin American relations.  
Ultimately, depending on what page the reader is on, they are treated with historical 
silver, plastic, or both; the book is valuable and limited at the same time. 
 That being said, Colby’s neo-colonialist lens is not an unfair treatment.  The 
economic goals of the OCIAA, as defined by the OCIAA itself, were five-fold:  
1. Extending financial aid to the American republics to…preserve internal 
stability. 
2. Reducing foreign exchange requirements of the American republics by 
adjusting their external debt services to accord with their capacity to pay, until 
developmental activity can be undertaken which will increase their ability to 
meet old and new financial obligations 
3. …stimulate commerce between the Republics, develop their resources, and 
assist desirable advances in their industrialization. 
4. Securing adequate provision for transportation facilities and adding to these 
as conditions warrant. 
5. Harmonizing the personnel and advertising policies of Latin American 
branches and agencies of the United States concerned with the objectives of 
Hemisphere defense.276 
These objectives parallel what many scholars have defined as Modernization 
Theory.  In this twentieth century iteration, the U.S. attempted to democratize and 
industrialize Latin America from the top down.277  This hegemonic mindset coupled with 
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the central priority of winning the war led to immense investments and U.S. supported 
development of industry in Latin America.  In the first six months of the OCIAA’s 
existence alone, $165 million in funds were made available as credit to Latin American 
nations.   
However, the U.S. economic involvement did not simply stop at investments.  
After the initial splash of foreign capital, the OCIAA’s next major economic task was to 
support the struggling export-driven Latin American economies which lost approximately 
40% of their normal export market from the Nazi blockade of Western Europe.  The 
OCIAA, in conjunction with FDR, his Cabinet, the Advisory Committee of the Council of 
National Defense, felt that this reality represented a “grave danger that in some of these 
countries economic and political deterioration may proceed to a point where defense of 
the western hemisphere would be rendered much more difficult and costly.”278  The 
solution they offered was to purchase as many commodities from Latin America as 
possible, specifically mentioning hides, wool, nitrates, manganese, tin, and “numerous 
other commodities.”  This gave the U.S. substantial economic power and political 
influence in the region, but also gave the export-led focused governments of Latin 
America the trading partner they desperately needed.  While the U.S. was 
reestablishing its economic and political control of the Western Hemisphere, it was 
largely done with the blessings of the conservative governments of Latin America and 
done with a parallel goal of promoting hemispherical security and cooperation. 
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One telling feature of this economic relationship concerns the availability of 
crucial materials to Latin America itself.  The neocolonial relationship described by 
Colby is convincing; however, it does not fully explain the reinvestment back into Latin 
America during the war.  First, the OCIAA loans were renewed or expanded every year 
during World War II.  More tellingly, however, was the distribution of essential war 
materials such as tin or rubber and a variety of consumer goods.  Many of these things 
were extremely scarce during the war; nevertheless, the OCIAA with the direct help of 
President Roosevelt made a point in April of 1941 to ensure that the Latin American 
Republics received a share of the strategic materials and consumer goods in order to 
ensure a strong hemispherical defense and continued industrialization.279 
As time went on, the OCIAA commercial activities covered a broader spectrum.  
In 1942 they teamed with the Radio Division to promote advertising and radio 
propaganda.  The final result was near blanket coverage with long range radio signals, 
making a major effort against the Nazi radio programming found throughout the region.  
In addition, a few narrow projects were added to the OCIAA portfolio.280  After Pearl 
Harbor, the projects included things like a partnership with the Office of Price 
Administration to regulate price controls and rationing and a special joint economic 
cooperation committee with the Mexican Government to maximize industrialization, 
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public works projects, efficient use of equipment and the cutting of bureaucratic red 
tape. 
As the previously cited OCIAA staff member said himself, things changed after 
Pearl Harbor.  But to be fair, the vast majority of the OCIAA’s economic policies were 
set in motion prior to December 7, 1941.  After Pearl Harbor, while these investments 
continued, most new programs and policies—albeit not dollars—were cultural, 
emphasizing the secondary mission in Rockefeller’s letter. 
 Some scholarly work has been done on the secondary mission, improving 
education and cultural relations.  The most comprehensive studies are Darlene Sadlier’s 
Americans All and Justin Hart’s Empire of Ideas.  Sadlier studies the OCIAA under the 
terms of Joseph S. Nye’s definition of cultural diplomacy as “soft power” and Hart 
emphasizes the U.S.’s manufacturing of its image using public diplomacy.281  The most 
well-known of this cultural emphasis are the films, radio, and goodwill missions that 
traveled across Latin America.  Perhaps the most effective cultural tool implemented by 
the OCIAA into Latin America was in the area of media.  Film was the most memorable 
medium to come out of the OCIAA’s cultural diplomacy.  As Nelson Rockefeller wrote to 
John Whitney on May 1, 1942, 
Of the three arms of psychological warfare—radio, news, and movies—the latter, 
from my point of view, has by far the greatest potentialities as it combines the 
impact of sight and sound….[The Film industry] stands ready to produce the 
most potent instrument of war possessed by any nation in the world.282 
 The Motion Picture Society for the Americas (MPSA), created with the urging of 
Nelson Rockefeller, opted to change the course of Hollywood’s portrayal of Latin 
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Americans.  Previously, Hollywood had stereotyped Latin Americans only as a wild 
revolutionaries, tango dancers, jungle dwelling savages, or sensual Caribbean beach 
dwellers.283  The MPSA decided to emphasize a new stereotype, one that emphasized 
modernization and the white middle class.  This decision was at least partially made to 
appeal to the ruling governments of Latin America which controlled the regional 
distribution of these films.284  Ultimately this produced a fair number of forgettable films 
featuring Latin Americans.  Despite 
the lack of popularity of films such 
as Underground Agent, Now 
Voyager, Latin American culture did 
manifest itself in other ways.  For 
instance, in Alfred Hitchcock’s 
Notorious, the MPSA convinced the 
filmmakers to feature Rio de Janeiro 
in the film.  In addition, a number of 
films featured an orchestra led by 
Cuban Xavier Cugat.   Even though 
the Latin American presence in 
wartime Hollywood is telling, 
perhaps the more interesting aspect 
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of these films was the power given to the respective featured Latin American 
governments.  Latin American leaders often criticized the films for cultural inaccuracies 
or what they felt was misrepresentations.  For example, Brazil’s assistant director of 
Departmento de Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP), Asis de Figueiredo, complained about a 
suppossed “Brazilian” chauffeur in Now, Voyager that was played by an Italian actor 
who spoke Spanish and drove a beat up vehicle.  In his opinion, the modern nation of 
Brazil should not be represented with this image.285 
Print was another key element to the OCIAA’s cultural diplomacy.  Under the 
Information Division, the OCIAA Press cooperated with presses in 19 Latin American 
countries and boasted an impressive list of 1,267 different newspapers and magazines 
printed each day.  Just like Disney’s feature films, Mexico and Brazil were the primary 
emphasis with 210 and 422 respectively. In addition, the OCIAA even published its own 
monthly magazine, En Guardia  (On Guard) which was distributing 80,000 copies a 
month by mid-1941.  Interestingly, the Nazi propaganda forces fought En Guardia in a 
very literal sense when they published De Guardia, designed to appear similar to En 
Guardia but propagate Nazi information into Latin America.286  In 1944 it became its 
own Division, known as Press and Publication. 
Of all the documents to survive from World War II in Mexico, various archives 
have a notably large number of these OCIAA documents.  The magazine Vigía, 
translated as Watch or Watchtower, is one example.287  The monthly magazine served 
as both a news source and opinion piece about predominantly international events, but 
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it also included a brief section in English on the last page.  The contents covered a 
broad range of topics, but always contained pro-allied content.  One great and fairly 
subtle example is an article which was accompanied with this map.  The map informs 
the readers of the state of Europe in May of 1944. The article however was not about 
recent events; it was actually a historical piece.  The story was a favorable biography of 
Luis Bríon, a Dutchman who fought with Simon Bolívar and supported Gran Colombia.  
The opening line is quite revealing: 
In Caracas, near the final resting place of the Great Liberator, lies the mortal 
remains of another extraordinary man, whose memory has been forgotten by 
time.   There was a time when the letters of his name made syllables, and these 
ran as words through the mouths of people throughout not only the Americas, but 
also those beyond the sea, all the way to Europe. 
 
The story does not end here.  Bríon is remembered fondly for his contributions to 
the army, but is also specifically recognized for the fact that he borrowed from creditors 
in New York, London, and Amsterdam to arm the Liberating army against the Spanish, 
three cities that represented resistance to the Nazis despite the fact that the Dutch royal 
family was in exile at the time.  With the map looking at the reader on the opposite 
page, the insinuation of the past being connected to the present circumstances is more 
than subtle.  Other Vigía articles were even more obvious in their support for the allied 
effort.  Some even argued that the allies were fighting for racial equality, while Hitler 
promoted racism in Mein Kampf.288 
 The well-funded radio division was perhaps the most impressive cultural 
diplomacy effort of the OCIAA.  It was designed to compete with Axis Radio and British 
Radio, both of which were more ubiquitous in Latin America than U.S. radio stations at 
the onset of World War II.  Fred Fejes’s Imperialism, Media, and the Good Neighbor: 
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New Deal Foreign Policy and United States Shortwave Broadcasting to Latin America 
details how Rockefeller brought together NBC, CBS, and a few other networks to form a 
united front for the Radio division.  They created their own short-wave stations 
emanating from New York City, San Francisco, Boston, Cincinnati, and Schenectady.  
In addition, they bought time on local channels for their programming, sent transcripts to 
be read on other stations, and made new programs using Latin-American consultants.  
They then utilized local coordinating committees in key Latin American cities to support 
their local radio and promote their new programming.  This often included the hiring of 
prominent local radio figures.  The scriptwriters for these programs were closely 
supervised by the OCIAA.  They were given directives that were created by State 
Department and OCIAA staff members.  Oftentimes the on-air personalities just read 
scripts handed to them by the state department or OCIAA verbatim.  The content of the 
radio broadcasting was diverse.  They featured regular news updates, music programs, 
drama shows, and serial features such as “Estamos En Guerra,” which focused on 
specific aspects of the war.  Notably, the OCIAA programs had a directive (Operating 
Procedure Directive No. 3, December 16, 1942) which forbade sponsorship of 
advertisers.  The idea was to keep their propaganda campaign pure and prevent their 
media outlets from being associated with businesses in the U.S. or even Latin 
America.289 
 The OCIAA also practiced person-to-person cultural diplomacy. Working in 
conjunction with the State Department, numerous United States personalities and 
industry leaders toured their way across Latin America, predominantly South America, 
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in the hopes of improving U.S.-Latin American understanding.  These “missions” as they 
came to be called were initially dramatic failures.  The early films taken to South 
America typically reflected drastic cultural misunderstandings and contained a variety of 
different Spanish or Portuguese dialects, making little sense to the native viewers.  One 
of the OCIAA’s Motion Picture Subcommittees in Buenos Aires telegrammed, “STOP 
SUCH PICTURES. OR AT LEAST CHECK THEM VERY CAREFULLY, BEFORE IT IS 
TOO LATE.”  Brazil’s foreign minister, Oswaldo Aranha, outlined the Brazilian opinion 
even more clearly, “The next good-will mission that arrives in Rio, Brazil will declare war 
on the United States.”  Thankfully, the cultural missions eventually turned around with 
Walt Disney in 1942. Multi-millionaire and Vice President of the Museum of Modern Art 
in New York John Hay Whitney struck a deal with Walt Disney to create a series of 
animated shorts on behalf of better hemispherical relations.  Disney decided that in 
order to do a thorough job, and avoid the problems of his predecessors, he would need 
to take a team to South America—nicknamed El Grupo.  The trip became the topic of a 
documentary released in 1943 called South of the Border with Disney.  The shorts were 
combined into a box-office hit feature film, Saludos Amigos (1942)—and remains a cult 
favorite among Disney animation aficionados today for being the first feature film 
appearance of Donald Duck and Goofy.  The film held its premier in Rio de Janeiro, a 
first for Hollywood, and then hit other major cities in Latin America, appearing in the 
U.S. five months later.  While Disney’s film did catch some criticism from Latin 
Americans, Disney and El Grupo cooperated and listened to Brazilian artists and 
leaders during their trip, making an overall significantly better received final product than 
the OCIAA’s previous film sponsorships.290 
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 In total, the OCIAA was responsible for a complete media blitz across Latin 
America.  While the majority of the hemispherical solidarity content was focused on the 
urban population, the blanket radio coverage ensured it reached the majority of Latin 
Americans—with the notable exception of non-Spanish speaking populations.  The 
results are hard to measure, but its long term impact on Latin American culture is not.  
The propaganda campaign is a great example of cultural globalization and the power of 
the media.  While obviously the cultural interchange between the American Republics 
has skyrocketed alongside technology since the 1940s, the OCIAA left the first 
widespread cultural imprint across Latin American history. 
The OCIAA had another cultural mission beyond that of the mass media that has 
not been previously studied nor was even specifically mentioned in Rockefeller’s initial 
memorandum.  The OCIAA wanted to improve the understanding of Latin American 
countries in the United States and help combat racial prejudice in the United States—
making the OCIAA an essential component to ethnic diplomacy in more ways than one.     
 Rockefeller’s organization always understood that better hemispherical relations 
were a two way street.  Rockefeller himself realized this point and publically advocated 
this cause in an April 1, 1941 press release.  He began with four fairly ambitious goals:  
“First: ...as a permanent extension of the Good Neighbor program to stimulate a 
general movement for popular education about Central and South America in 
every community in this country…. Second: We should have a concerted 
community action to provide for the study of Spanish and Portuguese in schools 
and in classes established for adults.  Third: We need concerted community 
action to increase purchases of products imported from the other American 
Republics and Fourth: It would be most helpful to have concerted action among 
women’s and other organizations to provide suitable hospitality for visitors and to 
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establish direct and friendly contacts with similar groups and organizations in the 
other American Republics.”291 
 
While the rhetoric began in the spring, there was limited effort at this early point.  
The State Department’s Cultural Relations Division was still the only encompassing 
organization in place until after Pearl Harbor, this change in policy, the creation of an 
organization designed to impact the U.S. population’s perception of Latin Americans, 
mirrored the State Department’s own change in policy after December 7, 1941.  Not 
wasting any time, on December 8 the Rockefeller selected Walter Laves from the 
University of Chicago, and formerly of the League of Nations Association, to head an 
inter-American education program for the United States.292  This became a formal part 
of the OCIAA in March of 1942 when his group became known as the Division of Inter-
American Activities in the United States.  Before his appointment, Laves realized that 
his success (much like the success of the entire OCIAA) would depend on his 
relationship with other organizations and offices.  He drew a diagram revealing his ideas 
for the future division. He emphasized the importance of the media, the Office of Facts 
and Figures, the Office of Civilian Defense, and the Coordinator of Information as 
instrumental to his success. 
 Once Laves’ group became an official division, it operated with three sections: 
the Civics Organization Section, which worked in public education and information, the 
Hospitality Organization Section, which welcomed visiting Latin American officials and 
dignitaries, and the Lectures and Materials Section which compiled sources for 
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promoting Latin America within U.S. education.  However, in May 1942 the OCIAA 
Bureau of the Budget decided that the OCIAA was not needed in the United States and 
cut back its budget so it could only “stimulate” the population rather than create 
significant programs.  Fortunately, this budget freeze was extremely short lived as the 
increased tension from Texas and (especially) the Sleepy Lagoon Trial in California led 
to the approval of a 50% increase in funding from the original mark.293 
 The focus of the reinvigorated division was on three projects: Inter-American 
centers built across the country, including a center in Washington D.C. predominantly 
used for housing Latin American guests, a series of traveling exhibits promoting inter-
American affairs, and a “Spanish-Speaking Minority Project.”  The centers, influenced 
by the San Francisco and New York Fair’s reception centers of the Cultural Relations 
Division, were the initial focal point and took the lion’s share of the budget.  By 1944 
there were centers in Los Angeles, Salt Lake City, Denver, Omaha, Kansas City, St. 
Louis, Memphis, Chicago, Detroit, Buffalo, Cleveland, Akron, Pittsburgh, Chapel Hill, 
Philadelphia, Hartford, Providence, and Boston.  Additionally, more centers were 
planned for San Francisco, San Antonio, Houston, New Orleans, Birmingham, Atlanta, 
and Louisville.294  Besides the initial centers, the first six months saw a flurry of special 
projects which included forums, conferences, and study groups that were organized by 
“several hundred” community groups in “most states of the country” and financially 
sponsored by the Division.295  Perhaps most interesting was the center in Washington 
D.C., which reveals a much deeper problem.  Non-white visiting dignitaries often had 
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trouble finding lodging in the segregated, southern city that Washington D.C. still was in 
the 1940s.  The United States understanding of race of white or non-white did not match 
the more narrow racial categories of Latin America.  As evidenced by the Mexican 
government’s complaints to the State Department, the visiting officials ran into this 
problem in the American Southwest and at times in the capital.  This center gave the 
OCIAA a place to organize activities in the D.C. area, but more importantly solved a 
potentially embarrassing problem.  This became even more apparent when the OCIAA 
added more “reception centers” to care for visitors from other American republics.296 
 These reception centers were part of the Inter-American Travelers’ Index and 
Reception Section and worked closely with the Department of State.  The two main 
branches and “reception centers” were in Miami and New York City (although eventually 
the San Francisco center, known as the Pacific House also became quite active).  
Beginning in 1943, these centers served as the entry point for all official visitors arriving 
from Latin America and were purposely built in the major ports of entry for Latin 
American immigrants.  With close cooperation from the military, Department of State, 
and the Cultural Relations Division of the OCIAA, these dignitaries were channeled to 
their respective destinations and all their travel plans were arranged on their behalf.  
Railroad and airplane tickets were provided and interpreters were made available to 
accompany them throughout their entire trip.  In addition, they would book hotel 
accommodations, provide tour guides, and arrange for official entertainment.   The 
OCIAA, and really the entire US government, benefited from this travel planning as they 
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were able to track the daily itineraries of the Latin American visitors and assist with “any 
particular problems which might arise.”297 
 The centers themselves were operated by volunteer organizations, each 
producing their own pro-hemispherical cooperation/pro-Latin American culture materials 
and events.  A surviving pamphlet from 1945 entitled Some Specific Suggestions for 
Inter-American Programs (3rd Edition) gives some examples of recommended activities: 
Celebrating Latin American independence days, Pan-American Day, Flag Day, showing 
slides and films, concerts, musical competitions, language classes in both Spanish and 
Portuguese.298   
Pan-American Day was the centers’ most consistently celebrated event.  A 324 
page book entitled Pan-American Day: An Anthology of the Best Prose and Verse on 
Pan Americanism and the Good Neighbor Policy was produced to accompany Pan-
American Day celebrations in 1943.  The book has some interesting aspects that reveal 
even more about the nature of ethnic diplomacy in the OCIAA.  It contained five 
sections: “Poetry and Prose,” “History and Ideals of Pan-Americanism,” “Anecdotes—
Legends—Stories,” “Speeches and Sayings,” and “Plays, a Pageant, and Program 
Material.”  The book’s introduction, penned by World War I veteran, cellist, and author 
Robert Haven Schauffler, explains that while the holiday was created in 1890, the U.S. 
had not celebrated it until 1931.  On the day itself, all government buildings were be-
flagged and schools, civic organizations, and citizens in general were encouraged to 
partake in ceremonies “that express our cordial feeling of friendship for all our sister 
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American republics, and for the ideal of continental solidarity.”299  Under FDR’s 
administration, Pan-American Day “has now come to be a highly important and 
significant occasion….  With each of the United States whole-heartedly behind the 
Good Neighbor movement, our schools are going in in a large way for study of the other 
American republics, their history, ideals, national heroes, folk-lore, customs, costumes, 
etc.”300 
One of the primary themes emphasized in the celebration of Pan-American Day 
was the legacy of Simón Bolívar as the original Pan-American.  A passage by Joseph 
Byrne Lockey, University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) History Professor of Latin 
America, was provided as a quotable passage on the topic.  Lockey wrote: 
What can America do to promote world unity?  It can first of all effect its own 
unification.  Fortunately, no insuperable obstacles lie in the path.  Bolívar, the 
torch, pointed the way more than a hundred years ago.  His light has not gone 
out.  It shines more and more resplendently as the years go by.  It is the symbol 
of American unity.  It is at a point about which the nations of American can rally.  
Let them rally.  Let them achieve Bolívar’s ideal.  Let them provide a model for 
the other great regions of the earth.  Let these emulate the American example.  
Let Europe federate.  Let the other regional unities be established.  Then 
perhaps the world can unite.  If that day comes, it may not be too much to call 
Bolívar the providence of the two hemispheres. 
 
As previously shown with FDR’s selective memory of Woodrow Wilson’s foreign 
relations with Latin America, U.S. leaders have often used a selective history in an effort 
to paint the United States and Latin America as having a more positive shared history.   
Even as recently as President George W. Bush’s Pan-American Day Proclamation, this 
extremely selective history and manipulation of Bolívar’s memory has been utilized.  In 
his speech Bush argued that “The United States and our neighboring countries in the 
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Western Hemisphere have a long history of cooperation.  Simon Bolivar (sic) first 
convened the Congress of Panama in 1826 with the intention of creating an association 
of states in the hemisphere.  In 1890, a Pan American conference established the 
International Union of American Republics.”301 
Pan-American Day was designed to celebrate this selective shared history and 
promote Latin American culture and history.  Perhaps most revealing of this new 
philosophy are the play scripts created by the OCIAA to help celebrate the holiday.  The 
most compelling script was a recreation of a conversation between Eleanor Roosevelt 
and Nelson Rockefeller and is designed to be played by a boy and a girl impersonating 
the First Lady and the CIAA.  This excerpt reveals the ideology behind it: 
Mrs. Roosevelt: I should like to ask you, Mr. Rockefeller, do you believe that we 
can achieve hemisphere solidarity? 
 
Mr. Rockefeller: Absolutely!  There’s no question in my mind but that we can 
achieve it if we have the idea that solidarity means uniformity.  We in this 
hemisphere are 21 different republics.  We have different histories—all of them 
exciting—but we have the common history of hatred of oppression and love for 
freedom and independence.  We have different cultures, but each of our 
countries can find in all the others much that is inspiring.  We have different 
resources, but our resources can supplement and benefit one another. 
 
Mrs. Roosevelt: That is very important for all of us to understand.  After all, what 
we are defending is the right of every country to work out its destiny in its own 
way, to live in peace and security, and to have access to the good things of life.  
It is that right of peoples which Hitler seeks to destroy.  You have confirmed my 
confidence that the countries of this hemisphere will never submit to foreign 
domination.  Certainly all the varying peoples of this half of the world have the 
common heritage of resistance to any threat against our freedom and to any 
external domination. 
 
The centers and the Division as a whole were also effective in convincing 
merchants to assist in their mission.  Businesses across the country were convinced to 
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sell Latin American goods.  The commercial influence represents an interesting parallel 
to the entire OCIAA—where private enterprise partnered with government to achieve 
their goals.  Each of the 48 States had grass root organizations aided and supported by 
the Division. 
 Shortly after the Division of Inter-American Affairs was given back its funding, 
Rockefeller increased its importance via a departmental reorganization and more 
staffing.  In February of 1943 the Division was placed underneath the Department of 
Information Services.  The Division of Inter-American Affairs in the United States was 
broken up into four sections: the Inter-American Centers Section, Major Key Groups 
Section, the Spanish and Portuguese Speaking Minorities Section, and the Speakers 
Service Bureau Section.   
The creation of the Spanish and Portuguese Speaking Minorities Section is an 
important step in the practice of ethnic diplomacy.  Even before the reorganization, this 
section existed in a more unofficial format.  In April of 1942, concurrent with the State 
Department’s own policy changes, Labor Economist David J. Saposs completed his 
report for Laves called “Resident Latin American Problems and Recommended 
Program.”302  The report was a scathing analysis of the discrimination and inequality 
seen across the Southwest.  Employment discrimination, illiteracy, inadequate housing, 
malnutrition, and segregation in schools and public places were all commonplace.  
Saposs guessed that the population was approximately 3.5 million which could either 
hinder the home front or support it with their labor.  His suggestions to improve racial 
relations were to open up support centers for victims of racial prejudice and educate 
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non-Hispanic citizens in order to end “racist attitudes and practices.”303  Ultimately 
Laves and his other department heads agreed with the findings in the Saposs Report.  
They established a committee to attempt to coordinate any and all agencies involved 
with this group of Americans.  Their primary responsibility was to improve the attitude 
toward Latin Americans by working with key groups across the United States.  In the 
reorganization the committee became its own section officially and Saposs was tabbed 
as director.  Some of their earliest activities were aimed at supporting talented Hispanic 
High School students with scholarships for college.  Laves gave the section an annual 
budget of $150,000; which was largely spent on these scholarships, community centers, 
Latin American holiday celebrations, such as the Tucson Alianza para Victoria 
celebration, and media programming.  Most importantly, as already discussed, the 
Cultural Centers became the centerpiece of the Division in 1943. 
 Less than a year later, corresponding with the increased racial turmoil across the 
nation, the Division of Inter-American Activities officially was upgraded to be its own 
Department, signifying its growing importance.  In October 1944 the new Department 
was renamed with the more generic title Department of Special Services.  It kept the old 
responsibilities but added a Labor Relations Division.  The Department continued in this 
capacity through the end of 1945.  The U.S. Government Manual from September 
states that the Special Services Unit, minus the newer Labor Relations Division, was to 
be terminated. 
While the budget of the Department of Inter-American Affairs in the United States 
reveals where the money was funneled, the above listed projects, cultural diplomacy 
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often can be successful with less funding.  The written word and education proved to be 
the newly formed department’s greatest tool.  The Division of Education and Teacher’s 
Aid focused on the training and preparation of teachers, the development and 
distribution of educational material, and the encouragement and assistance for the 
teaching of Spanish and Portuguese.  One instrumental aspect of teacher training was 
the “Inter-American Workshops.”  These programs, often created in conjunction with 
Latin American specialists from across the nation’s universities and colleges, were 
designed for the training of primary and secondary school teachers.  These workshops 
lasted between 2 and 6 weeks.  Fellow Americans was one of these workshops, 
designed as a fourth grade curriculum unit on Brazil with an emphasis on the region 
surrounding the Amazon River.  The workshop was conducted in Louisville, Kentucky, 
but the documentation was accessible nationally.   
Another example with surviving documentation is Grace Thompson Pugh’s 
Mexican Folk Dances from 1944.  Pugh’s workshop was designed to be educational 
and entertaining.  On the education side of the workshop, she emphasized the link 
between Mexican Folk Dances and Mexican history, explaining in detail how Mexican 
Folk dances each have a unique meaning and cultural significance.  In her guide, Pugh 
argued that “In no other American country is the present so rooted in the past as in 
Mexico.”304  The workshop also featured demonstrations of these traditional dances.  
These included such dances as Los Voladores (Dance of the Flying Pole) and La 
Danza de las Plumas (The Dance of the Conquest).  A deep analysis of the more 
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questionable elements of Mexican history was avoided.  For example, La Danza de las 
Plumas invokes the potentially controversial history of the Spanish Conquest.  Pugh’s 
comment on this particular topic is quite telling.  She comments that the “Indians dance 
happily the story of their own defeat.”305   Since her audience was U.S. citizens, this 
offensive interpretation of La Danza de las Plumas reinforced good feelings rather than 
create cultural conflict.  While attempting to avoid controversy, she also reinforced the 
ethnic diplomacy messages of Good Neighborism and Hemispherical Solidarity.  She 
closed her pamphlet by stating that “To understand Mexican dances is to understand 
Mexico; and understanding is the necessary basis for the neighborliness and friendship 
which we so earnestly desire.”306 
As part of this educational effort, the Department also created the Curriculum 
Service Bureau for International Studies.  The OCIAA used the Bureau to publish 
teaching resources, workshop pamphlets, and full curriculums that promoted Latin 
American education.  These included Inter-American Education in Our Schools by Marie 
R. Madden, which was a curriculum for New York area schools and included about 50 
pages in teaching aids, Source Materials for the Correlation of Mexican Music with our 
Secondary School Curriculum by William Tuckman, and Films for International 
Understanding edited by Elizabeth H. Flory. 
Branches of the OCIAA outside of the Division of Inter-American Activities in the 
United States also promoted the culture of Latin America within the U.S.  For example, 
the Radio Division, as previously discussed as part the propaganda campaign, also 
operated within the United States.  Instead of taking control of the networks, the OCIAA 
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worked within the regular commercial radio companies on their national programming.  
Representatives worked with advertising agencies and artists in order to create Latin 
American “flavored” programming.  The campaign proved fruitful with all four major U.S. 
radio networks cooperating and major sponsors, such as the Coca-Cola Company, 
backing a national program that saluted a different Southern Republic each week.307 
 The OCIAA as an independent body ceased to exist as of August 31, 1945.  The 
responsibilities were transferred to the Department of State, and the informational 
functions became called the Office for Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) and Nelson 
Rockefeller left the agency to Wallace K. Harrison, an architect friend of Rockefeller 
who collaborated on Rockefeller Center.  The tone of the agency shifted and a number 
of Soviet spies were discovered within the organization, most of whom had served 
throughout the war.  Unfortunately, while some cultural interchanges remained, the 
same diplomatic fervor was not present as the organization turned on itself to out 
communists. 
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All too often works of U.S. international relations history emphasize only the 
United States side of their issue.  This was particularly common among dated, non-
Western focused case studies that often suffer from methodological issues involving a 
lack of sources, language barriers, or classified information. As seen already throughout 
this study, ethnic diplomacy, just like most true examples of diplomacy, is a two-way 
exchange.  The U.S. side, while somewhat personified by Sumner Welles and Cordell 
Hull, was a multifaceted expression of policy represented by a variety of different levels 
of government.  The Mexican side of the exchange, which turned racism into an 
international issue in the first place, was more centralized stemming predominantly from 
President Manuel Ávila Camacho’s administration and to a certain extent the opinions of 
his constituents.   
 While Ávila Camacho’s administration made it clear—predominantly via close 
Ávila Camacho confidant and Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla—that racial prejudice in 
the United States was highly offensive to Mexicans, the only major diplomatic sanction 
in response to a lack of action in the United States was the bracero ban in Texas.308  
Seeing how strongly Mexico pushed the issue, why did Mexico take up the issue of race 
and then only push the United States so far?  They could have demanded national 
legislation, or pressured the U.S. with the entirety of the bracero program or, more 
effectively, restricted trade of vital wartime materials.  The reality was that Mexico had 
ulterior motives to their racial prejudice complaints similar to that of the State 
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Department’s ethnic diplomacy.  While Mexicans did not like being treated as inferiors 
while traveling within the United States, the larger issue was to make certain the United 
States did not appear racist to Mexico in order to maximize their industrialization.  This 
is best evidenced by an understanding of Mexican politics and economics at the time, 
their responses to the Sleepy Lagoon Incident and Zoot Suit Riots, which objectively 
speaking were the most grievous episodes of racial discrimination, and their good 
neighbor reciprocity with Texas. 
 An understanding of this moment in Mexican history reveals an interesting 
parallel to the “window of opportunity” that allowed ethnic diplomacy to exist.  Leading 
up the World War II, Mexico as a nation was still struggling to define what their 1910s 
Revolution meant.  As fascism and totalitarianism became a global phenomenon, 
Mexico’s stance was officially neutral.  As the debate over the meaning of their 
Revolution, and the Spanish Civil War, raged on in Europe, many Mexicans throughout 
the late 1930s attached to either the far left or the far right.  Mexico’s understanding of 
the Spanish Civil War reveals this political division best.  As Mexicans read about the 
conflict, many saw it both as similar to their own revolution ideologically and as a 
potential preview of what could happen in Mexico’s future due to its unresolved social 
issues.  The lower classes, mainly urban labor, sided with the Spanish Republicans and 
saw the war as a working-class struggle against fascism.  The newly created national 
labor union (which included communist unions), Confederation of Mexican Workers 
(popularly known as CTM) even raised money from its members to support the 
“comrade worker militiamen of Spain.”309  On the other end of the spectrum, capitalists, 
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businessmen, and Catholics challenged the Left’s interpretation of the Spanish Civil 
War.  Already upset with Lázaro Cárdenas’s presidency, they sided with the Spanish 
Falange.  The debate flared in the media as Spanish refugees arrived in Mexico without 
the administration taking any official stance. 
 By 1938, the debate shifted more to Nazi and Italian aggression as more and 
more countries were feeling the weight of fascist military might.  Cárdenas still kept 
Mexico officially neutral, but the newspapers show that a war for the hearts and minds 
of Mexico had already begun.  As the preeminent expert on Mexico during World War II, 
Monica Rankin, has shown many times over, propaganda was a powerful and popular 
tool in Mexico.  Arthur Dietrich, relative of Hitler’s close confidant and Third Reich’s 
Press Chief Otto Dietrich, had arrived in Mexico as a press attaché for the German 
embassy in 1924.  Early on, much of Arthur Dietrich’s work was community building.  He 
founded the Comunidad del Pueblo Alemán (German People’s Community), the Colegio 
Alemán (German School) and the Organización para el Extranjero (Foreigner 
Organization) and most notably—the National Socialist Party.  By 1938, German 
propagandists permeated the Mexican press, regularly penning editorials in major 
newspapers.  Thanks to the Mexican National Archives, a recently declassified report 
entitled, “El Nazismo en México por la División de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales” 
reveals the extent of the propaganda. Not only were the Nazi’s producing their own 
publications such as Defensa (Defense), Periódico Alemán (literally German 
Newspaper), and Timón (Helm), they had bought off many of the nation’s most popular 
newspapers and magazines.  A U.S. military intelligence report revealed that these 
sources were receiving large sums of money every month from a bank account that was 
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traced back to a German military attaché in Washington.  This even included two 
mainstream Mexico City dailies—Excelsior and El Universal which were believed to be 
receiving particularly large subsidies from the account.  In addition, Dietrich’s work got a 
major boost from the oil crisis.  After the U.S. embargo of Mexican oil in 1938, Nazi 
Germany became a major buyer of Mexican petroleum and the U.S.-Mexican situation 
soured as U.S. oil companies launched their own propaganda offensive against 
President Cárdenas and Mexico, most notably a 1939 Standard Oil funded publication 
entitled, Mexico at the Bar of Public Opinion.310 
 By 1940, the Mexican report states that Nazi agents had a sophisticated network 
of spies and propaganda.  Fortunately for the Allies cause, the facts about fascist 
aggression translated more into fear than sympathy.  The mainstream papers remained 
anti-U.S., but they could not ignore wartime coverage of Germany’s European conquest 
and its imperialist nature.  Some Mexicans worried that the German presence in Mexico 
represented a 5th column and questioned Cárdenas’s ability to prevent a fascist 
takeover.  Responding to this pressure Cárdenas officially supported the U.S. and pro-
allied forces and supplied weapons and materials to those fighting the Axis.  In the 
same moment, Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs forced Dietrich to leave the country. 
Amidst the global turmoil of the late 1930s, Mexico’s own future was at stake with 
a presidential election.  One of the consensus narratives within Mexican history 
scholarship is that Mexico took a conservative turn with this election in 1940.  After the 
controversial and economically tumultuous few years of Lázaro Cárdenas’s progressive 
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reforms which included intensified land reform, nationalized oil (discussed previously), 
and the reduction of clerical power in education, the government shifted course. This 
was not uncommon in the one-party Mexican system at the time.  The leaders of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (popularly known in Spanish with the acronym: PRI) 
typically congregated prior to a presidential election and often made potentially major 
decisions about what Mexico needed for both their country and therefore in their next 
president.  Cárdenas himself supported the conservative General Ávila Camacho who 
represented a very different opinion on the status of the Mexican Revolution.  While 
Cárdenas felt as though the revolution was incomplete, Ávila Camacho believed that it 
had been completed and the next step was a more industrialized economy.  Despite this 
difference, the two were still friends and Ávila Camacho held it as a point of pride that 
he had worked under Cárdenas previously. 
 With this mindset, Ávila Camacho’s economic platform was the central piece of 
his administration.  He called for the “Mexicanization” of Mexico’s Industry.  The idea 
was to make Mexico self-sufficient for vital manufactured goods and to export finished 
products.   This was a major change from the previous industrialization efforts that 
emphasized the exporting of raw materials.  Throughout the 1940s legislation was 
passed to boost manufacturing.  In 1941, the Law of Manufacturing Industries gave tax 
breaks and tariff protection for manufacturers, in 1942 the National Chamber of Industry 
was created to drum up public support for industrial development, and in 1944 the 
state’s Nacional Financiera was restructured to serve as a bank for to support 
industrialists and manufacturers.  While this was the goal, Ávila has also been tied to 
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the Monterrey Group by well-known Mexicanist Historian Stephen Niblo.311  The 
Monterrey Group was Mexico’s foremost organization of powerful industrial barons who 
preferred a closer relationship with the United States and “whose leaders dreamed of a 
return to the regimes of Porfirio Díaz.”312  Prior to his election as president, Ávila 
Camacho was seemingly courted by the Monterrey Group.  While no smoking gun 
document has been found of their close relationship, he did go to Monterrey four times 
in 1939, and his later policies revealed a close relationship with individuals tied to the 
group.313 
 Foreigners were encouraged to invest, however, some safeguards were put in 
place.  Foreigners were not allowed to invest in extractive industries, only manufacturing 
ones.  Even then, they could only control up to 49% of a particular company, which 
became known as the 51% rule.  In addition, in 1944 Mexico enacted import controls to 
protect their nascent companies.314  While some of the historiography simply leaves the 
story on this positive note of the compromising balance of nationalization, protectionist, 
and foreign capital, other scholars are quick to point out that major loopholes existed to 
these rules contributing to the popular historical idea that Mexican laws are often not 
enforced to the spirit of their meaning.315  The result was that U.S. companies held 
power in a number of companies that produced high demand raw materials. 
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 Eventually, the state-planning of Mexico in conjunction with U.S. investment 
resulted in government built industries in Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey and 
the development of a vast amount of transportation infrastructure, mainly roads and 
railways.  The biggest supporters for this type of development were industrialist political 
groups such as El Nuevo Grupo (The New Group), comprised mainly of urban 
manufacturers.  El Nuevo Grupo’s specific flagship issue was the subsidizing of new 
factories to produce tools for chemical and machinery industries.316   
 The more in-depth economic studies of Latin American economies during World 
War II argue that the war “quickly intensified demand” for Latin American primary 
products, increasing profits from exports.  So while manufacturing was the party line, 
key resources were also extracted at record levels.   On June 15, 1941 Mexico and the 
U.S. signed the Souglas-Weichers Agreement, which specified that Mexico would sell 
all of its strategic mineral output to the United States.  Other agreements followed, 
cementing Mexico deeper and deeper into the United States wartime production 
industrial framework.  The numbers reveal the changes; between 1940 and 1950 oil 
production shot up from 44,448,191 barrels to 73,881,472 barrels annually.  Steel more 
than doubled from 149,655 tons to 332,631 in the same period, Cotton production 
quadrupled up to 260,000 metric tons, and Zinc nearly doubled to 262,425 metric tons.  
Ultimately the wartime GDP growth was largely export driven, while the Export GDP 
grew 11.7% from 1940-45, the real per capita GDP in the same span was only 4.6%.  
To Ávila Camacho’s credit, this was the largest margin of real per capita GDP growth 
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during World War II in Latin America, with the rest of the region averaging growth from -
0.1 to 2%.317 
 Unfortunately, the resulting economic growth from these changes did not 
translate into direct improvements for the general Mexican populace.  Available 
manpower was nonexistent, social projects were not on the agenda, and the ability to 
import consumer goods was literally impossible due to a lack of availability.  Instead, 
Mexico simply banked the surpluses and their reserves grew by 480% between 1940 
and 1945.318 
 Ground transportation was also greatly improved during the war in an effort to 
maximize Mexican exports into the United States.  At the beginning of the war, porters 
and mule trains were more common than trucks for transportation.  In 1940, only 41,932 
trucks existed in the entire country, but by 1950 this number would swell to 105,162.  
Much of this traffic traveled along the much needed and newly developed road system.  
The Federal Highway Network in 1940 only ran 9,929 kilometers; by 1950 it had more 
than doubled to 21,422.  Many of these new roads were funded by Mexico’s 1941 
agreement with the United States to purchase $10 million in road bonds with their newly 
found economic surplus.319  A diplomatic victory for Mexico during this time was the 
U.S. agreement to the Pan-American Highway.  While it was publically praised as a sign 
of hemispherical unity by leaders on both sides, its practical purpose was as a new road 
to support the export economy.  Railroads of course were also essential.  Once scholar 
argues that the railroads were so overly utilized during the war that when it ended the 
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railways were in a significant state of disrepair.  In fact, when estimating Mexico’s raw 
material value during the Korean War, the United States believed that “the railroad 
network would be of minimal value.”320 
While the industrialization and rapid economic growth, not seen since “good” 
eras of the Porfiriato, was what headlined Ávila Camacho’s presidency, he also was 
forced to deal with the fascist presence in his country and political debate he inherited 
from his predecessor.  Ávila Camacho was among those who believed the aggression 
of the Axis powers was imperialistic and threatening to the world. Given the state of 
Asia and Europe in December of 1941, it was not unrealistic for Ávila Camacho to 
consider world domination by totalitarian regimes a viable reality.  At a key moment, 
Ávila Camacho had Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla address the Mexican Congress 
and call for Mexico to join with the Allied effort.  The reasoning by which he made this 
argument is extremely revealing.  He first linked the fight against fascism as a fight for 
freedom, invoking Mexico’s own history and recent revolution.  Secondly, he argued that 
Indian and mestizo groups would be oppressed by Germany’s racial policies.  Once 
again, racial equality was evoked by Padilla, this time as a key element of why Mexico 
was siding with the allies, which meant racial prejudices in the United States 
jeopardized this partnership.  The choice to work closely was extremely difficult for 
many Mexicans to accept; but these two reasons, which had nothing to do with the 
United States itself, were a compelling argument which allowed Ávila Camacho to push 
forward his conservative industrialization effort in the name of the Mexican Revolution, 
freedom, and racial equality.  Taking this line of thought to its fullest extent, this policy 
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decision had implication for all of Latin America.  The autobiographer/biographer of the 
Mexican Mural Renaissance, Anita Brenner, weighed in on Mexico’s hemispherical 
importance during World War II.  She stated, “Because of Mexico’s immediate 
revolutionary past, it is something like a school for . . . many other Latin American 
Republics; its moral leadership is beyond its size. Therefore it has had an enormous 
effect on the conduct of the war, for without its diplomatic work, the line-up of twenty-
one American republics against the Axis could not have been achieved. “321 While her 
argument is based off of personal experience and connections, it is not unfair to argue 
that U.S. prejudices against Latin Americans, specifically Mexicans, potentially 
jeopardized cooperation in the name of hemispherical solidarity for all of Latin America. 
 The propaganda war favored the Allies as the OCIAA got involved and Ávila 
Camacho’s own propaganda office, created after the Douglas-Weichers Agreement, got 
to work.  Padilla’s principles for supporting the Allies are found throughout the 
propaganda from both countries; however, the most common message portrayed to the 
average citizen in Mexico was that working hard equaled being patriotic and a defender 
of freedom.  While Mexico and the United States had different reasons for fighting 
fascism, there was an agreement that industrialization and cooperation were keys for 
victory.  The United States seemed more focused on winning the war abroad, while 
Mexico’s actions reinforce the idea that they were more interested in developing as an 
industrial nation while preventing imperialism from arriving on their shores.  In terms of 
ethnic diplomacy, this meant that both nations were somewhat on the same page.  Both 
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nations saw the racial inequality as a stumbling block to their goals; therefore it is not 
surprising that Mexico was unwilling to push the issue to the breaking point. 
 From his first days in office, Camacho valued a close relationship with the United 
States.  Upon taking office, Padilla told the U.S. Embassy that they were ready to create 
a Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission, something Cárdenas has been 
unwilling to do.  In the months before Pearl Harbor, Padilla and Camacho both made 
efforts to have other Latin American nations join a stand against German Aggression 
and encouraged cooperation with the United States.  Camacho however was forced to 
deal with a significant amount of criticism concerning his moves towards greater U.S.-
Mexican cooperation.  Political leaders and journalists liked to remind their audiences of 
previous U.S. interventions, the Mexican-American War, and racial discrimination 
against Mexicans.  The most notable periodical to express this view as Fraternidad, but 
by 1943 this faction became more organized through the formation of the Comité en 
Contra el Racismo (Committee Against Racism).  The group was quite influential within 
the PRI and commanded significant support from the Mexican public.  One of their most 
popular arguments was to equate the racism in the American southwest to Nazi racial 
superiority.  Ultimately, this political faction seems to have exerted substantial influence 
on Camacho’s attention to racial discrimination. 
 One good example of the Mexican government’s two-track diplomacy on the 
racial discrimination issue is found in its responses to Governor Coke Stevenson’s 
attempt to remove the bracero ban.  When Stevenson visited Mexico, Camacho and 
Padilla granted Stevenson a seat of honor at the National Palace and showed 
appreciation for Texas’s ethnic diplomacy.  However, while Stevenson was in Mexico, 
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Alejandro Carrillo, a leftist Congressman who supported labor rights, expressed the 
viewpoint of the Comité en Contra el Racismo.  Alejandro Carrillo was chairman of the 
newly formed Committee on Mexicans in the Exterior in the Chamber of Deputies.  The 
Committee monitored racial discrimination in an official capacity and encouraged 
Mexicans traveling abroad to report acts of discrimination to their local consuls.  At a 
public event in San Antonio, Carrillo announced Mexico’s continuation of the bracero 
ban.  He went on to state that President Camacho “follows with great interest the 
experiences of Mexicans who find themselves in Texas and in the other entities of the 
United States.”  He went on to point out that wartime relations, 
present the opportunity to consolidate the Mexico-American friendship, to avoid 
cases of racial discrimination that are absolutely contrary to the democratic spirit 
in all the American nations, where the worth of human beings is not measured by 
the shape of the cranium, the color of their skin or their eyes, the acceptance of 
this false theory would be tantamount to declaring ourselves followers of Hitler.322 
 Mexico’s reactions to the Sleepy Lagoon Incident and Zoot Suit riots serves as 
ideal evidence that Ávila Camacho and the Mexican urban population was not going to 
let racism in the United States spoil the country’s larger plan.323  As news of the riots 
spread to below the border, reactions were mixed towards the Pachucos.  The Mexican 
government officially was concerned about Mexican-Americans living in Los Angeles 
and sent emissaries to meet with city and state authorities concerning the riot; however, 
they did not believe that “anti-Mexican hysteria” caused the violence.  The reports were 
veiled at first.  El Universal ran a United Press story about the clash between sailors 
and costumed individual labeled as “Tarzans.”  The article notably did not distinguish 
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the “Tarzans” as Mexican-American.324  The government’s own newspaper, El Nacional 
ran a similar story, but labeled the “Tarzans” as “idle and bad-living criminals” who were 
promptly being dealt with by the local authorities.325  The Mexican newspaper La Prensa 
was the first to unveil the racial side of the crimes.  Even so, the headline was not a 
condemnation.  It read, “Not True Mexicans, they are an Offense to our Republic.”   The 
paper went on to chastise the Pachucos and explain their behavior with their own racial 
prejudices.  The author argued that the colony in Los Angeles is “almost always 
mestizos of Mexican and Negro, or Mexican and Chinese or Filipino [heritage]; the great 
majority of them are not by birth or nationality Mexicans.”326  While I could not find direct 
proof of these articles being fabricated by government officials on either side of the 
border, the prevalence of the OCIAA and Ávila Camacho’s propaganda machines at this 
time and other examples of their influence in these newspapers raises legitimate 
suspicion in regards to their strong viewpoints and censorship.   Another source of 
popular public commentary on the Pachucos was famed Mexican poet Octavio Paz, 
who happened to be living in Los Angeles during the riot.  He labeled them as “’sinister 
clowns’ caught between the ‘labyrinth of solitude’ in Mexican culture and the materialism 
of American culture.”327 
 On the other side of the fence were activists ready to protest American racism.  
With many donning Zoot Suits, a group in Mexico City traveled around town “booing, 
jeering, and hissing” an establishment with links or visible signs of a connection to the 
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United States.328  Interestingly, two days before this particular walkabout, two young 
Mexicans wearing Zoot Suits were attacked and stripped of their activist garments.  Few 
details of the episode were recorded in the newspapers, but conspiracy theories from 
the anti-U.S. side of the debate made the situation tense.  Ultimately the activists 
formed the Comité de Defensa de Los Mexicanos de Afuera (Committee for the 
Defense of Mexicanos Abroad) which continued organized protests against racism and 
the lack of a stronger response from the Mexican government.  Foreign Minister Padilla 
was the primary target of their criticism.  Despite Padilla’s stance on racial issues, his 
overall close cooperation with the United States, which culminated in his visit to D.C. a 
year earlier in 1942, made him the closest Mexican official to the United States from the 
perspective of most Mexicans.  On June 15th Padilla sent a friendly worded message to 
Secretary of State Hull diplomatically stating that he wanted those responsible for the 
riots punished and the victims compensated.329  Padilla’s detractors which included the 
Comité and publications such as Novedadas and La Nación fiercely contested the 
issue, suggesting Padilla should have responded more strongly or even fly to Los 
Angeles to make sure they received justice.  Padilla responded to the critics by standing 
his ground, arguing that traveling to the scene and influencing the situation would set a 
precedent for one state in the internal affairs of another.  The irony was not lost on his 
critics, who saw the United States as exerting influence in Mexico.  In addition, under 
the guise of ethnic diplomacy, Padilla had already influenced U.S. policy at the state 
and national levels. 
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Another and much more real threat to U.S.-Mexican harmony emerged after the 
Zoot Suit Riots.  The Sinarchists and Acción Nacional in Mexico, both used their own 
media outlets to propagandize anti-U.S./pro-fascist arguments, breathing new life into 
the fascist side of the propaganda war which had been ongoing since the late 1930s.  
These groups were met with resistance from the PRI supported CTM in particular.  As 
the Sleepy Lagoon Defense Citizen’s Committee pointed out, “Lombardo Toledano 
[founder of the Confederation of Mexican Workers or CTM] and Mexican labor called for 
firmer unity among the win-the-war forces in both countries to defeat the common 
enemy. If the Mexican Fifth Column had a limited success in capitalizing on the work of 
its U. S. counterpart, it was because Lombardo and other democratic leaders in Latin 
America were able to point to the activities of organized labor in the U. S. and of such 
groups as the Citizens' Committee as proof that not all Americans think like the very 
publically racist Sheriff Office’s representative Ed Duran Ayres.  Ayres, made the official 
statement concerning the Zoot Suit incident for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department.  One could easily see how his comments could be inflammatory: 
  The biological basis is the main basis to work from....When the Spaniards 
conquered Mexico they found an organized society composed of many tribes of 
Indians ruled over by the Aztecs who were given over to human sacrifice. 
Historian’s record that as many as 30,000 Indians were sacrificed . . . in one day, 
their bodies ... opened by stone knives and their hearts torn out.... This total 
disregard for human life has always been universal throughout the Americas 
among the Indian population, which of course is well known to everyone.... This 
Mexican element ... knows and feels ... a desire to use a knife or some lethal 
weapon.... His desire is to kill. or at least let blood....330 
 
 By the time this potentially disastrous racial violence occurred, Mexico’s wartime 
economic plan was already in effect.  Previously Mexico proved they were willing to 
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diplomatically sanction an individual state (Texas), but their response to this episode 
shows that they were not willing to punish the U.S. as a whole, nor a state vital to 
hemispherical defense and more progressive in fixing their racial problems (California).  
By utilizing these state-specific foreign policies towards the United States the industrial 
elite and Presidential Administration could ensure their economic plan remained intact 
and could argue that they were still addressing a popular issue among mestizos and 
people of indigenous ancestry. 
 Another piece of evidence for how both Mexico and the United States both 
wanted to sweep racial unrest under the rug occurred between the Sleepy Lagoon 
incident and the Zoot Suit Riots.  Even before Coke Stevenson took his two-week tour 
of Mexico, FDR became the first president to visit Latin America (as President) by 
meeting with President Camacho on Mexican soil.  The overall goal for both sides was 
to reaffirm their cooperation and alliance with a large amount of press coverage and 
public fanfare.  Interestingly, both FDR and Ávila Camacho’s made historically based 
quotes, likely chosen to invoke Mexicans historical pride and to further legitimize the 
Camacho Administration’s connection to the Mexican Revolution.  Their  
misrepresentation of their neighbor’s national histories reveals how both sides felt about 
issues that could potentially break the current relationship.  Whereas, we later learn that 
Mexico was willing to forgive the Zoot Suit riots, apparently the two leaders were also 
willing to wash away the two countries conflicting histories by forgetting some fairly 
major historical details.  IN 1943, FDR stated that, "Our two countries owe their 
independence to the fact that your ancestors and mine held the same truths to be worth 
fighting for and dying for. Hidalgo and Juarez were men of the same stamp as 
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Washington and Jefferson."   Ávila Camacho then replied, "Washington, Jefferson and 
Lincoln are present in the current decisions of your country. And, among your other 
claims to fame, your Excellency undoubtedly possesses that of having inflexibly fought 
to apply to the relations between the countries of this hemisphere the teachings of the 
same liberators."331 The historic meeting also produced the Mexican-American 
Commission for Economic Cooperation. This agency formalized the economic 
partnership, which FDR described as “interdependence.”   
 For the record, the statements were successful in their purpose.  For one, the 
Sleepy Lagoon Defense Citizen’s Committee fully embraced the fabricated history, by 
believing that “On April 20th, 1943 FDR voiced the faith which enables men of all races, 
creeds and colors to join together in the fight against the common enemy, everywhere 
in the world.”332  Conveniently forgetting about specific major aspects of United States 
and Latin American history was convenient for both sides at this particular moment. 
 Mexico’s two-track diplomacy was again evident days a mere few days after the 
Roosevelt-Camacho meeting.  Mexican Consul Luis L. Duplán issued a scathing report 
of discrimination in Texas, stating that is was a major obstacle to wartime cooperation.  
The report was widely distributed, with copies going to the State Department, LULAC, 
the OCIAA, and the Texan government.333 
 Even Texas would receive some reciprocal goodwill by the end of the war.  While 
not as clear cut as the Mexican response to the Sleepy Lagoon or Zoot Suit Riots, there 
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was cultural goodwill initiated from the Mexican side of the border as well.  The most 
entertaining episode occurred in 1946 when Governor Coke Stevenson was planning 
another trip to Mexico, this time without the hand-holding of the OCIAA and the State 
Department.  Unfortunately, his brother grew gravely ill and he was forced to cancel the 
trip on fairly short notice.  Rather than take the cancellation as a snub, the Mexican 
governors of the states he was slated to visit expressed their concern respectively and 
seemed to sympathize with the Governor.  Dr. José Ibarra González, representing 
Mexico’s University presence in Rosita, Coahuila, decided to give the governor arguably 
one of the most interesting diplomatic gifts in all of history: a live black bear.  After 
showing his appreciation, the governor accepted the odd gift feeling pressure that 
refusing it would cause further damage with his southern neighbors.  Once in 
possession of “Chita,” the governor’s dilemma of what to do with the young beast 
became somewhat public knowledge around the state. The cub was only eleven months 
old and had previously lived in Ibarra González’s home “eating milk, fruits, and hard 
sweet rolls.”334  Ultimately, Baylor University learned about the bear and the Baylor 
Chamber of Commerce Volunteers—who care for the bears—petitioned the governor to 
give it to them as a gift.  On September 18, 1946 “Chita” made her way to Waco where 
she would live out her life being protected by Baylor students against Texas A&M 
pranksters prior to any “Battle of the Brazos.” 
 Ultimately, Mexico’s combining of industrialization with patriotism, racial equality, 
and revolutionary ideas was successful; however, it was also a short lived success.  By 
1945, wartime policies had birthed a new class of industrialists in Mexico.  They were 
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productive, but still far behind their northern neighbors in terms of a presence on the 
global market.  As the war drew to a close, the industrialists who were so closely 
associated with Ávila Camacho feared for their existence if forced to compete with U.S. 
companies come peacetime.  
 The window of opportunity in the U.S. that birthed ethnic diplomacy and an 
overall more sympathetic view towards Mexico’s role in hemispherical cooperation had 
closed.  For one, the champions of these policies were no longer in power. Sumner 
Welles forcibly resigned in September of 1943, Cordell Hull was out of office due to 
illness by November of 1944, and FDR died in April of 1945.  Hull’s most trusted Latin 
American specialist, Laurence Duggan—who was later found to be a Soviet spy, was 
also out of office in 1944.  Their replacements would instead emphasize trade, 
specifically free-market capitalism with no tariff barriers, which directly conflicted with 
Ávila Camacho’s Hemispherical Cooperation argument for Mexico.   
  Ávila Camacho saw this diversion of interests coming as early as 1942.  A series 
of conferences between government officials from the Ministry of National Economy and 
the School of National Economy at the Universidad Autónoma de Mexico began to 
discuss potential problems Mexico would face upon the end of the war.  After the 
conferences, Ávila Camacho appointed a commission to study the matter, known as the 
Comisión Nacional de Planación.  The Commission became active in propaganda 
targeted towards the upper classes and the new industrialists, reinforcing the concept 
that Mexico would protect and support the new businesses.  At the 1945 Inter-American 
Conference of Problems of War and Peace held at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City 
the diverging economic interests of the two countries officially clashed for the first time. 
225 
 
The U.S. representatives proposed resolutions to the charter which eliminated trade 
barriers across the hemisphere and discouraged any new industrial growth which would 
require protectionist policies.  On all other sides of the negotiating table, Latin 
Americans asked for more economic aid, defended state run corporations, and 
defended their protectionist measures.  Despite this major division, the pressure to 
create an agreement and the success of World War II ensured the “Act of Chapultepec” 
would pass, ultimately needing nebulous language for its economic policy to appease 
the majority.  The agreement essentially only agreed to continue supporting the 
principle of hemispherical solidarity and reciprocal assistance in the face of 
aggressors—which is not all that different from where the hemisphere began prior to the 
fascist aggression. 
After Chapultepec, the U.S. aimed to eliminate nationalist economic policies.  
The new Undersecretary of State for Latin America, Spruille Braden, argued that “The 
exaggerated nationalism, now so prevalent everywhere” needed to be “completely 
extirpated.”335  Braden became fixated on the cause, particularly after Braden lost in his 
efforts to prevent Juan Perón from coming to power while he was serving as the U.S. 
Ambassador to Argentina in Buenos Aires.  After the famed UN conference in San 
Francisco, the U.S. cancelled most of its guaranteed contracts for minerals and other 
strategic materials with Latin American countries.  Despite this, most Latin American 
economies continued to boom until 1947, using their newly filled reserves to import 
products from the United States.  When the reserves ran dry, the economy quickly 
stalled and most of Latin America, Mexico included, was forced to devalue their 
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currency.  The purveyors of ethnic diplomacy, now out of power, gave advice from the 
sidelines.  Sumner Welles argued that the U.S. should try to perfect “the existing inter-
American system.  The United States had to continue wholeheartedly its policy of 
economic cooperation with its American neighbors.  Such bread cast upon the waters 
come back to this country a hundredfold.”  In a second book published in 1946, Welles 
continued his argument, predicting that “unless economic aid was reinstated, Latin 
America would experience more social and economic trouble and potentially turn to 
communism.”336  Laurence Duggan was even more critical, openly criticizing the abrupt 
end to the wartime trade contracts and the failure to assist Latin America’s transition to 
a peacetime economy.  He stated that the United States should adopt, “an 
understanding and tolerant attitude toward tariff protection in Latin America.”337 
 As the economic values between the two countries broke apart, so did ethnic 
diplomacy. A new priority for all U.S. foreign affairs was looming in the form of the 
Soviet threat, which would prove to be a much less amiable bear than “Chita.”  Just as 
the reality of 1942 reordered the diplomatic world in the Western Hemisphere for a time, 
so did the start of the Cold War.  Mexico no longer had as strong of a diplomatic 
presence to influence the United States as it had during the war and the United States 
Department of State became more preoccupied with leftists in Latin America—whom 
ironically as seen with CTM’s support of ethnic diplomacy were groups often at the 
forefront of their solidarity campaign. 
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The complaints about racial prejudice from Mexico slowed and the State 
Department policy went back to pre-war levels of no response or passing full 
responsibility back to the governor.  There were two noticeable differences however.  
Firstly, thanks to the wealth of scholarship on Chicano and Mexican-American activism 
in the United States, a lot of work has been done revealing the extreme growth of 
activist organizations during the war years. LULAC had only around a dozen active 
members initially and the Good Neighbor Commission initially only met occasionally 
with no real budget.  In the post-war years LULAC increased membership exponentially 
and heavily increased its geographic footprint while the Good Neighbor Commission of 
Texas became well-funded, well organized, and met on a regular schedule.338    
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 Winston Churchill, one of the most famous historical figures of World War II, is 
also one of the most highly quoted people from the 20th century.  The inexorable orator 
discussed a variety of topics, but he held a special place for the subject of history as he 
regularly quipped about the usefulness of it.  Cambridge Churchill historian, J.H. Plumb, 
wrote, “It (history) became part of his politics, his diplomacy, his strategy and his tactics. 
I think it is extremely difficult for anyone not born into Churchill’s world or time to realize 
what a dominance the past had over all his thinking and action.”  The most famous 
representation of this mentality was Churchill’s comment to U.S. Presidential 
speechwriter James Humes, where Churchill advised, “Study history. Study history. In 
history lies all the secrets of statecraft.”  He later famously echoed this belief in another 
oft quoted line, “A good knowledge of history is a quiver of arrows in debates.”339  While 
many people, including Churchill, would agree that learning history simply for the sake 
of learning is a valuable way to spend ones time, I believe Churchill would also agree in 
asking the follow up question that I not-so-eloquently term as “so what?”  In this case of 
this project, ethnic diplomacy is an intriguing concept, but “so what?”  In other words, 
what deeper knowledge or information beyond the story itself is achieved from 
understanding Ethnic Diplomacy?  I believe there are several significant broader points 
to be taken from the research represented here; specifically, the importance of Latin 
America during World War II, a more thorough understanding of U.S.-Mexican relations, 
the benefits of a hemispherical or borderless history, how Southwest borderlands 
history can fit in with wartime diplomacy, the difference between racial constructs in the 
U.S. and Mexico, the potential for state governments playing a role in the creation of 
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foreign policy, and motivation as a new methodology example  for categorizing 
diplomatic behavior. 
 First, Ethnic Diplomacy helps change the perspective on Latin America during 
World War II.  The typical narrative of World War II does not include anything from Latin 
America, except perhaps for conspiracy theorists who believe Hitler escaped to 
Argentina with other former Nazis.  Even historians of the era normally only 
acknowledge the combatants: the 201st Fighter Squadron from Mexico and the Brazilian 
Expeditionary Force.  From Lend-Lease and troop deployment statistics we saw that the 
United States valued their Latin American neighbors with a significant amount of U.S. 
dollars.  In addition, the U.S. did not hide the fact that they intended to maximize Latin 
American exports in their wartime production.  Moreover, Ethnic Diplomacy reveals that 
not only was U.S.-Mexican relations important; U.S.-Latin American relations were as 
well. 
Ethnic Diplomacy represented a drastic change to the history of U.S.-Mexico 
relations and an enhancement of our understanding of FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy.  
The simple fact is that U.S.-Mexican relations had a rough history from Mexican 
Independence up through World War II.  A short list includes the support of Texan 
independence, the annexation of Texas, the War of North American Aggression (known 
as the Mexican American War in the United States) with subsequent taking of 1/3 of 
Mexico’s total land, the neocolonial economic exploitation which occurred during the 
Porfiriato, the tension surrounding the Mexican Revolution which included two separate 
invasions by U.S. troops into Mexico, and the raid into New Mexico by Pancho Villa’s 
men (or potentially Pancho Villa and his men).  Even in the 1930s under the Good 
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Neighbor Policy relations were stressed.  While FDR promised non-intervention, other 
issues plagued the two neighbors.  A mass deportation, with scholars estimating up to 2 
million Mexican-Americans (including many born in the United States) back to Mexico 
increased border tensions during the Great Depression and neocolonial economic 
interests conflicted with the ardent nationalism of President Lázaro Cárdenas (such as 
the previously discussed Oil Crisis).  Ethnic diplomacy in the name of hemispherical 
solidary is a significant change from this troubled history.  The simple fact was that 
Mexico’s increased importance due to raw materials, laborers (legal braceros and 
illegals), regional influence, and security created a unique situation where Mexico was 
influencing the United States, rather than the other way around.  In essence, the United 
States truly had to be good neighbors with Mexico for the time in their history. 
Ethnic Diplomacy is also a step towards bridging the gap between two regional 
histories limited by nationality: United States history and Mexican history.  Even though 
these two countries share an almost two-thousand mile long border and have countless 
links across the spectrum of politics, economics, social structures, and culture; the two 
nations are typically only discussed within each other’s narratives if there is violence or 
major unrest between them.  World War II is not one of these exceptions.  The history of 
the United States during WWII and the economic development of Mexico during the 
1940s are almost exclusively discussed in their own separate historical circles.  I believe 
these two separate historiographies share common ground.  It is unfair to think that the 
famed United States mobilization happened in a vacuum while concurrently Mexico, 
Brazil, and much of the rest of Latin America developed their strategic material 
industries at an incredibly fast rate.  The ethnic diplomacy relationship between Mexico 
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and the United States is one lens into studying this economic relationship, undoubtedly 
there are others such as Gerard Colby’s investigative study of the U.S. exploitation of 
the Amazon rainforest for products like rubber. Much of the evidence discussed in this 
project contributes to making Ethnic Diplomacy an international or hemispherical 
history.  World War II, more than anything in U.S. history before it, engaged the United 
States into the globalized world.  After the war the U.S. became central to the 
metaphorically shrinking world around them with Cold War weaponry and advances in 
transportation, information, and communication over the next few decades.  However, 
as Ethnic Diplomacy proves, even before the Cold War the success of the United States 
hinged on their relationships from one side of the globe to other.  The world would never 
be unconnected again, or perhaps never truly was despite U.S. isolationist’s best 
arguments.  Personally, I believe more work needs to be done in this area to create a 
more united hemispherical understanding of “the war at home.” 
 Ethnic Diplomacy also contributes to the history of Southwest borderlands in the 
World War II era.  The vast majority of incidents of racial prejudice occurred in what 
historians have termed the “outer borderlands” both before ethnic diplomacy was 
created and during the policies lifetime.340  The “outer borderlands” is a social definition 
of the region (since it is hard to define the borderlands with real boundaries) which is 
defined by “feeling the impact of the border,” in this case the extent of racial prejudice 
was felt all the way to Los Angeles and in every border state.  The reality is that racial 
prejudice did not suddenly pop up in the 1930s nor was it subsequently eliminated in the 
1940s via the different forms of diplomacy.  However, the area of the Southwest United 
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States that caused turmoil during this era of ethnic diplomacy did go through some 
major changes in the 1920s and 30s.  Mexican-American immigration swelled incredibly 
with the pushing factor of the instability of the Mexican Revolution and from the pull of 
economic opportunity due to the rise of commercial agriculture in California.  Racial 
prejudice was evident prior to the increase of immigrants, but with tens of thousands 
more Mexican-Americans coming into the country, the prevalence and disdain for the 
immigrant population became more pronounced.  One relatively well documented 
incident occurred as early as 1917 in Bisbee, Arizona.  Approximately 90% of the 
copper-mining workers were a part of a labor strike hoping to win an increase in pay, 
better safety standards, and the end of blacklisting union members.  The labor force had 
a significant number of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans.  Eventually the local law 
enforcement in Bisbee supported by a posse of about two thousand (mainly whites) 
broke the strike by putting the workers into box cars and shipping them off to the middle 
of the New Mexican desert where they were dumped and abandoned.  What became 
known as the “Bisbee Deportation” was just one of many racial injustices to occur in this 
early period.  When the Sheriff of Bisbee was interviewed by the Congressional 
Committee on Foreign Relations, the Sheriff’s actions were ultimately supported and the 
racial nature of the crime justified out of fear of a Mexican conspiracy known as the Plan 
of San Diego to take back the California territory. 
 In the 1930s, the backlash against Mexican sojourners and Mexican-Americans 
was even more pronounced, highlighted by the aforementioned mass deportation or 
“Repatriation” that sent approximately 2 million people to Mexico.  It is estimated that 
1.2 million of these forced migrants were American citizens at the time, including some 
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with Californio ancestry.341  Nativism and anti-foreigner thought aided this process, 
ultimately deporting somewhere between half a million and a million people to Mexico.  
Hate crimes based on skin color were not uncommon and the travel journals and 
periodicals of the time period have some obvious racist viewpoints.  Looking at any 
scholarly book concerning the rights of Mexican-Americans in this time period tells this 
tale in much greater detail than Ethnic Diplomacy does.342  Most notably, this particular 
deportation event is covered in great detail in Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation 
in the 1930s.343 
 The Southwest borderlands in the decades leading up to the 1940s were largely 
an unregulated place in terms of racial equality.  While the situation only resembled 
what borderlands theorists call an “unruly borderland” during the instability caused by 
the Mexican Revolution, as I explained above the racial tension was present throughout.  
As was the case with Brisbee, the U.S. government deferred to regional elites in nearly 
all cases of claims of racial prejudice.  This lack of a national presence resulted in 
increasingly segregated communities.  Ethnic Diplomacy represents a change to this 
dynamic, which continuing with borderlands history theory, aimed to produce a “quiet 
borderland.”  Given the increased importance of Latin America, racial unrest in 
borderlands regions had potentially much larger implications even beyond the “outer 
borderland.”  The purveyors of ethnic diplomacy, nearly all of whom were wealthy and 
powerful (whether they were Mexican Consuls, U.S. government officials, or even 
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members of LULAC), pursued a peaceful borderland region with minimal tension—
meaning a truly quiet borderland with minimal apprehension on both sides of the racial 
prejudice issue.  This helps explain why major civil rights legislation was just as 
threatening as race riots.  A secure southern border was part of the larger wartime 
planning, and any major civil rights legislation—as evidenced by the Texan Caucasian 
Rights Bill—threatened the borderlands stability in a similar fashion as racially motivated 
violence.  Perhaps the best example if this is when the FEPC tried to hold a large-scale 
public hearing to address racial discrimination in September of 1942, the State 
Department immediately stepped in and stopped it.344 
Ethnic Diplomacy borrows from, yet also contributes to the sociological 
understanding of how the racial constructs in the United States and Mexico differ and in 
this case clash.  The Mexican elites were particularly bothered by the realization that in 
the United States they were simply another “Latin American” or “Mexican.”  While in 
Mexico their skin color would be considered within the context of what percentage of 
African, Native American, and/or European a person was; once they entered the United 
States, Mexicans of all social classes experienced segregation as African-American’s 
did in the South.  This conflict is one of the reasons the Mexican leadership pushing the 
United States for action on racial equality; however, the general population of Mexico 
also felt very strongly that the United States needed racial reform.  As evidenced by 
Mexico’s response to the Zoot Suit Riots, there was a disconnect between the Mexican 
Leadership and the urban Mexican population.  The Institutional Revolutionary Party 
leadership mirrored the U.S. government at the time.  Both were only willing to push for 
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racial equality as long as it did not jeopardize the wartime economy or security, whereas 
the Mexican population—as in the United States—had segments that wanted racial 
equality for the sake of racial equality. 
Another “so what” element from Ethnic Diplomacy is the State Department’s 
involvement in race relations.  I am not the first historian to address this issue; most 
notably Mary Dudziak argues in Cold War Civil Rights that international pressure was 
essential to the United States addressing its own racial inequalities.  She argues that 
foreign nations became a strategic factor for African-American activist organizations 
such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People as early as 
World War II.345  These foreign nations became a major concern for State Department 
officials in the 1950s and 60s and highly impacted Civil Rights legislation.346  Ethnic 
Diplomacy provides and even earlier precedent for the United States government’s 
attempts to stop racial prejudice with a goal towards improving U.S.-relations with 
developing nations.  In addition it adds credence to the idea that there seemingly has to 
be another reason, besides racism itself, for the government to get involved in ending 
racial prejudice.  It also reveals the potential power foreign nations can have on U.S. 
domestic life and in turn also the power the State Department, especially when 
supported by a president, can have on domestic affairs. 
Ethnic Diplomacy also reveals how individual states can play a role in the 
creation of foreign policy.  From the analysis of the leadership from both Texas and 
California, we see how governors forged their own relationship with Mexico.  I believe 
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there are two broader truths that this ethnic diplomacy case study brings to light.  First, 
a governor’s role in foreign policy is dependent on reciprocation, whether good or bad, 
from the neighboring nation.  A governor can try to forge his or her own path with a 
neighboring nation, but unless said nation recognizes the relationship and reciprocates 
(such as the bracero ban against Texas), the federal government will remain the 
purveyor of foreign policy while the states may still exist as an unequal partner (such as 
in California).  Secondly, the Governor’s power to impact foreign policy is still framed by 
the national government’s policies.  Mexico measured Texas and California not only by 
their own records on race relations, but also on their adherence to the State 
Department’s push towards diplomacy that attempted to improve race relations. 
Furthermore, Ethnic Diplomacy contributes an innovative way of categorizing 
diplomacy.  Most historians of U.S. Foreign Relations tend to talk about diplomacy using 
descriptive terms such as “traditional,” “cultural,” “public,” or “secret.”  While these all 
help explain the type of diplomacy being used, that is where the term’s usefulness 
stops.  I believe these are extremely useful terms and in fact make use of them here 
often.  However, building on the shoulders of those innovative scholars who defined 
different categories of diplomacy, I believe an additional description can be added, one 
that explains the why behind the action rather than the how.  The terminology of ethnic 
diplomacy provides simply another option to delineate the history of international 
relations, which allows for an emphasis on the why.  In the case of what this paper 
covers, it would be appropriate to label much of it cultural, traditional, or even 
“backdoor” diplomacy.  However, in this case where racial prejudice in foreign policy is 
the determining factor for inclusion, I believe the purpose behind the diplomacy is more 
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notable than the technique; therefore, Ethnic Diplomacy makes more sense in its 
categorization. 
The mixing of racial prejudices with diplomacy also serves as an example of 
breaking down the barriers between social history and the history of foreign affairs.  All 
too often as historians we entrench ourselves into categorical schools of study such as 
“political historian” or “social historian.”  While these, and the many others, are noble 
pursuits in their own rights, histories such as Ethnic Diplomacy could otherwise remain 
lost without a marriage between these fields of study. 
Ethnic Diplomacy also supplies an answer to the “so what” question in terms of 
power within diplomacy.  In what is a unique episode in the long history of U.S.-Mexican 
relations, Mexico exerted agency in its relationship with the United States during World 
War II.  The history of the relations between these two nations is filled with examples of 
the United States exerting its power over Mexico; therefore, the application of ethnic 
diplomacy by the U.S. government is a unique example of a diplomatic countercurrent.  
Ethnic Diplomacy contributes to our understanding of the broader U.S.-Mexican 
relationship and shows how power can be exerted in non-traditional ways. 
Ethnic Diplomacy is an excellent example of how the “so what” question can be 
applied to history.  As outlined above, Ethnic Diplomacy has a number of secondary 
purposes beyond just providing an interesting historical case study.  So, while I believe 
Winston Churchill was correct by identifying the value of studying history, I think more 
sound advice would come from an amended quotation: “Study history, learn from 
history, and when you write history think about why it matters.” 
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Appendix 1: Letter to Ezequiel Padilla from Coke R. Stevenson 
          Austin, Tex., 
          July 12, 1943 
His Excellency          
 Señor licenciado Ezequel Padilla,     
 Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 México, D.F. 
 Mexico 
 
 Excellency: 
 
It has recently come to my attention that the Mexican Government has 
contemplated that in view of discrimination which may exist against Mexicans resident 
in this State, Mexican laborers who are being sent elsewhere in the United States under 
existing agreements between the Mexican and United States Governments will not be 
sent to Texas.  I have full regard for any decision which may be taken by the Republic of 
Mexico, and the reason for this letter is not to presume in any way, but to lay before 
Your Excellency certain factors of which I, as Governor of this State, am aware and 
which I believe will show that every effort is being made to wipe out such discrimination 
as may exist and to assure to Mexicans resident in Texas that they are not only a 
welcome part of the population of the State but are entitled to full protection under its 
laws. I likewise desire to stress the urgent need for Mexican farm workers in certain 
regions of the State where farmers are faced with crop losses due to the lack of 
manpower in the fields.  While I am mentioning below certain specific areas where this 
need is most urgent, I am likewise advising the growers in those regions to avail 
themselves of the procedure set up under the Farm Security Administration for certifying 
to the need and obtaining the required authorization of the competent authorities in 
Washington in order that the Mexican Government may be apprised of this need 
through the usual channels specified in the Agreement of August 1942 as amended in 
April of this year. 
In the two counties, cotton growing areas, of Nueces and San Patricio, farmers 
are looking forward this year to the largest crop in recent years. It is expected that this 
crop will have a value of some twenty million dollars.  The efforts of growers, however, 
to secure adequate farm labor to pick the crop are unavailable due to the manpower 
which has been drained from this State into the armed forces of our country.  I am 
advised that there is an immediate need for some 17,000 workers in this area alone; at 
present only 3,500 are available. 
Any decision of Your Excellency’s Government to prohibit the moving of Mexican 
laborers under these Agreements into the State of Texas would cause me deep 
distress, because the Government in my charge is now making a sincere effort to wipe 
out discrimination in cases where it has arisen and to make Mexicans resident in Texas 
feel that they are self-respecting and loyal members of the Communities in which they 
reside.  Moreover, I am today issuing instructions to all law enforcing agencies of the 
Government of the State of Texas to be especially vigilant in order to prevent 
discriminations against Mexicans and where incidents arise to be especially severe 
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winder the laws of this State in order that those who may commit infractions will not 
again violate our Good Neighbor Policy. 
In this connection, I am pleased to advise Your Excellency that not only my 
Office but all branches of the State and Municipal governments in Texas are on the alert 
to ameliorate any misunderstandings that may arise or may have arisen through so-
called class or race distinction. I am glad to say that Federal and State officials have 
already successfully ironed out a number of such instances, which after all Your 
Excellency must admit have been but a few in comparison to the many thousands of 
Mexican citizens, or U.S. citizens of Mexican descent who reside happily in this State.  I 
may point out the number of cases which your Embassy filed with the State Department 
and which subsequently came to my attention have been amicably settled, or are in 
process of settlement. (I can assure Your Excellency that my administration is heartily in 
sympathy with the Good Neighbor policy). 
I should like also to call to your attention the work being done by the Office of 
Inter-American Relations of The University of Texas as well as that of the Inter-
American Cooperation Committee of the Texas Junior Chamber of Commerce.  The 
schools of the State of Texas, moreover, are giving special attention to the problems of 
education which affect the Spanish speaking population of Texas.  This summer, at Our 
Lady of the Lake College in San Antonio, and at the Southwest Texas State Teachers of 
San Marcos, large groups of teachers have assembled to study the specific problems of 
education in communities with Spanish speaking residents. 
No citizen in the state of Texas is without his Mexican friends, for in some 
communities they form a majority of the residents.  I have often been impressed by the 
high integrity, the initiative and public spirit displayed by persons in this State whose 
origin was in your own country.  In a sense, I feel that Texas must be the proving 
ground for one of the principal aims of the Good Neighbor policy, a policy to which the 
Government and the people of Texas subscribe to wholeheartedly and in all sincerity. 
Here in the City of Austin, capital of this State, there are officials of the State 
Government who have instructions to bring to my personal attention cases involving 
discrimination which may arise and, therefore, I would respectfully suggests that Your 
Excellency issue instructions to the Mexican Consuls throughout this State to bring to 
my attention informally such cases as may come to their knowledge to that directions 
can be given to resolve them. 
Finally, in order to insure the success of our Good Neighbor policy as set forth in 
the House of Representatives Concurrent Resolution No. 105, I have today officially 
taken the following measures: 
1. I have issued a proclamation by press and radio to all citizens of the 
State of Texas asking their complete cooperation in the observance of 
the Good Neighbor policy, and calling on them to stamp our wherever 
possible any unjust discrimination due to racial prejudice or class 
distinction. 
2. I am considering the advisability of appointing a Commission to receive 
complaints, investigate and adjust all instances of discrimination 
violating the Good Neighbor policy, and generally to promote better 
relations, good will and friendship between the citizens of Mexico and 
Texas. 
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3. I have always ordered all the State policy and the Ranger force to be 
on the alert against instances of discrimination and to warn citizens of 
the State that such discriminations against persons of Latin American 
extraction are in violation of the Good Neighbor policy as stated in 
House Concurrent Resolution No. 105, and though not punishable by 
criminal prosecution may be subject to civil action in the courts. 
 
Although what I have said above applies largely to Mexican permanently residing 
in this State, I feel that I need not assure Your Excellency that all possible measures of 
protection will be extended to those Mexican workers whom the Mexican Government 
will permit to work in this State.  In addition to the (sic) guarantees furnished by the 
Agreement between our respective Federal Governments, I can assure you that they 
will be performing a valuable service to the war effort and it is our high resolve that such 
service shall not go unrewarded. 
In am forwarding this letter to our Ambassador in Mexico City with the request 
that he places it in Your Excellency’s hands.  I desire further to assure Your Excellency 
that the people of this State will await with the highest interest the decision of the 
Mexican Government which I hope will permit Mexican workers to come to Texas in 
order to work on our farms, where they are so desperately needed.  
I ask you to accept, Mr. Minister, an expression of my high esteem and sincere 
regard. 
 
Sincerely Yours,  
  
 Coke Stevenson 
 Governor of Texas 
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Appendix 2: Response to Governor Stevenson from Dr. Padilla 
 
        Mexico City, July 20, 1943. 
Hon. Coke R. Stevenson, 
Governor of the State of Texas, 
Austin, Texas, U.S.A. 
 
Mr. Governor, 
 
Sir: 
 
From the letter which you have been good enough to address to me, I have 
noted with deeply sympathetic interest your views in regard to the eliminating, in Texas, 
every kind of discrimination against Mexican residents, as being opposed to the noble 
spirit of the times through which our democracies are now living, and to the guiding 
principles of the fight being waged to destroy Nazi and Fascist tyranny. 
I have very carefully noted what you have to say in your letter, and how greatly 
you would regret any decision on the part of my Government, adverse to sending 
Mexican workers to assist farming labors in the State of Texas.  Before going any 
further, I must assure you that such a decision would be no less painful to me, for I feel 
that the present hour demands the closest collaboration between our two peoples.  This 
all the more as both Mexico and the United States have given eloquent and repeated 
proofs that they are building up a new structure of reciprocal understanding founded on 
solid and enduring friendship. 
However, and within the spirit of the above facts and circumstances, I feel that I 
must draw your attention to a situation actually prevailing in the State of Texas. 
There are many places in your State where Mexican residents cannot attend 
shows or places of decent amusement without exposing themselves to annoyance, 
criticism and protest.  There are towns where my countrymen are forced to dwell in 
certain sections.  Not even the families of our official representatives are safe from such 
persecution, or from unwarrantable molestation.  Hardly a week ago, in the heart of an 
important city of the State of Texas, in a public establishment, they refused to serve the 
daughter of our Consul, just because they heard her speaking to another Mexican 
young lady she was with.  Incidents like this occur daily, and if the newspapers gave 
special prominence to the one I mention, it was not so much because of its rarity as on 
account of the position of the person involved. 
While Consuls report to the authorities, newspapers and dwellers on the Texas 
border father and transmit information directly reaching the whole people of the 
Republic of Mexico.  Such reports have aroused a feeling of righteous indignation 
because of the discrimination shown against our nationals, based not only on racial 
differences, but in many cases on the mere fact of their Mexican nationality. 
I have carefully considered the measures and safeguards which you have, 
impelled by a praiseworthy desire to remedy these anomalous conditions, seen fit to 
suggest with a view to counteracting, in the minds of the Mexican people, the animosity 
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shown by certain sections in Texas against nationals of this country.  I feel absolutely 
convinced of the sincerity with which you regret, just as I do, these unfortunate 
incidents, which are all the more painful because they occur at a time when racial 
discrimination is branded as one of the very abused which the United Nations are 
fighting to abolish. 
Mexico and the United States are laying the soundest foundations, in all their 
history, of an indissoluble friendship within their common interests of freedom and 
solidarity.  To this end they are using the sincerest arguments of Pan Americanism, so 
vital to the defense of our Continent.  The conduct of our peoples is an example and 
pattern from which shall flow the confidence of the other nations of this Hemisphere.  It 
consequently becomes essential that the unfair humilliations (sic) inflicted on Mexicans 
by regressive prejudices leading to discrimination, disappear utterly in short order.  The 
contrast with the courtesies and affection extended by the Mexican people to Americans 
dwelling in our midst or visiting us, is obvious if compared with the treatment meted out 
to my countrymen in certain sections of Texas.  As a matter of fact, we are approaching 
a subject which may mean to the Americas one of their loftiest gains in behalf of 
brotherhood and unity.  This excuses and authorizes us to discuss this transcendent 
topic with respectful frankness. 
The foregoing considerations deeply disquiet my mind.  The problem is a thorny 
one, and I am encouraged, when facing it, by the cordial tone of your letter which 
evidences the disinterested spirit in which it was written. 
What remedies are available for solving this conflict?  They are laws, wholesome 
propaganda and penalties. If these means of redres (sic) could be put into operation at 
once, with the necessary publicity to quieten (sic) minds burning with resentment, this 
would help to do away with a crying evil, one most seriously threatening to could an 
atmosphere which would, but for this, be brighter than ever before: that of the relations 
between our two people. 
On such an understanding, I am sure that the Mexican Government would be 
delighted to make the cooperation of our workers available to the fields of the State of 
Texas.  They would then go there just as enthusiastically as they now do to other States 
of the American Union, where they are not exposed to that discrimination to which our 
nationals are unfortunately subject in sections where racial animosity is perhaps 
fostered and aggravated by a fifth columnism which it might be advisable to trace and 
locate. 
Believe me when I say, Mr. Governor, that any efforts on your part in behalf of 
the reciprocally patriotic aim of rooting in the mind of the people of Texas the conviction 
that racial hostility against Mexicans is notoriously unfair, and any measures taken to 
punish breaches of that principle of human equality which is the basis of our collective 
action in this international conflict, would not only result in genuine cordiality between 
our two peoples, but would also render eminent service to Pan Americanism of which 
both the United States and Mexico are sincere and ardent champions. 
I feel sure that you will construe this letter, not only with that loftiness of aim 
evidenced by your generosity and attainments, but also with constructive intent, which I 
warmly share, and I have the honor to renew to you, Mr. Governor, the assurances of m 
distinguished consideration. 
        Ezequiel PADILLA 
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Appendix 3: PROCLAMATION OF MEXICAN FRIENDSHIP DAY 
 
 Our Nation is at war against powerful and ruthless enemy nations and peoples.  
At our side in this great struggle stand the government and the people of our good 
neighbor republic, the United States of Mexico. 
 The Mexican Government and people are bound together by their devotion to the 
same ideals of freedom and democracy that we of this country hold dear.  Therefore, 
their share of the burden of the war will be carried and their share of responsibility for 
winning the war will be discharged with enthusiasm, energy, fidelity and determination 
equal to our own, and leading, moreover, to like peacetime goals. 
 Mexico and California have a common boundary.  Hundreds of thousands of 
Mexican citizens reside in California. Thousands of Californians reside in Mexico.  The 
very cultures and histories of the two states have much in common, even unto their 
origins.  Commercially, we are very largely dependent upon each other. 
 Therefore, the friendship that exists between the people and the governments of 
the two states, Mexico and California, is strong because it is natural, and real because it 
is mutual.  Moreover, it is of the greatest possible importance to us all, now that our 
people are “brothers in arms.” 
 September sixteenth, being Mexico’s national Independence Day, offers us a 
special and timely opportunity to evidence and celebrate our friendship for Mexico. 
 Now, therefore, I, Culbert L. Olson, Governor of California, do hereby designate 
Wednesday, September sixteenth, 1942, for general observance as Mexican Friendship 
Day in California, and I hereby give public notice that public ceremonies, celebrating 
Mexican independence and honoring the government, the people and the President of 
Mexico, will be held and conducted in front of the State Building in Los Angeles on 
Wednesday, September sixteenth, 1942, at 10:30 o’clock in the morning.  
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Great 
Seal of California to be affixed this 29th day of August, A.D. one thousand nine hundred 
forty-two. 
 
          CULBERT OLSON 
[seal]          Governor of 
California 
 
PAUL PEEK 
Secretary of State 
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Appendix 4:  
MEXICAN INDEPENDENCE AND NEW WORLD IDEALS 
“THREE MORE FREEDOMS” 
By HENRY A. WALLACE, Vice-President of the United States 
Approximate English translation of address delivered in Spanish on the occasion of the 
celebration of Mexico's Independence Day at Los Angeles, Cal., September 16, 1942 
TODAY we are gathered here in California to celebrate the anniversary of the 
independence of our neighbor country, Mexico. One hundred thirty-two years ago, this 
day, in the little church at Dolores—70 miles north of Mexico City—Father Hidalgo with 
his famous Grito de Dolores raised the cry of liberty which has been Mexico's undying 
birthright. The people responded to this cry in the most spontaneous and overwhelming 
mass movement which has yet been seen in any country in this hemisphere. Without 
arms to fight and moved only by the burning passion in their souls, the people rose at 
once by the tens of thousands. When Father Hidalgo fell, Father Morelos carried on. 
Father Morelos, who had in his veins white, Negro and Indian blood, won brilliant 
victories and established a constitution which abolished slavery and recognized the 
equality of the races. Thus Father Morelos became the first to give definite political 
recognition to the reality of genetic democracy. 
Such was the dramatic and inspiring birth of the Mexican republic. Today this inspiring 
birth is being commemorated by Mexicans everywhere, and we in the United States are 
proud to honor it with our warmest tribute. 
As we seek to understand Mexican history, and the significance of this anniversary day, 
it is worthwhile to note the part which religion played in the Mexican revolution. Father 
Hidalgo and Father Morelos went beyond the letter of the Bible into the very spirit of its 
transforming power, and in their own way reached out toward God, the Creator and 
Father of all the races. 
Hidalgo and Morelos were killed, but their intense love of liberty forever will inspire the 
Mexican nation. The people whom they led charged against cannon with bare hands. 
They finally won, not because of equipment, but because of their bravery. 
Many years later, in the 1860's, the spirits of Hidalgo and Morelos marched in the 
person of Benito Juarez, the Indian lawyer. Juarez, in his struggle against Maximilian, 
had more experience with fighting European invasion than anyone else in this 
hemisphere has had in the past 100 years. 
Then, beginning in 1910, the spirits of Hidalgo, Morelos and Juarez all marched—
marched with the battle cry of Emiliano Zapata, "Land and liberty!" Confusion reigned. 
Men died fighting passionately for their beliefs, but through all the blood and sorrow the 
vision of land, liberty and schools grew ever clearer. 
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No one should falsely conclude that the Mexican people liked bloodshed, that they 
enjoyed throwing their lives away recklessly. It was not that the Mexicans despised life, 
but rather the exceedingly high esteem they placed on liberty and land and the 
education which they felt to be the basis of liberty. They fought for what they knew deep 
down in their hearts to be the right. 
And now, just as on the Fourth of July we in the United States recall the deeds of 
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln and all of our immortal dead, 
so also in Mexico, on September 16, Hidalgo, Morelos, Juarez and Zapata revivify the 
people's minds and hearts. For them, as for us, the memory of the heroes of the past is 
a torch that lights the pathway of the future. 
We can all be glad to see the increasing cordiality in relations between our two 
countries. On our own holiday, last July 4, Mexico paid tribute to us in a special 
celebration. It is fitting that today we likewise should express most warmly the high 
esteem which we have for our neighbor to the south. This terrible world war, in which 
we both are now engaged on the same side, is not without its compensations in the 
form of a new appreciation for each other. I learned this for myself in December of 1940, 
when, after several conferences with President Avila Camacho, I discovered the wise 
statesmanship which has since been demonstrated to the whole world. 
The Mexican people are showing that whatever misunderstanding may have existed in 
the past is disappearing, and that a solid friendship based on mutual respect and 
understanding is taking its place. Nowhere is this friendship more strikingly 
demonstrated than right here in California, where several hundred thousand persons of 
Mexican ancestry are American citizens. Mexico and California have the same heritage, 
the same ancient tradition. The acquisition of California as territory of the United States 
was a part of the frontier history of both countries. The present offers a unique case, 
here in California, of what might have been a sore spot—an "Irredenta"—but which 
actually has become instead a fusion ground for two cultures. Hitler could never 
understand that. 
Mexico and California have a special kinship at the present time because of the bonds 
of a common peril. Both have an extensive western coast line facing the enemy in the 
Pacific. President Avila Camacho began in December of 1940 to take steps to protect 
Mexico's western coast. California also was forehanded. I have been informed by 
Governor Olson that California worked out a complete job of civil defense earlier than 
any other state in the Union. This state's aircraft warning system, with 1,500 observation 
posts manned by 80,000 volunteer observers maintaining a 24-hour watch, helps to 
protect our shores against invasion by our foes. 
I like to look into the future when our common bonds will be of a more tangible nature 
than at any time in the past, when Californians will find it possible to drive from Nogales 
to Guadalajara and thence to Mexico City and Acapulco. I like to think of ten times as 
many Californians speaking Spanish as are able to do so today. I like to think of them 
enjoying the Mexican music, understanding the words of the Mexican songs when they 
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hear them. I like to think of Californians investing money in Mexico, not on a coyote 
basis, as Mexicans would say, but on a fair and decent basis. 
Dollar diplomacy died ten years ago. Coyote investments also will die, and so will all 
other forms of imperialism, direct or indirect. 
Mexico is of great service in our united war effort by producing to the limit of steel, 
mercury, copper, tungsten, strontium, zinc, lead and all the other metals with which she 
is so richly endowed and which are needed, so badly by the war industries of our own 
country. She is sending us valuable mahogany lumber, a variety of fibers, and many 
vital drugs. As President Avila Camacho has stated, it may be that Mexico's role will not 
be fighting on foreign battlefields, but the operating of industries, farms, mines and 
forests. The demand of our airplane and tank factories for raw materials is insatiable. 
This mutual war effort is giving our two countries an opportunity to cooperate in 
countless ways. Take the matter of the living standards of war workers. The 
governments of both countries are interested in protecting these standards, and so it is 
of great significance that the contracts under which the United States is getting 
materials in Mexico contain labor provisions which comply with the progressive labor 
laws of Mexico. 
Or take the reciprocal arrangements on rubber, Mexico is sending us all she can of 
rubber produced from the shrub, guayule, which will be needed for mixing with the 
synthetic product. Mexico also is giving up 30 per cent of the output of her tire factories 
to supply deficiency areas elsewhere. We in turn are sending Mexico a certain amount 
of tree rubber and are helping in the development of new plantations of rubber trees. 
Or take the measures being carried out jointly by our two governments to conserve and 
develop the resources of Mexico—such as the conservation of her petroleum and the 
survey of her railroad system with a view to adapting it to her industrial needs. 
Or take the cooperative arrangement by which Mexican workers will come into the 
United States to help harvest our crops and do other war work—not on the basis of low-
wage competition as in the past, but with the whole-hearted assistance and protection 
of the two governments. Just as dollar diplomacy has become a thing of the past, so 
also let us hope that the arrangements entered into by our two governments will 
definitely end exploitation of and discrimination against Mexican labor. 
Mexico is doing a splendid job in the construction of a difficult and costly link in the Inter-
American highway. As you all know, the stretch from Laredo to Mexico City is 
completed and doubtless many of you have had the opportunity to travel over this 
beautiful and scenic road. Right now Mexico is working on the uncompleted link in the 
southern part of the country. This, along with one or two other links on which work is 
now in progress, will open up a land route from the United States to Panama, and bind 
more closely together the nine countries of Central and North America. 
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These various instances of cooperation thus far attained are merely an indication of 
what can be worked out between the two countries in the future. I feel that, as time goes 
on, the number of mutually beneficial projects can and should be greatly increased. The 
significant fact is that Mexico is helping the United States and the United States is 
helping Mexico. We are next-door neighbors, and good neighbors, and we have joined 
hands in the great fight of the United Nations to keep the world free. 
The Mexican people have a profound belief in the Four Freedoms as enunciated by 
President Roosevelt—freedom of speech and religion, freedom from want and fear. But 
if I understand their history and feelings correctly, they would add three more 
freedoms—first, the freedom to buy land at a reasonable price; second, the freedom to 
borrow money at a reasonable rate of interest; and third, the freedom to establish 
schools which teach the realities of life. Farmers and workers of Mexico are standing 
shoulder to shoulder with their brothers on our own side of the border. The Mexican 
people know that the Nazis have a hatred and disdain for those who do not have what 
the Nazis choose to call "Aryan" blood. The Mexican people know that the 
establishment of Nazism anywhere in this hemisphere would mean the eventual 
destruction of all the seven freedoms in which they so passionately believe. 
A Nazi or a Jap victory would spell the death of liberty everywhere in the Western 
Hemisphere. And something else would die—an intangible something which has been 
taking shape gradually over the years, as the peoples of the New World have been 
groping for a special destiny all their own. 
About three weeks from now, on October 12, the people of Mexico, like the other 
Spanish-speaking peoples of the Western Hemisphere, will celebrate what they call "the 
day of the race," meaning the Spanish-speaking race. We in the North call it "Columbus 
Day." I hope the time will come when we shall refer to it as "New World Day," and shall 
make it stand for liberty and true democracy throughout the hemisphere. Mexico and 
the United States have each in their own way made a special contribution towards 
bringing liberty to all the peoples of the world. We are fighting in this war for the privilege 
of rendering that contribution really significant and secure. 
Here in the United States we speak the English language, but our people are 
descendants of those who represented every culture in Europe. South of our border, the 
prevailing language is Spanish, but the people represent not merely the Spanish and 
other Mediterranean cultures but the native Indian as well. In Mexico there is a 
justifiable pride in the great contribution to the national entity made by the Aztec, 
Tarascan and Mayan cultures. Thus there has come into being, here in the New World, 
something which is neither English nor Spanish nor Portuguese, but has an identity of 
its own, an identity that is uniquely American. 
It is to preserve this New World identity, this New World love of liberty, this New World 
love of peace, this New World love of education and the dignity of the common man, 
that Mexico and the United States and other New World countries have joined in the 
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great struggle of the United Nations. We are fighting against the monsters of tyranny 
and savage force, wherever on the earth they must be fought. 
We do not turn our backs on the Old World. We know that freedom cannot be safe in 
the New World unless it is secure in the entire world. We know that our devotion to New 
World ideals and our utter willingness to sacrifice our all in their defense give the 
millions in the Old World the courage to fight on. 
It is because President Avila Camacho and President Roosevelt typify these New World 
ideals that our two nations have placed them in positions of supreme leadership. 
These two great leaders will not be satisfied with anything less than a complete victory. 
President Roosevelt has made it clear in his September speeches that we intend to take 
the offensive, that we shall hit the enemy where it hurts, that we shall wake up the 
people of Japan and Germany to the enormity of the crimes of their leaders. 
And when the victory on the battlefield is won, our New World ideals will be needed all 
the more, as we confront the job of building a wise and enduring peace for the entire 
world. That fight for the right kind of peace will not be won in a day. That fight will go on 
down the years. It will be fought in California and in Texas and in every one of our 48 
states. It will be fought not only in the United States  but in Mexico and in every one of 
our United Nations. It will be fought over the entire world, wherever men and women 
and children live and love and make their homes. It is a fight that never will be 
completely won, but it will always be the fight most worth the winning. This is the fight 
that we in the New World have pledged ourselves to make. We shall not forsake that 
pledge. 
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